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INTRODUCTION
In 2011, when the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan announced that a proposed lay
observer system would be the next judicial reform measure intended to rebuild Taiwanese
society’s trust in the court’s fairness and the professional judges’ credibility, many
questioned why, at this moment, had the Judicial Yuan decided to introduce the lay
observer system as its means of judicial reform; this struck some as an odd choice, since
for pervious attempts to introduce a lay participation system had resulted in failure.

Accordingly, Chapter One will begin with the discussion regarding probable
reasons as to why the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan proposed the lay observer system in order
to realize its goals with regard to the criminal justice system. This chapter will also
examine whether the current Taiwanese criminal justice system needs reform. This will
be done by reviewing the results of the previous reforms in 2002, which include the shift
from an inquisitional to a modified adversarial system and the introduction of the
prosecution review stage.

Those previous reforms resolved few problems and, instead, brought with them to
the Taiwanese criminal justice system a host of new issues to be addressed. This chapter
will categorize five distinct characteristics of the contemporary Taiwanese criminal
justice system: “an elitist educational system,” “a judicial bureaucracy,” “involved and
abstruse judgments,” “complicated roles of professional judges” and “an inefficient
criminal justice system,” which cause the people to continue to distrust the judgments
made by professional judges. In short, this chapter concludes that the Taiwanese criminal
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justice system does indeed need reform measures to improve its trial proceedings and to
make it a more just and fairer system.

Even though reforms are necessary, there are lingering concerns regarding
whether establishing a lay participation system is an efficient (or possible) means of
resolving problems associated with the Taiwanese criminal justice system. These
concerns can be explored and either validated or allayed by exploring the public’s and
legal professionals’ inclinations toward the implementation. Without both citizens’ and
legal professionals’ support, the implementation would be impractical. Accordingly, this
chapter will compare official surveys and research, along with polling results conducted
by either the Judicial Yuan or various academic institutions, in order to affirm that lay
participation- thanks in part to the Taiwanese people’s high approval and the positive
attitudes of legal professionals- could be an efficient method to resolve most of the
current issues in Taiwan.

Moreover, to find a most suitable trial proceedings pattern in which the Taiwanese
citizens may participate, Chapter Two will explore the historical background of general
jury systems and lay participation systems. This chapter will also introduce basic
structures of contemporary trial systems including the jury systems in the United
Kingdom and the United States of America; the lay participation systems in Germany and
France; and also the innovated mixture tribunal patterns, the Japanese Saiban-in System
and the South Korean citizen participation system. These are all system to which the
proposed Taiwanese lay participation trial proceedings structure may refer.
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Chapter Three will introduce and discuss the previous four attempts to introduce a
lay participation system into Taiwanese criminal justice system. The chapter will also
examine the failure associated with each attempt such that it may shine a light on the
reasons behind the failures and explore why each attempt was rejected by the Taiwanese
judicial and administrative systems. This chapter concludes that constitutional issues
played the most crucial role in the failure of each of the previous attempts. Accordingly,
this chapter will research solutions to the constitutional issues in order to ensure the
constitutionality of implementing the proposed lay observer system in Taiwan.

The first constitutional issue has to do with whether the nature of lay participation
conflicts with the Taiwanese Constitution when the law itself “remained in silence.” By
referring to two Japanese judgments and using different means of legal explanation to
examine the concepts under Taiwanese constitutional law, it is evident that the Taiwanese
Constitution did not deny the possibility of lay participation; rather, it permitted flexible
discretion regarding the trial patterns for both the jurisdiction and legislative institutions
to determine. Therefore, per the Taiwanese Constitution, lay participation itself is not an
absolute unconstitutional component of trial proceedings.

Further, this issue is extended to a discussion regarding the position of lay
participation in Taiwan. The theory of judicial democratization has been abandoned by
the Japanese Saiban-in system because it is too controversial to balance with the
traditional theory of judicial professionalization in the Japanese criminal justice system.
However, a nation’s jurisdiction should not be isolated from administration and
legislation because it is the nationals who authorize all of these national behaviors. As
such, this chapter will introduce a modified theory of judicial democratization to the
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proposed lay observer system in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the proposed
system’s implementation in Taiwan.

The second issue concerns the principle of judicial independence guaranteed by
the Taiwanese Constitution. Whether lay participation will infringe upon the judges’
professional determination was an issue of a constitutional nature during the previous
four attempts, because the Taiwanese Constitution prevents any improper interference
from inappropriately influencing the professional judges’ independent positions within
the judicial system.

This chapter will discuss whether the nature of judges’ determination is
completely unbound under Taiwanese constitutional law, and it finds that the Taiwanese
Constitution, in fact, draws both inner (the rule of thumb and the rule of rational) and
outer (the design of bench and the appeal system) boundaries to ensure that professional
judges’ judgments are just, fair and stable. As a result, lay participation will not be an
absolute unconstitutional trial pattern as long as its structure complies with the
constitutional boundaries.

This chapter will further discuss issues surrounding the proposed system in order
to ensure its constitutionality in all regards. Establishing a lay participation system will
not only affect the Taiwanese criminal justice system, but it will also affect the Taiwanese
people; for example, when they are in the position of defendant or are required to serve as
a lay observer under the proposed lay observer system, this proposed system will have
direct impact on their lives.
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The Taiwanese Constitution guarantees its people the right to litigate and the right
to remain free from any involuntary servitude. As for potential defendants, the answer
regarding whether the Taiwanese Constitution also guarantees them the right to be tried
by legal professionals should be explored from the definition of “judge” and the principle
of statutory judges under Taiwanese constitutional law.

It is evident that the Taiwanese Constitution put more effort into providing
defendants a more independent, just and fairer court than it did in assigning them legal
professionals during trial proceedings. As such, articles under the Taiwanese Constitution
are defined as a means of ensuring the independence of judges’ determinations so that
their verdicts result in a fair court for defendants.

The Japanese Supreme Court also concluded that after establishing the Saiban-in
system, citizens’ determinations would inevitably become part of the jurisdiction.
Therefore, as long as the court can maintain its justness and fairness, Japanese
constitutional law did not exclude people other than legal professionals from participating
in trials either.

In addition, under the Taiwanese judiciary, some specific trial proceedings had
already allowed people other than professional judges to participate in and determine
cases along with professional judges. In sum, lay participation will not infringe upon the
defendants’ rights to litigate guaranteed by the Taiwanese Constitution when it brings in
people other than professional judges to determine a case.
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With regard to whether the proposed lay observer system unconstitutionally
imposes obligations on Taiwanese people to participate in trial proceedings when the
Taiwanese Constitution did not specify that serving as a lay observer is a nationals’ duty,
this issue can be solved by practicing the principle of proportionality because different
obligations should be examined by different standards of constitutional protections.

After examining these obligations through the constitutional standard and
referring to the Japanese Court’s decisions, this chapter concludes that, under the
proposed lay observer system, the lay observers’ obligations, such as participating in the
trial proceedings and the duty of confidentiality, meet the constitutional requirements.

In Chapter Four, both the advantages and disadvantages among all of the existing
systems will be categorized in order to find the most suitable trial proceedings pattern in
which the Taiwanese people may participate. The advantages under both traditional jury
and lay participation systems will be analyzed in three ways: politically, legally and
socially. The origins of these traditional trial proceedings resulted primarily from the need
to avoid improper interference in judicial system matters and from society’s mistrust of
the original judicial systems. Accordingly, the developments under these systems focused
on how to realize judicial democratization, to protect people’s rights and to educate and
strengthen citizens’ legal beliefs.

However, implementation of these systems also brought issues and caused
dissatisfactions with regard to societal expectations. For instance, the jury lengthens the
trial proceedings because of the selection process and the requirement of a unanimous
verdict. In addition, society questioned the quality of a jury’s verdict because jurors are
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not legally trained and are easily influenced by factors outside of the courtroom. As a
result, when the jury’s participation did not improve the court’s decisions as a whole, this
lengthy and inefficient trial was deemed a waste of judicial resources.

Lay participation faced similar challenges as well. Under this cooperative trial
pattern, most people questioned whether the positions between professional judges and
lay judges were unbalanced. In addition, this trial pattern also resulted in a decline in the
quality of the court’s decisions because professional judges’ responsibilities increased
during the trial proceedings and lay judges cannot comprehend the complicated trial
proceedings before making their determinations.

This chapter will introduce considerations that were taken into account when both
the Japanese and the South Korean judicial systems framed the Saiban-in system and the
citizen participation system, respectively. Further, in order to examine the efficiency and
social reactions regarding these two new mixture patterns, practical outcomes of these
two innovative systems will be analyzed through official statistics and poll results.

Finally, to ensure that the starting point of the Taiwanese proposed lay observer
system is correct, this chapter will compare both pro and con characteristics among all
these existing systems with regard to what the proposed system is expected to accomplish.
After the chapter confirms that the Judicial Yuan’s current proposed “intermediary”
system could be a workable measure for improving the Taiwanese criminal justice system,
recommendations to the proposed system will be given.

vii

Chapter Five will first introduce the trial proceedings under the proposed lay
observer system and explore probable issues by analyzing the results of mock trials held
by the Taipei Shihlin and Chiayi District Courts. Recommendations will be given to the
proposed system in accordance with its procedural stages: (1) The adoption of the
modified indictment-only doctrine and the implementation of the evidentiary rulings
stage during the preliminary trial proceedings; (2) To separate trial proceedings in order
to individualize the sentencing phase from the conviction phase; and (3) The lay
observers’ distinct rights to deliberate during the conviction and sentencing phase.

With regard to the preliminary trial proceedings, the controversies between the
Taiwanese Judicial Yuan and the Administrative Yuan will be resolved by analyzing their
different views of Articles Forty-three (the evidentiary rulings stage) and Forty-five (the
modified indictment-only doctrine) in the proposed Act.

Because of the concern that the lay observers are not legally trained and are
lacking in trial experience, this chapter tends to support the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan’s
notion, which is to adopt the modified indictment-only doctrine into the proposed system.
This is because the modified doctrine will not only ensure both professional judges’ and
lay observers’ objectivity before the trial, but it will also grant professional judges the
opportunity to read case files and access evidence as a procedural necessity.

In addition, in order to prevent the lay observers’ determinations regarding both
the accused’s conviction and sentencing from unnecessary influence before the
deliberation process begins, this chapter further supports the Judicial Yuan’s proposal
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intended to strengthen the evidentiary rulings stage during the preliminary proceedings so
that lay observers will not be confused by incompetent or irrelevant evidence in trials.

As for the recommendations to the trial proceedings, three Taiwanese Supreme
Court judgments will be introduced to clarify how the Court has reviewed current
criminal procedural structures since the adoption of both ICCPR and ICESCR as
domestic laws under the Taiwanese judicial system. This chapter concludes that both the
Supreme Court and the Judicial Yuan are concerned with whether the decision-makers
under either general or the proposed lay observer trial proceedings have adequate ability
to make determinations regarding the accused’s conviction and sentencing appropriately
and in accordance with the statutory factors that are regulated via both the Taiwanese
criminal and criminal procedural codes.

The South Korean citizen participation system has demonstrated the necessity of
the distinct procedural stage in Taiwan. This chapter analyzes South Korea’s statistical
results and concludes that the citizen participation system might not improve the lay
participants’ comprehension regarding the trial proceedings because judges will exclude
complicated cases from being tried by jurors.

Accordingly, to evaluate the possibility of establishing a two-stage system in
Taiwan, the origins of the separate deliberation process that resulted from significant U.S.
Supreme Court judgments will be introduced. The sentencing phase has been positioned
to serve a different function from the conviction phase under the American criminal
justice system. Moreover, recent American research indicated that jurors’ “premature
punishment decisions” regarding the accused’s sentencing occur when they hear evidence
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during the conviction phase. These American experiences demonstrate how necessary it
is to distinguish procedural stages under the proposed lay observer system because lay
observers lack the legal professionalism and trial experience that would enable them to
distinguish conviction evidence from sentencing information.

However, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court’s previous decisions regarding
similar issues were conservative. The Court not only refused to modify any procedural
stages under the criminal justice system, but it also denied a petition that challenged the
entire criminal justice system by stating that it is not functional to ensure defendants’
right to defense. This chapter further examines the experiences of the Japanese Saiban-in
system, which reveal that some courts have already tried to separate the trials into two
distinct stages out of both practicality and necessity.

As a result, with regard to the trial proceedings, it is evident that the Taiwanese
proposed lay observer system should divide its proceedings into two completely separate
stages so that lay observers will deliver their verdict more objectively and accurately.

Lastly, the most controversial issue regarding the Taiwanese proposed lay
observer system has to do with whether to grant lay observers the right to deliberate. This
chapter will begin the discussion by defining the scope of deliberation for lay observers.
The traditional notion of “letting the citizens discover the facts and letting the
professional judges practice their discretion on legal matters” proves challenging in
Taiwan because it is almost impossible to distinguish legal issues from factual issues
when judges have to exercise the method of syllogism. Accordingly, it is more practical
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to allow lay observers to determine both factual and legal issues related to the conviction
and sentencing and leave only the procedural matters for the professional judge to decide.

Although many people in Taiwan question whether the lay observer system will
become meaningless when the lay observers do not have the same authority as
professional judges, this chapter recommends maintaining the consultative position of the
lay observers’ verdict during the conviction phase. This is because the “factual influence”
under the South Korean citizen participation system should work to alleviate concerns
regarding the risk that public prosecutors and defense counsels might neglect lay
observers’ opinions when jurors under the citizen participation system do not have the
right to deliberate.

In addition, the statistical results of the Japanese Saiban-in system further separate
the saiban-ins right to deliberate from their willingness to participate in trials. As such,
this chapter concludes that, until the lay observers have full confidence in their ability to
objectively determine a case, it is better that their verdict is not binding on the court’s
decision; this would help to ensure a fair trial for the defendant.

As for the legitimacy of the consultative pattern under the Taiwanese lay observer
system, it is strengthened when the risk of the “two-way rubber stamps” is eliminated
from the proposed system. This chapter will present a slightly modified version of the
deliberation process in the conviction phase, which prevents lay observers and
professional judges from joining together. This would result in lay observers being more
willing to express their personal opinions without hesitation, and it would prevent
professional judges from trying to persuade lay observers.
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With regard to the accuracy of the lay observers’ verdict, this chapter suggests
that their verdict is representative of societal values and should not be evaluated in terms
of right or wrong. In addition, the procedural scheme of the intermediary discussion and
the lay observers’ right to request the professional judge’s explanation will enhance their
understanding of the pending case before making their verdict in any case.

Moreover, the South Korean citizen participation system determined that the
professional judges’ statutory obligation to explain why the court did not accept the jurors’
verdict in the written judgment raised a risk that professional judges might compromise
their determinations. Therefore, this chapter proposes to abolish this obligation. However,
some question whether this abolition would turn the lay observers’ participation into a
meaningless gesture.

This worry might be baseless because no one is capable of estimating how the
court evaluates the lay observers’ verdict until the judgment is announced. Moreover, the
proposed lay observer system also requires the professional judge to explain the reasons
in person after the deliberation process has ended. Accordingly, the abolition of the
statutory obligation is to reduce professional judges’ burden during the trials and further
prevent the potential for the professional judges’ to compromise regarding their
determinations.

The sentencing stage should comply with certain principles, and these will be
ascertained by way of three specific Taiwanese Supreme Court judgments. According to
the Court’s rulings, the sentencing standards under the Taiwanese criminal justice system
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contain both legal (the liability of the offender) and factual (the totality of circumstances)
factors. Therefore, after comparing both the Japanese Saiban-in system and the South
Korean citizen participation system, the chapter suggests that the Taiwanese proposed lay
observer system grant lay observers the right to deliberate, and it suggests that the system
adopt the Japanese special majority vote.

This suggestion would probably encounter challenges with regard to both
historical components and contemporary debates resulting from the American’s jury
system. There were four historical considerations that prohibited jurors from determining
the guilty party’s sentencing. However, none will occur under the proposed lay observer
system. Furthermore, the contemporary debate regarding residual doubt can be resolved
in accordance with three aspects: logic, relevancy and operative influence. As a result, the
lay observers’ right to deliberate should be recognized in the sentencing phase because
the reasonableness of the sentencing under the Taiwanese proposed system would be
improved.

This chapter will also discuss the standard of the deliberation vote. In Japan, in
order to maintain the professional judges’ significant roles in the trial, the Saiban-in
system has established a standard of special majority vote that requires at least one
professional judge to join the majority. This standard might bring about a concern similar
to residual doubt under the American jury system, that is, whether the standard will be
inevitably raised from a majority vote to a substantial majority vote because opinions
under the sentencing phase are more likely to be split.
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This concern is unnecessary because the Taiwanese professional judges are the
only decision-makers during the conviction phase, which makes their position more
significant than the Japanese judges. In addition, even though the deliberation standard is
inevitably raised to a higher level, the requirement that at least one professional judge
should join the majority in fact further guarantees the judges’ position during the
sentencing phase. Moreover, when higher standards are applied to the sentencing phase,
then the defendants are more likely to receive appropriate punishment for their crimes.

As for the worry regarding the more severe punishment in Taiwan, this chapter
finds that even in Japan, the sentencing results under the Saiban-in system did not become
more severe in an extreme way. In fact, the sentences in Japan tend to be split such that
some sentences have become more severe while some have become more clement.

In summary, this chapter has outlined and discussed in-depth two primary
recommendations. During the conviction phase, the lay observers’ verdict is consultative
to the court in order to retain the accuracy of the court’s verdict. In contrast, during the
sentencing phase, the lay observers should be granted the right to deliberate and the
special majority vote should be employed so that the sentencing results could comply
with not only legal professionalism but also societal values.

Finally, Chapter Six, the last chapter, will provide a brief summary of the five
previous chapters. This chapter will also offer an update with regard to the Taiwanese
proposed lay observer system and where it is presently in terms of being passes. This
chapter will further point out other issues with the system remain such as the scope of
eligible cases, the selection process, the appeal system, and the defendants’ right to
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choose (or decline). These issues remind the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan that the proposed
system should be more carefully considered before it is fully implemented by the
Taiwanese Legislative Yuan.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE NECESSITIES AND POSSIBILITIES OF INTRODUCING A LAY
PARTICIPATION SYSTEM IN TAIWAN
In 2011, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan organized a commission to consult the
possibility of establishing a so-called “lay observer system” 1 under the Taiwanese
criminal justice system.2 The Judicial Yuan invited professional judges, prosecutors,
defense lawyers, criminal academics and prominent social leaders as members of this
commission in order to fully discuss related issues regarding criminal justice reform in
Taiwan.3

This was not the first time that the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan had tried to introduce
a lay participation system into its criminal justice system. In fact, at one point, a lay
participation system was implemented in Taiwan and was maintained for more than forty
years. Throughout the history and development of the Taiwanese criminal justice system,
there have been four attempts at introducing different lay participation systems. However,
none of these attempts were successful. As such, many questioned why the Taiwanese

1

The “lay observer system” is a unique lay participation system designed by the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan
in 2011. Just as the literal meaning of these words indicates, under this newly created system, citizens who
participate in a criminal case can only observe the trial proceedings. Their opinions do not bind the
professional judges’ decisions. Other details of this system will be discussed carefully in this dissertation
later.
2
See the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan, Yanyi Renmin Guanshen zhi Kexing Xing- Sifa Yuan Zhaokai Renmin
Guanshen zhi Yanyi Weiyuan Huiyi (研議人民觀審制可行性-司法院召開人民觀審制研議委員會議)
[Discuss the Possibility of the Lay Observer System- The Taiwanese Judicial Yuan Holds a Commission for
Consulting the Lay Observer System] 1527 SIFA ZHOUKAN 1, 1 (Jan. 20, 2011); see also JUDICIAL YUAN,
CRIMINAL DEPARTMENT, SIFAYUAN RENMIN GUANSHEN ZHIDU YANYI ZILIAO HUIBIAN- SHANG (司法院
人民觀審制度研議資料彙編(上)) [THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION
st
REGARDING THE PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE] 12 (Judicial Yuan Criminal Department, 1 ed.
2012).
3
Id.
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Judicial Yuan had chosen to introduce a lay participation system as part of its new policy
in 2011.

1.1 Reasons for the Fifth Attempt at Introducing a Lay Participation System
in Taiwan
Despite failing four times previously at establishing and implementing a lay
participation system in Taiwan,4 the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan declared that one of its new
criminal justice reforms was to establish a fifth model of the lay participation system, the
lay observer system, and subsequently implement it into the Taiwanese criminal justice
system.5

There are several possible reasons as to why the Judicial Yuan chose to promote
this policy at this time, and two of the most likely reasons are the corruption of a number
of professional judges and some controversial cases from 2010 that created a lack of
confidence in the Taiwanese judicial system; essentially, the people recognized that the
judicial system had gone from bad to worse.6

Additionally, the Judicial Yuan had conducted research, which suggested that
societal mistrust of the judicial system was perhaps rooted in the fact that the Taiwanese
people were not familiar with the inner workings of the system.7 The lay observer system,
4

See the previous attempts to introduce a lay participation system in Taiwan, infra notes 697, 716, 739 and
762.
5
See SIFA ZHOUKAN, supra note 2.
6
Zhang Yonghong (張永宏), Woguo Yinjin Guomin Canyu Xingshi Shenpan Zhidu zhi Yanjiu, yi Riben
Caipanyuan Zhidu wei Jiejing (我國引進國民參與刑事審判制度之研究-以日本裁判員制度為借鏡) [A
Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure- Using Japan’s
“Saiban-in” System for References], NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY, COLLEGE OF LAW (2013) at 164.
7
See THE DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN, YIBAN MINZHOUNG DUI SIFA
RENZHI DIAOCHA (一般民眾對司法認知調查) [THE INVESTIGATION STATISTICS OF THE GENERAL
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therefore, looked like a good possible solution that would enable the Judicial Yuan to
reestablish itself as a prestigious body and rebuild the Taiwanese people’s trust in and
reliance on the judicial system.8

(1). A Long-Rooted Issue: The Taiwanese Society Mistrusts Its Judicial System
In order to observe the issues regarding whether the judicial reforms would satisfy
the Taiwanese societal expectations,9 the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan carefully researched
society’s reactions to its judicial system for an extended amount of time and released
those statistics every year as part of its “administrative program transcripts.”10 In fact,
even before the professional judges’ corruption came to light and the controversial cases
of 2010 took place,11 the Taiwanese judicial system had already lost a significant amount
of the public’s trust.

For example, with regard to the credibility of professional judges, although the
positive results increased over the four-year period, it remains that over 40% of the
Taiwanese people do not agree that professional judges are entirely credible or
trustworthy during trial proceedings. According to the results of the past five years, it is
PUBLIC’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL SYSTEM]; available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/index1.htm (last visited on Oct. 30, 2013).
8
See JUDICIAL YUAN, CRIMINAL DEPARTMENT, SIFA YUAN RENMIN GUANSHEN SHIXING TIAOLI CAOAN
YANJIU ZHIDING ZILIAO HUIBIAN- XIA (司法院人民觀審試行條例草案研究制定資料彙編(下)) [THE
VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S RESEARCH REGARDING THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY
OBSERVER SYSTEM – TWO] 769 (The Judicial Yuan Criminal Department, 1st ed. 2012). (The explanation
of Article 1 under the first draft of the proposed act stated that after the lay observer system was
implemented and found to work under the Taiwanese criminal justice system, the Taiwanese society might
gradually trust its judicial system because judgments would be more in line with societal expectations since
the professional judges could hear the people’s feelings and their viewpoints before making their final
decisions.)
9
See THE INVESTIGATION STATISTICS (2012), supra note 7; available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/u102.pdf (last visited on Oct. 31, 2013).
10
Id. (It’s an official investigation with regard to how the Taiwanese society comprehends its judicial
system.)
11
See Tou Tiao Yao Wen, infra notes 29, 30 and 31.
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obvious that the judicial scandal of 2010 caused a sharp decline with regard to the
credibility of professional judges, and it took two years to recover the Taiwanese people’s
confidence:12
Year
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Positive
48.5%
39.2%
42.1%
49.5%
51.2%

Neutral
Negative
No Comment
0.4%
46.8%
4.3%
1.0%
56.1%
3.7%
2.4%
52.2%
3.3%
1.7%
42.0%
6.8%
1.5%
42.8%
4.5%
Figure 1:
Question: Do you agree with the statement that the professional judges in Taiwan are
credible and trustworthy?
Additionally, since 2011, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan conducted more research
regarding Taiwanese society’s reliance on its courts and professional judges.13 The results
revealed that the majority of Taiwan considered neither professional judges nor courts
reliable:
Year

2013
Positive Neutral Negative
41.0%
1.7%
54.3%
38.6%
1.9%
56.3%

2012
N/A
Positive Neutral Negative
N/A
Court
3.0%
44.8%
2.7%
48.4%
4.1%
Judge
3.2%
41.9%
3.0%
51.2%
3.9%
Figure 2:
Question: Do you agree with the statement that the courts and the professional judges in
Taiwan are reliable?
An assumption that might explain the low supporting rate of the professional
judges’ credibility has to do with the fact that in nearly every case, there must be one
party who loses in a lawsuit; therefore, it might cause half of Taiwan’s litigants to
develop negative feelings. 14 However, in the Judicial Yuan’s statistical reports, the
percentage of the Taiwanese people who had experiences in trials negates this assumption.

12

See THE INVESTIGATION STATISTICS (2012), supra note 9, at 67.
Id., at 30.
14
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 164.
13
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According to the reports, the percentage of Taiwanese who had ever had trial
experiences was 31.5% in 2009, 37.4% in 2010, 34.6% in 2011, 30.8% in 2012 and
27.4% in 2013.15 Therefore, the “losing litigants” are not the majority in these research
programs. In other words, the results with regard to the satisfaction of professional judges
or the courts would be defined as a mere impression,16 and, obviously, the impression has
not been positive for many years in Taiwan.

(2). Judicial Scandals, Controversial Cases and Societal Reactions in Taiwan
In February 2010, an adult raped a six-year-old girl, and a prosecutor charged him
with aggravated sexual offense.17 However, the district court concluded that since there
was no evidence that could prove that the defendant’s behavior violated the victim’s will,
the defendant should be convicted of a lighter crime;18 the lighter crime involved the
prohibition of an adult from having sexual intercourse with anyone who is under the age
of fourteen.19 This judgment shocked Taiwanese society because it is unthinkable that
anyone would suggest that a six-year-old girl could understand what she experienced at
the moment that the defendant assaulted her.20

15

See THE INVESTIGATION STATISTICS (2012), supra note 9, at 59.
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 164.
17
See MINGUO XINGFA [CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA] art. 221 (2013) (Taiwan): “A
person who by threats, violence, intimidation, inducing hypnosis, or other means against the will of a male
or female and who has sexual intercourse with such person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less
than three years but not more than ten years.” See also art. 222 (2013): “A person who commits an offense
specified in the preceding article under one of the following circumstances shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for not less than seven years: … 2. Offense against a male or a female under the age of
fourteen…”
18
See id., art. 227, §1 (2013): “A person who has sexual intercourse with a male or female under the age of
fourteen shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than three years but not more than ten years.”
19
Taiwan Gaoxiong District Court, 99 Niandu Su Zi No. 422 (June 18, 2010).
20
See Tou Tiao Yao Wen, Huangmiu Panjue, Zongrong Selang (荒謬判決，縱容色狼) [A Ridiculous
Judgment which Released the Offender] PIN GUO RI BAO [APPLE DAILY] (Taiwan) on Aug. 15, 2010;
available at http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/headline/20100815/32739146/ (last visited on
Oct. 29, 2013).
16
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About six months later, another similar case occurred. In this case, an appellate
court’s judgment confirmed that the defendant raped a four-year-old girl.21 However, the
Supreme Court overruled this decision because the way that the defendant violated the
girl’s will was not certain.22 This judgment resulted in societal resentment of the justice
system because, in this case, the four-year-old girl cried and said “no” when the
defendant assaulted her.23

These two controversial cases caused severe criticism of the Taiwanese criminal
justice system. There was a petition that originated from a social network that requested
that the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan eliminate “dinosaur judges”24 from its judicial system.25
These petitions earned almost three hundred thousand people’s support and quickly
evolved into a social protest; protesters stated that the Taiwanese criminal justice system
had departed from both societal emotions and society’s expectations that a criminal
justice system should be fair and just.26 Moreover, the sponsor of the social protest
formed a juridical association, White Rose Social Care Association, and further

21

Taiwan Gao Deng Fa Yuan Gaoxiong Fen Yuan, 97 Naindu Shang Su Zi No. 1008 (Sep. 12, 2008).
Taiwan Zui Gao Fa Yuan, 99 Naindu Tai Shan Zi No. 4894 (Aug. 5, 2010).
23
See Tou Ban Xin Wen, Shao Yanling Fahui Gengshen- Nutong Xingqinan Nizhuan Pan Wuzui (邵燕玲
發回更審/女童性侵案，逆轉判無罪) [The Judge Shao Yanling Overruled the Judgment- the Reversal
Meant that the Sexual Offender was Found Not Guilty] ZI YOU SHI BAO [THE LIBERTY NEWS] (Taiwan) on
Apr. 1, 2010; available at http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2011/new/apr/1/today-t2.htm (last visited on Oct.
29, 2013).
24
The definition of the “dinosaur judges” refers to those professional judges who are fettered by old
conventions when finding facts or applying laws to a criminal case.
25
See the Establishment of Origin, the White Rose Social Care Association; available at
http://www.whiterose.org.tw/files/13-1349-26464.php (last visited on Oct. 29, 2013). (The petition was
started on Facebook. After more than 280,000 people joined, the originator formed a “Justice Alliance” and
launched the “White Rose Movement” in order to appeal to the Taiwanese government to seriously
examine the current Taiwanese criminal justice system.)
26
Id.
22
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demanded that the Taiwanese judicial system introduce a jury system into the criminal
trial proceedings.27

These controversial cases induced public complaint about the Taiwanese criminal
justice system; the subsequent corruption exhibited by the professional judges merely
served to push people’s confidence even further down and cause a “reliance crisis”
regarding the entire Taiwanese judicial system.28 The most fatal thump to the Taiwanese
judicial system was a reveal that five judicial officials took bribes in July 2010. The
public media described the day that the Taiwanese Special Investigation Division of the
Supreme Prosecutors’ Office conducted a search and seizure of four appellate courts’
judges and one district prosecutor as the most shameful day in the Taiwanese judicial
history.29

These five judicial officers obtained more than ten million New Taiwan dollars
from the defendants of their cases and further held that the defendants were either not
guilty or guilty but sentenced to a lighter punishment.30 This judicial scandal not only
forced both the president and the vice president of the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan to lose

27

Id.
Li Qiuman (李秋滿), Guomin Canyu Sifa Shenpan zhi Yanjiu (國民參與司法審判之研究) [The Study of
the Citizens Participate in Judicial Judgment], SOOCHOW UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF LAW (2011) at 78; see
also Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 164.
29
See Tou Tiao Yao Wen, Da Chou Wen, Si Sifa Guan Shengya (大醜聞，四司法官聲押) [A Big Scandal,
Four Judges are Detained] PIN GUO RI BAO [APPLE DAILY] (Taiwan) on July 14, 2010; available at
http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/headline/20100714/32659417 (last visited on Oct. 29,
2013).
30
See Tou Tiao Yao Wen, Faguan She Shouhui, Qingfu Dang Baishoutao (法官涉收賄，情婦當白手套)
[Judges are Involved in Taking Bribes, Using Mistress as a Go-Between] PIN GUO RI BAO [APPLE DAILY]
(Taiwan) on July 14, 2010; available at
http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/headline/20100714/32659448 (last visited on Oct. 30,
2013).
28
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their positions,31 but it also caused the people’s distrust of the judicial system to go from
bad to worse.32 According to a public media’s poll conducted right after the scandal was
revealed, almost 73% of the Taiwanese people stated that this case had eroded their
confidence in the Taiwanese judicial system.33

(3). The Taiwanese Judicial Yuan’s Responses to Those Societal Reactions
Not only did the official statistical results show the low supporting rate of the
judicial system in Taiwan, but the investigative reports of the criminology research center
also drew the same conclusion. The Department and Graduate Institute of Criminology of
the National Chung Cheng University established a crime research center, which was
devoted to the study of Taiwanese society’s satisfaction with the governmental measures
regarding a victim’s protection and the control of public security since 2009.34 According
to those academic research results, the majority of Taiwanese society had been
questioning both the professional judges’ and the prosecutors’ fairness in Taiwan for
quite some time:35

31

See Tou Tiao Yao Wen, Sifa Yuanzhang Lai Yingzhai Yinjiu Qingci (司法院長賴英照，引咎請辭) [The
President of the Judicial Yuan, Lai Yingzhoa, Request to Resign Because of the Scandal] PIN GUO RI BAO
[APPLE DAILY] (Taiwan) on July 18, 2010; available at
http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/headline/20100718/32670333 (last visited on Oct. 30,
2013).
32
See Tou Tiao Yao Wen, supra note 29.
33
Id.
34
GUOLI ZHONGZHENG DAXUE FANZUI YANJIU ZHONGXIN (國立中正大學犯罪研究中心) [NATIONAL
CHUNG CHENG UNIVERSITY, CRIME RESEARCH CENTER], QUANGUO MINZHONG FANZUI BEIHAI JI
ZHENGFU WEIHU ZHIAN SHIZHENG MANYIDU DIAOCHA (全國民眾犯罪被害暨政府維護治安施政滿意度
調查) [RESEARCH REGARDING PEOPLE’S SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENTAL MEASURES PERTAINING TO
VICTIM’S PROTECTION AND THE CONTROL OF PUBLIC SECURITY]; available at
http://deptcrc.ccu.edu.tw/index.php/news/ (last visited on Nov. 1, 2013).
35
Id.
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Year
The First Half of the Year 200936
The Later Half of the Year 200937
The First Half of the Year 201038
The Middle of the Year 201039
The Year of 201040
The First Half of the Year 201141
The Year of 201142
The First Half of the Year 201243
The Year of 201244
The First Half of the Year 201345

Judges
68.9%
70.0%
65.8%
63.0%
77.9%
81.0%
74.5%
74.6%
72.3%
80.4%

Prosecutors
62.1%
65.3%
63.7%
65.5%
73.9%
72.9%
71.5%
70.9%
72.8%
74.5%

Figure 3:
Question: Do you question the fairness of professional judges and prosecutors in Taiwan?
In order to explore the reasons why Taiwanese society had such a bad impression
regarding both its judicial system and the judicial officers, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan
further investigated the sources from which the Taiwanese people would gain their
judicial knowledge.46 Additionally, the issues with regard to how the Taiwanese people

36

See CRIME RESEARCH CENTER, RESEARCH REGARDING PEOPLE’S SATISFACTION, infra note 37.
See CRIME RESEARCH CENTER, RESEARCH REGARDING PEOPLE’S SATISFACTION of July, 2009 (Aug. 31,
2009); available at http://deptcrc.ccu.edu.tw/index.php/examine/showExamine/11 (last visited on Nov. 1,
2013).
38
See CRIME RESEARCH CENTER, RESEARCH REGARDING PEOPLE’S SATISFACTION of January, 2010 (Jan.
28, 2010); available at http://deptcrc.ccu.edu.tw/index.php/examine/showExamine/38 (last visited on Nov.
1, 2013).
39
See CRIME RESEARCH CENTER, RESEARCH REGARDING PEOPLE’S SATISFACTION of July, 2010 (Aug. 23,
2010); available at http://deptcrc.ccu.edu.tw/index.php/examine/showExamine/39 (last visited on Nov. 1,
2013).
40
See CRIME RESEARCH CENTER, RESEARCH REGARDING PEOPLE’S SATISFACTION (2010) (Jan. 30, 2011);
available at http://deptcrc.ccu.edu.tw/index.php/examine/showExamine/40 (last visited on Nov. 1, 2013).
41
See CRIME RESEARCH CENTER, RESEARCH REGARDING PEOPLE’S SATISFACTION of July, 2011 (Sep. 7,
2011); available at http://deptcrc.ccu.edu.tw/index.php/examine/showExamine/41 (last visited on Nov. 1,
2013).
42
See CRIME RESEARCH CENTER, RESEARCH REGARDING PEOPLE’S SATISFACTION (2011) (Feb. 17, 2012);
available at http://deptcrc.ccu.edu.tw/index.php/examine/showExamine/42 (last visited on Nov. 1, 2013).
43
See CRIME RESEARCH CENTER, RESEARCH REGARDING PEOPLE’S SATISFACTION of July, 2012 (Aug. 14,
2012); available at http://deptcrc.ccu.edu.tw/index.php/examine/showExamine/43 (last visited on Nov. 1,
2013).
44
See CRIME RESEARCH CENTER, RESEARCH REGARDING PEOPLE’S SATISFACTION (2012) (Mar. 20, 2013);
available at http://deptcrc.ccu.edu.tw/index.php/examine/showExamine/44 (last visited on Nov. 1, 2013).
45
See CRIME RESEARCH CENTER, RESEARCH REGARDING PEOPLE’S SATISFACTION of July, 2013 (Sep. 17,
2013); available at http://deptcrc.ccu.edu.tw/index.php/examine/showExamine/45 (last visited on Nov. 1,
2013).
46
See THE INVESTIGATION STATISTICS, supra note 7.
37
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comprehended the trial proceedings were also carefully examined in these official
investigative reports.47

Since 2009, television, newspapers and the Internet comprised the primary
sources from which people gained their information regarding the Taiwanese judicial
system.48 To study the Taiwanese people’s comprehension of their judicial system, the
research project divided this topic into two aspects:49 the first question was open for the
experimental subjects to self-evaluate their own knowledge about the Taiwanese judicial
system;50 the second part of this topic posed some questions about how the Taiwanese
judicial system works, and there was emphasis placed on the criminal justice system so
that the statistics would disclose whether the Taiwanese people understood the concepts
of their criminal justice system:51
Year
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Self-Acknowledgement

Actual Acknowledgement
15.0%
18.0%
15.0%
12.1%
11.8%

25.0%
23.0%
21.0%
22.6%
25.1%
Figure 4:
The accuracy of Taiwanese’s personal and actual acknowledgement of their judicial
system

The percentage of the Taiwanese’s self-evaluation with regard to whether they
understood the Taiwanese judicial system was surprisingly low, and it could be concluded
47

Id.
See THE INVESTIGATION STATISTICS (2009-2013), supra note 7; available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/4_u98.pdf (2009), at 3; http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/4_u99.pdf (2010),
at 3 to 4; http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/u100.pdf (2011), at 4 to 5;
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/u101.pdf (2012), at 26; and http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/u102.pdf
(2013), at 27 (last visited on Nov. 1, 2013).
49
Id. (This topic was located at the following pages in each report: The year of 2009, at 1 to 2; The year of
2010, at 1 to 2; The year of 2011, at 1 to 2; The year of 2012, at 17 to 24; The year of 2013, at 17 to 26.)
50
Id. (This question was located at the following pages in each report: The year of 2009, at 1; The year of
2010, at 1; The year of 2011, at 1; The year of 2012, at 17 to 18; The year of 2013, at 17 to 18.)
51
Id. (This question was located at the following pages in each report: The year of 2009, at 1 to 2; The year
of 2010, at 1 to 2; The year of 2011, at 1 to 2; The year of 2012, at 19 to 23; The year of 2013, at 19 to 24.)
48

10

that no more than a quarter of Taiwanese thought that they understood their judicial
system. Furthermore, with regard to the actual acknowledgement, especially with regard
to the differences between the professional judges’ and the prosecutors’ authorities during
the trial proceedings, the results revealed that the Taiwanese people were extremely
unfamiliar with how the Taiwanese criminal justice system functions.

The Taiwanese Judicial Yuan analyzed the main reason that Taiwanese society
did not trust its judicial system, and it was determined that there was no proper way for
people to understand how the judicial system functioned in Taiwan. 52 Therefore,
establishing a lay participation system in Taiwan would grant people the opportunity to
think like a professional judge during criminal trial proceedings.53 In other words, after
the Taiwanese criminal justice system adopted the lay observer system, the Taiwanese
people would have a better and more direct means of understanding that it is not an easy
job for professional judges to discover the truth of a case and to apply laws when
evidence is uncertain or unclear and there is limited time.54

In the long run, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan hoped that by establishing the lay
observer system, Taiwanese society would eliminate its inaccurate impressions and

52

See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 8 to 9. (The Taiwanese Judicial Yuan stated
that the Taiwanese people are not familiar with the processes related to criminal trial proceedings, how
professional judges decide whether the defendant is guilty or not, how the professional judges evaluate the
punishment, etc.)
53
See Chen Jianhong (陳建宏), Sifa Gaige Xin Jiyuan- Sifa Yuan Su Yongqin Fu Yuanzhang Tan Renmin
Guanshen Zhi (司法改革新紀元-司法院蘇永欽副院長談「人民觀審制」) [The New Age of the Justice
Reforms- The Judicial Yuan’s Vice-President Su Yongqui Talks About the “Lay Observer System”], 57:4
JUNFA ZHUANKAN [THE MILITARY LAW JOURNAL] 1, 9 to 10 (2011). (The vice-President Su discussed the
purposes of framing the proposed lay observer system in Taiwan.)
54
Id.; see also Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial
Procedure, supra note 6, at 168. (The author stated that a reason to establish a lay participation system is so
that those people who are without legal training will better understand how a criminal justice system works.)
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unrealistic expectations of the criminal justice system and reestablish trust in Taiwan’s
judicial officers and their abilities to demonstrate just and fair attitudes.55

1.2 Whether the Taiwanese Criminal Justice System Needs to be Reformed
Despite understanding the reasons as to why the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan wants
to introduce the lay observer system into its criminal justice system, it is necessary to
explore some prerequisite issues in order to figure out what issues might become
obstacles later, and this must be done before fully establishing the proposed system. The
first issue to be addressed has to do with whether the Taiwanese criminal justice system
really needs to be reformed.

(1). The Statutory Reforms of the Taiwanese Criminal Justice System in 2002
The Taiwanese criminal justice system had been radically amended in 2002.
Before these statutory reforms occurred, an inquisitional system had dominated all
Taiwanese criminal procedures, and it required professional judges to investigate
evidence during the trial proceedings in order to convict the defendant.56 With regard to
discovering the facts of crimes, the previous article also put the burden of proof on
prosecutors.57 In other words, when discovering the truth about whether a defendant
committed a crime, there was no fine line between professional judges’ and prosecutors’

55

See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 9.
56
See XINGSHI SUSONG FA [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] art. 163 (2001) (Taiwan): “In order to find
the truth, the court should investigate evidences in accordance with its duty.” (This is the previous content
of Article 163.)
57
See id., art. 161 (2001): “The burden of proving the defendant’s crime is on the prosecutors.” (This is the
previous content of Article 161.)
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duties during the trial proceedings because both of them were required by law to
investigate all evidence.

These confusing duties as they pertained to investigating evidence resulted in
prosecutors rarely attending court because professional judges would further investigate
evidence necessary to convict the defendant.58 However, in general, professional judges
are expected to play a fair and neutral role under a criminal justice system so that the
defendant’s right to be presumed innocent59 is assured during the trial proceedings.60
Under this previous inquisitional system in Taiwan, it is hard to imagine that professional
judges would not only cooperate with prosecutors in order to convict the defendant but
that they would also play an impartial role so as to assure the defendant’s rights at the
same time.61

Accordingly, in order to fulfill the purpose of maintaining the fairness of criminal
justice in Taiwan,62 the position of professional judges was to be modified because the
judges needed to balance the interests of both the defendant and the prosecutor. 63
Therefore, the Taiwanese criminal justice system moved from an inquisitional system
58

See the introduction of these statutory reforms, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan, available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/work/work02/work02-01.asp (last visited on Nov. 6, 2013); see also Zhang, A
Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure, supra note 6, at
359. (The author pointed out that under these confusing authorities between professional judges and
prosecutors, the main function of prosecution was just to bring an indictment to the court.)
59
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 154 (2013): “Prior to a final conviction
through trial, an accused is presumed to be innocent.”
60
Chen Zhonghe (陳中和), Lun Susong Zhihui Quan- yi Diyishen wei Zhongxin (論訴訟指揮權-以第一審
為中心) [Discussion About the Discretion of Control of Court Proceedings: Centering on the Trial Courts],
NATIONAL CHUNG CHENG UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF LAW (2009) at 33.
61
See Chen Yuncai (陳運財), Xinshi Susong Zhidu zhi Gaige ji qi Keti (刑事訴訟制度之改革及其課題)
[The Statutory Reforms of the Criminal Justice System and Its Lessons], 100 YUEDAN FAXUE ZAZHI
[TAIWAN LAW REVIEW] 73, 75 (2003). (The author explored the main reason as to why Taiwan’s previous
inquisitional system needed to be reformed, stating that it would address issues regarding the confusing
authorities of professional judges and prosecutors in practice.)
62
See the introduction of these statutory reforms, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan, supra note 58.
63
Id.
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toward an adversarial one known as the “modified adversarial system” and this shift took
place in 2002.64

In this new modified adversarial system, the burden of proof was shifted primarily
from the professional judge to the prosecutor65 because the professional judge’s and the
prosecutor’s duties were distinguished by the Constitutional Court. 66 The Taiwanese
Judicial Yuan believed that the relationships among professional judges, prosecutors and
defendants in the trial proceedings would improve after the modified adversarial system
was implemented in Taiwan.67

For instance, professional judges would take charge of decision making rather
than continuing prosecutors’ investigation processes; as for prosecutors, they would
attend the court and prove defendants’ guilt by disclosing related evidence, and the
defendant would, therefore, expect his or her right to the presumption of innocence to be
ensured because professional judges no longer needed to question in the same way that
prosecutors did.68

64

Id. (The Taiwanese criminal justice system was not changed to an adversarial system, but rather to a
“modified” adversarial system, because under some circumstances, the professional judges have to
investigate evidence, just as they did in the previous inquisitional system.)
65
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 161, § 1 (2013): “The public prosecutor
shall bear the burden of proof as to the facts of the crime charged against an accused, and shall indicate the
method of proof.” (Prior to this revision, this article stated that the prosecutor only has to prove the facts of
crime. The professional judge, however, shall investigate evidence in order to find the truths of crime.
(Previous art. 163)).
66
See CONST. CT. INTERP. 384 (1995). (The Justice held that due process is required in both the criminal
code and in criminal procedural law. The Court further indicated that in a criminal procedure, due process
includes but is not limited to “the voluntariness of the confession,” “evidences for convicting,” “the right to
cross-examine witnesses,” “the separation of the judiciary and prosecution” and “the right to appeal.”)
67
See the introduction of these statutory reforms, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan, supra note 58.
68
Id.
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After clarifying the authorities between professional judges and prosecutors in the
court, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan considered that the Taiwanese criminal justice system
would hence not only fulfill the function of discovering truth but it would also achieve the
goal of assuring a fair court to both of the litigants.69 In short, the Judicial Yuan believed
that these statutory reforms would raise society’s trust of the Taiwanese judicial system.70

(2). The Results of the Criminal Justice Reforms in 2002
However, the new system brought with it new issues. In fact, the proposed system
was named the modified adversarial system because it still maintained some of the
characteristics of the inquisitional system.71 For example, although professional judges
were no longer required to investigate evidence during the trial proceedings in general;
under some specific circumstances, the law would still require professional judges to do
so in order to maintain justice or to protect the defendants’ interests.72 Additionally, the
Taiwanese Judicial Yuan also introduced a “prosecution review stage” in order to filter
inappropriate accusations by professional judges prior to the first trial date at the same
time.73

69

Id.
Id.
71
See Chen, The Statutory Reforms of the Criminal Justice System and its Lessons, supra note 61, at 73 to
74.
72
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 163, § 2 (2013): “The court may, for the
purpose of discovering the truth, ex officio investigating evidence; in case for the purpose of maintaining
justice or discovering facts that are critical to the interest of the accused, the court shall ex officio
investigate evidence.”
73
See id., art. 161, § 2 (2013):
[P]rior to the first trial date, if it appears to the court that the method of proof indicated by the
public prosecutor is obviously insufficient to establish the possibility that the accused is guilty,
the court shall, by a ruling, notify the public prosecutor to make it up within a specified time
period; if additional evidence is not presented within the specified time period, the court may
dismiss the prosecution by a ruling.
70
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As for the situations in which professional judges should investigate evidence, the
Taiwanese Judicial Yuan explained that only when both litigants did not disclose enough
evidence during the trial proceedings should the professional judges begin to further
investigate evidence necessary to conclude the case.74 These particular situations were
designed as exceptional circumstances so that the professional judges’ roles of being fair
third parties would not be tainted in court. However, it is questionable regarding whether
these “exceptional” circumstances would, in fact, turn into general ones because
professional judges should always maintain the justice and protect the defendants’
interests in every criminal case.75

Further, with regard to the prosecution review stage, the purpose of introducing
this stage is to further carry out the prosecutor’s burden of proof.76 However, as a matter
of fact, the prosecution review stage is unfavorable to the defendant in many ways,
especially when it seems that the professional judge and the prosecutor have joined
together to make accusations “sufficient to establish the possibility of the defendant’s
guilt” when the prosecutor has a second chance to supplement necessary evidence under
the professional judges’ permission.77

In short, even though the Taiwanese criminal justice system was amended to a
modified adversarial system, the role of professional judges did not change in the way
74

See the introduction of these statutory reforms, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan, supra note 58.
See Zhang Yonghong (張永宏), Yanni Yinjin Xingshi Guomin Canshen Zhidu zhi Chuyi- yi Riben
Caipanyuan Zhidu wei Jiejing (研擬引進刑事國民參審制度之芻議-以日本裁判員制度為借鏡) [A
Discussion about Introducing A Lay Participation System under A Criminal Justice System-with Emphasis
on the Japanese Saiban-in System], 172 TAIWAN FAXUE ZAZHI [TAIWAN LAW REVIEW] 19, 21 to 22 (2011).
76
See the introduction of these statutory reforms, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan, supra note 58.
77
Guo Fusan (郭福三), Susong Jiandu Jizhi zhi Bijiao Yanjiu – yi Qisu Shencha wei Zhongxin (訴訟監督
機制之比較研究-以起訴審查為中心) [A Comparative Study for Monitoring the Litigation System with a
Focus on Prosecution Review], CHINESE CULTURE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF LAW (2002) at 139 to
140; see also Chen, The Statutory Reforms of the Criminal Justice System and Its Lessons, supra note 61, at
76 to 77.
75
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that the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan expected; the judges were no fairer or more neutral than
they had been prior to the reform. On the contrary, the position of professional judges
under the Taiwanese criminal justice system became more complicated than before
because of the introduction of the prosecution review stage.78

Some concluded that the reason that professional judges’ duties increased instead
of being simplified after the reforms of 2002 was because the principle of “discovering
truth” was still the priority function in the Taiwanese criminal justice system. 79
Accordingly, it was inevitable that both the judicial system and society in Taiwan
expected that professional judges would do more in order to accomplish the goal of
finding facts.80

(3). Issues That Remained after the Previous Criminal Justice Reforms
Despite the fact that ten years had passed since the criminal justice reforms of
2002, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan still struggled with issues surrounding why the
criminal justice system had a low rate of reliance among the Taiwanese people. One
assumption might be an acceptable theory to explain the low approval rating in Taiwan.
That is, to Taiwanese society, policies regarding whether the Taiwanese criminal system
should adopt an inquisitional, an adversarial or a modified adversarial system did not
matter. 81 Or it could be said that people in Taiwan were unable to experience the

78

See Chen, id., at 78 to 80. (The author pointed out that the blind spot of these previous criminal justice
reforms was that there was too much expectation regarding the judge’s abilities.)
79
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 173 to 175.
80
Id.
81
See Lin Shantian (林山田), Bie Mishi zai Zhuyi de Conglin Zhong- wei Zhiquan Yuanze yu Diaocha
Yuangze Hanyuan (別迷失在主義的叢林中-為職權原則與調查原則喊冤) [Do Not Be Lost in the
Mystery of Doctrines- Support both the Principles of Inquisition and Investigation], 1 TAIWAN BENTU
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differences among these systems because most of them will not find themselves playing
the role of defendant, victim etc. in a criminal case.

Therefore, the practical standards that Taiwanese society used to evaluate its
criminal justice system were the results of judgments, rather than the feelings of
procedural fairness.82 In other words, although the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan kept trying to
improve the defendants’ procedural rights via those previous reforms, issues regarding
the low approval rate in Taiwan could not be solved because the Taiwanese people cared
more about the judgments’ reasonableness.83

There are five specific characteristics of the Taiwanese professional judges that
serve to influence the results of the approval rating in Taiwan. With regard to the
professional judges themselves, the ways that they were educated and trained forced them
to depart from the societal emotions in Taiwan.84 Additionally, the Taiwanese judicial
system as a whole is a closed institution,85 so that professional judges somehow need to
obey moral rules under the judicial administration.86

FAXUE ZAZHI [TAIWAN LAW REVIEW] 1, 9 (1999); see also Guo Weiting (郭威廷), Taiwan Xingshi Susong
Fa Chaoxiang Dangshiren Zhuyi Xiuzheng de Lishi Dongyin (台灣刑事訴訟法朝向當事人主義修正的歷
史動因) [The Historical Causes of the Adversarial Reform in Taiwanese Criminal Procedure], NATIONAL
TAIWAN UNIVERSITY, COLLEGE OF LAW (2004) at 3 to 5.
82
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 167. (The author questioned why Taiwanese society only focuses on the results of each
case, rather than the procedural fairness or justice of each case.)
83
Id.
84
Wang Qixiu (王啟秀), Xingshi Shenpan Zhidu zhi Yanjiu (刑事審判制度之研究) [The Study of
Criminal Trial Systems], CHUNG YUAN CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC LAW (2009) at 14 to 15.
85
See Cai, Discuss the Necessity and Possibility of Adopting a Lay Participation System in Taiwan, infra
note 104, at 12.
86
Yang Wenren (楊文仁), Cong Guomin Canyu Shenpan Zhidu Yanjiu Junren Canyu Junshi Shenpan zhi
Kexing Xing (從國民參與審判制度研究軍人參與軍事審判之可行性) [Based on the Study of Nation
Participation Judiciary to Investigate the Feasibility of Military Personnel Assigned as the Member of
Military Judiciary], NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, MANAGEMENT COLLEGE, DEPARTMENT OF LAW
(2011) at 123.
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Further, although trials are open to the public, the way that professional judges
have made their decisions has been too abstract for the people to understand.87 Moreover,
the position of the professional judges was too complicated, such that this situation not
only created some misunderstandings among the Taiwanese people,88 but also delayed the
trial proceedings and further caused a low rate of support for the criminal justice
system.89

A. An Elitist Educational System
In Taiwan, most of the professional judges completed an LL.B. degree when they
studied in a law school and then took the judicial official examination after graduating90
so that they could qualify for a two-year judiciary education program held by the
Academy for the Judiciary of the Ministry of Justice.91 Almost all law students dedicated
their time to this training system in order to be admitted by the judicial official
examination.92

87

Id., at 125 to 126.
See Wang, The Study of Criminal Trial Systems, supra note 84, at 16.
89
See Zhang, A Discussion about Introducing A Lay Participation System under A Criminal Justice System,
supra note 75, at 22 to 23.
90
See Chen Chuanyue (陳傳岳), Sifa shi Renmin de Sifa, Fayuan shi Renmin de Fayuan (司法是人民的司
法,法院是人民的法院) [Justice Belongs to the People, the Court is the People’s Court], 83 SIFA GAIGE
ZAZHI [JUDICIAL REFORM MAGAZINE] 43 (2011).
91
The Academy for the Judiciary, Ministry of Justice (Taiwan); available at
http://www.tpi.moj.gov.tw/mp092.html (last visited on Nov. 8, 2013).
92
See Zhang Yonghong (張永宏), Lun Guomin Canyu Xingshi Shenpan Zhidu de Jiben Linian (Xia)Jianlun Renmin Guanshen Shixing Tiaoli Caoan zhi Lifa Zongzhi (論國民參與刑事審判制度的基本理念
(下)-兼論人民觀審試行條例草案之立法宗旨) [Discuss the Basic Concepts of the Lay Participation
System (Two) - Also Focus on the Legitimate Purposes of the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer System],
213 YUEDAN FAXUE ZAZHI [TAIWAN LAW REVIEW] 177, 179 to 180 (2013).
88
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After completing the judiciary education programs, those admitted judicial
officers would be appointed as candidates of professional judges or prosecutors directly.93
Therefore, these professional judges seemed to depart from the “real world” for years
because both passing the official exam and being trained as a professional judge occupied
most of their time before sitting in the court.94

Accordingly, under this elitist educational system designed for Taiwanese
professional judges, the more years that some professional judges sit in the courtroom, the
more aloof and distant they become; this is the result of being isolated from society and
lacking social experiences. 95 As a result, this situation gradually caused some
controversial judgments, such as the cases that induced the White Rose Movement of
2010,96 to come down in Taiwan and further reduced Taiwanese societal reliance on the
criminal justice system.97

B. A Judicial Bureaucracy
Taiwanese constitutional law guarantees the professional judges’ position for
life, 98 and it guarantees them freedom from any interference, 99 such that they may
implement the independence of the justice. However, because of these constitutional
93

See Chen, Justice Belongs to the People, the Court is the People’s Court, supra note 90.
See Zhang, Discuss the Basic Concepts of the Lay Participation System (Two), supra note 92.
95
Zhang Shixian (張世賢), Zhuanjia Canshen Zhidu Fazhengce Xue Fenxi (專家參審制度法政策學分析)
[A Policy Analysis of the Experts Participation System], NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF KAOHSIUNG,
DEPARTMENT OF LAW (2008) at 131 to 133.
96
See the Establishment of Origin, the White Rose Social Care Association, supra note 25.
97
Lian Yuncheng (連雲呈), Woguo Guomin Canjia Xingshi Susong zhi Yanjiu (我國國民參加刑事訴訟之
研究) [A Study of the Lay Participation System in Taiwan], CHINESE CULTURE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT
OF LAW (2008) at 56 to 57 and 60 to 63.
98
MINGUO XIANFA [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA] art. 81 (1947) (Taiwan): “Judges shall
hold office for life.”
99
Id., art. 80 (1947): “Judges shall be above partisanship and shall, in accordance with law, hold trials
independently, free from any interference.”
94
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protections, the professional judges appeared to form an exclusive group, and the whole
judicial system, therefore, became a bureaucracy.100

Under this closed judicial system, the judicial administration dominated the
relationships among professional judges, particularly in the courts’ judicial levels and the
opportunities of promotion.101 Therefore, Taiwanese professional judges were restricted
and catered their points of view to the previous precedents, rulings and legal resolutions
without challenging that some of these previous decisions might have been outmoded.102

Accordingly, even though the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan proposed several criminal
justice reforms, the attitude of these professional judges made both the criminal
procedures and their judgments more and more rigid.103 Thus, Taiwanese society lost
confidence in professional judges’ credibility because of the closed judicial system as
well.104

C. Involved and Abstruse Judgments
When the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan tried to explore reasons as to why Taiwanese
society was not satisfied with its professional judges, it found that one of the factors
100

Huang Zhengzhong (黃政忠), Guomin Canyu Sifa Shenpan Zhidu zhi Yanjiu (國民參與司法審判制度
之研究) [Research on Citizens’ Participation in a Judicial System], NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY,
MANAGEMENT COLLEGE, DEPARTMENT OF LAW (1998) at 48 to 49.
101
See Yang, Based on the Study of Nation Participation Judiciary to Investigate the Feasibility of Military
Personnel Assigned as the Member of Military Judiciary, supra note 86, at 123 to 124; see also Zhang,
Discuss the Basic Concepts of the Lay Participation System (Two), supra note 92, at 179 to 180.
102
See Zhang, A Discussion about Introducing A Lay Participation System under A Criminal Justice
System, supra note 75, at 21 to 22; see also Zhang, id.
103
See Yang, Based on the Study of Nation Participation Judiciary to Investigate the Feasibility of Military
Personnel Assigned as the Member of Military Judiciary, supra note 86, at 123 to 124.
104
See Cai Zhifang (蔡志方), Lun Woguo Caixing Canshen Zhidu zhi Biyao Xing yu Kexing Xing (論我國
採行參審制度之必要性與可行性) [Discuss the Necessity and Possibility of Adopting a Lay Participation
System in Taiwan], 161 LUSHI TONGXUN [TAIPEI BAR JOURNAL] 9, 12 (1993).

21

affecting public opinion and satisfaction had to do with the unintelligibility of
judgments.105 Taiwanese professional judges used to use intricate and obscure phrases to
interpret legal issues and explain their conclusions and reasoning in a judgment.106 To
both the litigants and Taiwanese society, these intricate judgments seemed to be the
“professional secret”107 of the whole judicial system, and it was difficult to understand
how the court settled legal issues via laws.108 In other words, these decisions did not
“communicate” with the litigants or Taiwanese society.109

In Taiwan, although the court is always open to the public, to most of the
Taiwanese people, it is the judgment itself, rather than the trial proceedings, that is the
most significant link for them being able to understand the Taiwanese criminal justice
system. 110 Therefore, when Taiwanese society could not understand the professional
judges’ inclinations regarding legal issues by way of their abstruse judgments, the people
became disappointed and began to misunderstand the whole criminal justice system.111

105

See the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan, Weisheme Zhengyi Buneng Linran, Duli Buneng Angran- Cong
Dangqian de Sifa Kunjing Fansi Faguan de Shehui Zeren- Xia (為什麼正義不能凜然，獨立不能昂然-從
當前的司法困境反思法官的社會責任-下) [Why Justice Cannot be Implemented and Why Independence
Cannot be Realized (Two)-Discuss the Professional Judges’ Societal Responsibility Amidst the Current
Judicial Obstacles] 1571 SIFA ZHOUKAN 3 (Dec. 1, 2011).
106
See Huang, Research on Citizens’ Participation in a Judicial System, supra note 100.
107
See Zhang, A Discussion about Introducing A Lay Participation System under A Criminal Justice
System, supra note 75, at 21 to 22.
108
See Yang, Based on the Study of Nation Participation Judiciary to Investigate the Feasibility of Military
Personnel Assigned as the Member of Military Judiciary, supra note 86, at 125 to 126.
109
See SIFA ZHOUKAN, supra note 105. (This article pointed out that one of the professional judges’
societal responsibilities is to communicate with the litigants.)
110
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 167.
111
See Yang, Based on the Study of Nation Participation Judiciary to Investigate the Feasibility of Military
Personnel Assigned as the Member of Military Judiciary, supra note 86, at 125 to 126; see also Xie Kaijie
(謝凱傑), Woguo Caixing Renmin Canyu Shenpen Zhidu zhi Tantao- yi Guomin Canshen Shixing Tiaoli
Caoan wei Zhongxin (我國採行人民參與審判制度之探討-以國民參審試行條例草案為中心) [Citizen
Involvement in Taiwanese Criminal Procedure], NATIONAL CHENGKUNG UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF
LAW (2008) at 80 to 81.
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D. Complicated Roles of Professional Judges
Since discovering the truth is still a significant principle of the modified
adversarial system in Taiwan, 112 Taiwanese professional judges have their duties to
investigate evidence in order to determine the facts of crimes.113 Accordingly, even
though the criminal procedural laws put the burden of proof on prosecutors,114 in practice,
professional judges still investigate evidence directly or command a prosecutor to
investigate evidence in order to discover the truth. 115 Under these circumstances, a
professional judge inevitably plays both a “commander of investigation” and a “decision
maker of the case” in Taiwan.116

Moreover, the professional judges also need to implement the defendants’ right to
be presumed innocent.117 With these complicated and somehow contradictory authorities
amid Taiwanese professional judges, it is understandable why the majority of Taiwanese
society might have the wrong impression of their professional judges. When the majority
of Taiwanese people cannot distinguish a professional judge from a prosecutor,118 it is
unacceptable to them that the professional judges “guard” the defendant’s innocence
while the laws also require them to accomplish their mission to investigate evidence in
order to possibly convict the defendant during the trial proceedings.119

112

See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 173 to 175.
113
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 163, § 2 (2013).
114
See id., art. 161, § 1 (2013).
115
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 174.
116
See Wang, The Study of Criminal Trial Systems, supra note 84, at 16.
117
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 154 (2013).
118
See THE INVESTIGATION STATISTICS (2013), supra notes 48, at 19 to 26.
119
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 167.
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E. An Inefficient Criminal Justice System
There was an old phrase that said, “Justice delayed is justice denied.” Indeed, the
Taiwanese judicial system lost considerable public support because of its time-consuming
trial proceedings.120 According to the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan’s statistics, from the
Supreme Court to the District Court in Taiwan, it usually takes almost one or two months
for a court to close a case.121 This level of work efficiency was apparently not accepted by
Taiwanese society because in the previous investigative reports,122 all results concluded
in the same way, that if people should attend to a court many times, their satisfaction with
the Taiwanese judicial system would be low in the past five years:123
The year of 2011124 The year of 2012125

28.95 days128
73.58 days131
62.42 days134
Figure 5:
The average duration for the Taiwanese criminal justice system to close a case

The Supreme Court
The Appellate Court
The District Court

27.07 days127
68.92 days130
59.61 days133

The first half year of
2013126
32.86 days129
79.57 days132
65.26 days135

120

See Xie, Citizen Involvement in Taiwanese Criminal Procedure, supra note 111, at 78; see also Zhang,
A Discussion about Introducing A Lay Participation System under A Criminal Justice System, supra note
75, at 23.
121
See THE DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN, SIFA YEWU GAIKUANG (司法
業務概況) [THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS PROFILE], available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/index1.htm
(last visited on Nov. 9, 2013).
122
See THE INVESTIGATION STATISTICS (2009-2013), supra note 48.
123
Id. (This question was located at the following pages in each report: The year of 2009, at 5 to 6; The
year of 2010, at 4 to 5; The year of 2011, at 6; The year of 2012, at 35; The year of 2013, at 36.)
124
See THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS PROFILE (2011), supra note 121; available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/100all.pdf (last visited on Nov. 9, 2013).
125
See THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS PROFILE (2012), supra note 121; available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/101all.pdf (last visited on Nov. 9, 2013).
126
See THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS PROFILE (The first half year of 2013), supra note 121; available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/102up.pdf (last visited on Nov. 9, 2013).
127
See THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS PROFILE (2011), supra note 124, at 5.
128
See THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS PROFILE (2012), supra note 125, at 5.
129
See THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS PROFILE (The first half year of 2013), supra note 126, at 5.
130
See THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS PROFILE (2011), supra note 124, at 7.
131
See THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS PROFILE (2012), supra note 125, at 7.
132
See THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS PROFILE (The first half year of 2013), supra note 126, at 7.
133
See THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS PROFILE (2011), supra note 124, at 13.
134
See THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS PROFILE (2012), supra note 125, at 13.
135
See THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS PROFILE (The first half year of 2013), supra note 126, at 13.
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There is one thing that should be mentioned: the above statistics were the results
of the average duration of general cases, and in fact, the duration was much longer in a
number of significant cases.136 For example, there was one noted case,137 which began in
1991, that took almost twenty years to close, and it came to a close because of a new law
passed in 2010.138

In sum, it is time to make improvements to the Taiwanese criminal justice system,
and the improvements should especially place emphasis on reviewing the roles of
professional judges so that the Taiwanese judicial system can fall into favor with and
obtain more support from Taiwanese society.

1.3 Is Introducing a Lay Participation System an Effective Solution
After exploring the difficulties of the current Taiwanese criminal justice system,
the next step before introducing a lay participation system is to examine whether the
proposed system would be an effective solution. Accordingly, it is necessary to observe
whether or not citizens could or would be willing to play a critical role during the trial
proceedings, such that their participation would further improve the Taiwanese criminal
justice system. Moreover, the possibility of implementing a lay participation system is
136

See Zhang, Discuss the Basic Concepts of the Lay Participation System (Two), supra note 92, at 180 to
181.
137
The process of Su Jianhe, Zhuang Linxun and Liu Binglang’s case is on Wikipedia; available at
http://zh.wikipedia.org/zh/%E8%98%87%E5%BB%BA%E5%92%8C%E6%A1%88 (last visited on Nov. 9,
2013).
138
See XINGSHI TUOSU SHENPAN FA [THE CRIMINAL SPEEDY TRIAL ACT] art. 8 (2010) (Taiwan):
[A] case shall not be appealed to the Supreme Court if it is more than six years from the date the
case is pending in the first instance and after being remanded by the Supreme Court for the third
time, the court of second instance upholds the not guilty judgment rendered by the first instance or
its not guilty judgment has been upheld by courts of the same instance for more than twice before
remanding.
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also a crucial concern. Accordingly, the inclinations of professional judges, prosecutors,
defense lawyers and the general public in Taiwan are compulsory as well.

(1). Could the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan’s Expectations Be Fulfilled by a Lay
Participation System?
The Taiwanese Judicial Yuan completed the first draft of the “Proposed Act of the
Lay Observer System” on January 5th139 and further finalized this proposed act on June
14th in 2012.140 According to Article One,141 the goal with regard to this model of the lay
participation system was to increase people’s reliance on the Taiwanese judicial system.
Moreover, this newly designed system would also be expected to both raise the range of
the criminal justice system’s visibility and to improve the public’s understanding
regarding the trial proceedings under the Taiwanese criminal justice system.142

In order to achieve these anticipated objectives, the proposed lay participation
system, regardless of whether it would be the lay observer system under the Taiwanese
criminal justice system in the long run or not, needs to solve the five contemporary issues
that led to the noted mistrust of the judicial system in Taiwan.143

139

See the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan, Yanyi Renmin Guanshen Zhidu- Renmin Guanshen Shixing Tiaoli
Caoan Chugao Chulu, Sifa Yuan Jiang Tuidong Lifa (研議人民觀審制度- 人民觀審試行條例草案初稿出
爐，司法院將推動立法) [Discuss the Lay Observer System- The Draft of the Proposed Lay Observer
System Act was Completed, and the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan Would Further Push for Its Legislation] 1576
SIFA ZHOUKAN 1 (Jan. 5, 2012).
140
See the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan, the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer System, THE WEBSITE OF THE
LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/Guan-Shen/intro03.asp (last visited on Jan. 25, 2014).
141
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S RESEARCH REGARDING THE
PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – TWO, supra note 8.
142
Id.
143
These five issues are: an elitist educational system, a judicial bureaucracy, involved and abstruse
judgments, complicated roles of professional judges and an inefficient criminal justice system.
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As to the elitist judiciary education that caused the Taiwanese professional judges
to be apart from the societal emotions,144 a lay participation system would provide
opportunities for professional judges to supplement both their general sense and social
experiences from the citizens’ participation during the trial proceedings.145 Moreover, a
lay participation system would mitigate the concerns regarding the judicial bureaucracy
and the unintelligible judgments associated with the Taiwanese criminal justice system
because both professional judges and joined citizens could communicate more effectively
with one another in trials.146

Furthermore, it is impossible for laymen to spend two months on judging a
case,147 the lay participation system would also shorten the duration of trial proceedings,
allowing cases to reach their conclusions much faster.148 Although a lay participation
system would increase professional judges’ duties in the courtroom because they have to
clarify both legal and procedural concepts to laymen,149 it would, in practice, help to
make a judge’s duties more focused, rather than more expanded. For example, one
supporting policy, which is concerned with solidifying the preliminary proceedings,
would minimize the judge’s duties before the trial begins because issues would be
precisely focused so that professional judges would not have to sum up again during the
trial proceedings.150

144

See Zhang, Discuss the Basic Concepts of the Lay Participation System (Two), supra note 92.
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S RESEARCH REGARDING THE
PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – TWO, supra note 8; see also the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan,
the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer System, supra note 140. (The instruction of Article 1.)
146
Id.
147
See THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS PROFILE, supra notes 133 to 135.
148
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S RESEARCH REGARDING THE
PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – TWO, supra note 8, at 791 to 793; see also the Taiwanese
Judicial Yuan, the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer System, supra note 140. (The instruction of Article 37.)
149
Id.
150
Id.
145
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In short, a lay participation system would be an efficient criminal justice reform
measure because it could solve most of the current issues regarding the Taiwanese
criminal justice system. Not only would professional judges be more inclined to make
“proper” decisions that comply with both the rules of law and societal emotions but also
citizens would personally experience how difficult it is for professional judges to
command the trial proceedings within a limited time by way of the evidence disclosed in
the courtroom.151

(2). The Possibilities of Introducing a Lay Participation System in Taiwan
After the lay observer system was announced as the next criminal justice reform
in Taiwan, the Judicial Yuan immediately began to investigate the general public’s
inclinations as they pertained to reform in order to analyze whether Taiwanese society
would support the introduction of the lay observer system. The Judicial Yuan not only
conducted several polls itself, but it also assigned various institutions to further explore
more detailed and professional statistics with regard to the possibilities of establishing the
lay observer system under the Taiwanese criminal justice system.

A. The General Public’s Inclinations toward the Lay Participation System
Since the lay observer system needs laymen to participate in it, the Taiwanese
Judicial Yuan was especially concerned with the public opinions regarding this system.
The first poll was completed right after the Judicial Yuan declared that the lay observer

151

See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S RESEARCH REGARDING THE
PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – TWO, supra note 8; see also the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan,
the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer System, supra note 140. (The instruction of Article 1.)
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system would be the next criminal justice reform in Taiwan.152 In this brief inquiry, the
Judicial Yuan explored three preliminary topics:153 first, it looked at whether Taiwanese
society would support the lay observer system; second, it assessed whether people would
choose the lay observer system to be a part of their own case; and, third, it examined
whether people would be willing to be lay observers under the Taiwanese criminal justice
system.

With regard to Taiwanese society’s approval of the lay observer system, the
results showed that almost 96.5% of the experimental subjects would support the lay
observer system.154 Additionally, as defendants, 83.4% of the people would apply this
system to their own trial proceedings. 155 Moreover, when the experimental subjects
placed themselves in the role of victim or complainant, it was demonstrated that 86.5% of
them would support the lay observer system.156 With regard to people’s inclinations
toward being lay observers under the Taiwanese criminal justice system, 85.9% of the
experimental subjects stated that they would be willing to participate in trial proceedings
in this capacity.157

152

See JUDICIAL YUAN (TAIWAN), DELIBERATION OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM (2011), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/revolution/judReform03.asp (last visited on Nov. 22, 2013). (This is an official
website created by the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan when it first declared its intent to introduce the lay
observer system into the criminal justice system in Taiwan.)
153
Id. (There were 472 Taiwanese people who took this poll.)
154
Id. (Among 472 subjects, there were 431 experimental subjects who had very clear views with regard to
this issue. Of the respondents, 39% supported the lay observer system, and 57.5% accepted that the
implementation of the lay observer system could server as an attempt by the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan to
improve the criminal justice system.)
155
Id. (Among 472 subjects, there were 404 experimental subjects who had very clear views with regard to
this issue. Of the respondents, 45% were eager to apply the lay observer system to his or her trial
proceedings, and 38.4% might accept the lay observer system to be his or her case trial pattern.)
156
Id. (Among 472 subjects, there were 408 experimental subjects who had very clear views with regard to
this issue. Of the respondents, 46.8% were eager to adopt the lay observer system to his or her involved
case, and 39.7% might accept the lay observer system to be his or her case trial pattern.)
157
Id. (Among 472 subjects, there were 413 experimental subjects had very clear views with regard to this
issue. Of the respondents, 50.8% were eager to serve as a lay observer, and 35.1% might accept to serve as
a lay observer when he or she was selected.)
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After this brief inquiry was completed, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan proceeded
with additional research and conducted it during its consulting conferences.158 The initial
research was a summary of the results of six official forums held by different district
courts to introduce the lay observer system to professional judges.159 Therefore, the range
of the experimental subjects was limited to people who attended these six forums.160
Furthermore, these forums were mainly held as policy illustration meetings for
professional judges, the experimental subjects were thus divided into two groups:
“professional judges” and “others” in these results. 161 In other words, experimental
subjects other than professional judges could include not only the general public but also
prosecutors and defense lawyers.162

According to this research,163 even though most people engaged in legal practice
were not in support of the lay observer system,164 the results as a whole could still be

158

After the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan declared its intentions of introducing the lay observer system in
Taiwan, it organized a consulting committee to discuss any issues regarding the possibility of adopting the
lay observer system into the Taiwanese criminal justice system. This committee held ten conferences
between January and July in 2011.
159
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 118 to 120. (These official forums were held by
Taipei, Taoyuan, Gaoxiong, Pingdong, Taidong and Penghu District Courts.)
160
Id., at 119. (The six district courts delivered 360 questionnaires in total and received 297 back.); see
also JUDICIAL YUAN, CRIMINAL DEPARTMENT, SIFAYUAN RENMIN GUANSHEN ZHIDU YANYI ZILIAO
HUIBIAN ZHONG (司法院人民觀審制度研議資料彙編(中)) [THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL
YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – TWO] 446 to 457, 474 to 499
and 521 to 560 (Judicial Yuan Criminal Department, 1st ed. 2012).
161
Id.
162
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 119; see also JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF
THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – TWO,
supra note 160, at 475. (According to the reports, 18.9% of the experimental subjects were engaged in legal
practices and 81.1% were not.)
163
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, id., at 110 to 111. (The third consulting conference was held on
Feb. 25th, 2012. Item No. 5 on the agenda was to announce the results of the “Evaluation Regarding the
Possibility of the Lay Participation System”; the results were provided by the Department of Statistics of
the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan.)
164
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – TWO, supra note 160. (In the report, each result was displayed in two
ways: the result as a whole and a separated percentage of the general public and the people engaged in legal
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viewed as positive that most of the Taiwanese people tended to support the lay observer
system:
The initial inquiry
The initial research
Do you support the lay observer system
96.5%
97.1%165
When being a defendant, would you
83.4%
86.6%166
apply to the lay observer system
When being a victim or a complaint,
86.5%
87.5%167
are you willing to adopt the lay
observer system to your case
Would you participate in a trial as a lay
85.9%
88%168
observer
Figure 6:
Comparative results of the first two investigative reports
Following this research, in order to obtain more professional and more systematic
statistics before the consulting conferences ended, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan further
assigned a general public poll with regard to issues pertaining to the lay observer system
to the Election Study Center of the National Chengchi University. 169 Before the
consulting conferences had come to an end, issues of whether the Taiwanese criminal
justice system should adopt a general lay participation system or a unique lay observer
system were still controversial; therefore, this research designed its options between the
general lay participation system and the unique lay observer system.170

practices. The results regarding those engaged in legal practices will be further discussed later in this
chapter.)
165
Id., at 483. (Among 360 experimental subjects, 273 expressed very clear views with regard to this issue;
45.1% supported the lay observer system, and 52% might accept that the lay observer system could be an
attempt for the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan to improve the criminal justice system.)
166
Id., at 479. (Among 360 experimental subjects, 255 expressed very clear views with regard to this issue;
49% were eager to apply the lay observer system to his or her trial proceedings, and 37.6% might accept it.)
167
Id., at 480. (Among 360 experimental subjects, 57 expressed very clear views with regard to this issue;
49.8% were eager to adopt the lay observer system to his or her involved case, and 37.7% might accept it.)
168
Id., at 482. (Among 360 experimental subjects, 259 expressed very clear views with regard to this issue;
54.8% were eager to serve as a lay observer, and 33.2% might accept to serve a lay observer when he or she
was selected.)
169
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 332. (Item No. 5 of the last conference agenda
was to announce the results of this general public poll, on July 12th, 2012.)
170
See JUDICIAL YUAN, CRIMINAL DEPARTMENT, SIFAYUAN RENMIN GUANSHEN ZHIDU YANYI ZILIAO
HUIBIAN XIA (司法院人民觀審制度研議資料彙編(下)) [THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL
YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – THREE] 215 to 346 (Judicial
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With regard to the general public’s inclinations regarding these two probable
systems, 71.8% of the experimental subjects stated that they would support the unique lay
observer system,171 and 67.6% stated that they would support the general lay participation
system. 172 These results demonstrated that both system types would be accepted by
Taiwanese society:173
Judgments decided by
Judgments decided by both
professional judges only
professional judges and laymen
Strongly Support
14.6%
20.3%
Support
57.2%
47.3%
Oppose
15.5%
19.7%
Strongly Oppose
8.2%
8.6%
No Comment
4.6%
4.2%
Figure 7:
Comparative results of the lay observer system and the lay participation system
Upon further exploration, it was determined that when the experimental subjects
placed themselves in different roles under these two probable systems, the unique lay
observer system would obtain more approval from Taiwanese society when the
experimental subjects saw themselves as defendants in criminal cases.174 On the other
hand, the differences between the unique lay observer system and the general lay

Yuan Criminal Department, 1st ed. 2012). (Within this general public poll, each question has two options
that allow for the experimental subjects to express their opinions or points of view. The first one stated that
professional judges alone would decide judgments, a characteristic of the unique lay observer system. The
second one stated that judgments would be decided by professional judges and laymen, a characteristic of
the general lay participation system.)
171
Id., at 240. (There were 1,073 people who took part in this research. There were 156 people would
strongly support the unique lay observer system, and 614 people would support it. On the other hand, 166
of the 1,073 people would not support the unique lay observer system, and 88 people would strongly
oppose it. Of the respondents, 49 people did not declare their views regarding this topic.)
172
Id. (There were 1,073 people who took part in this research. There were 218 people would strongly
support the general lay participation system, and 507 people would support it. On the other hand, 211 of the
1,073 people would not support the general lay participation system, and 93 people would strongly oppose
it. Of the respondents, 45 people did not declare their views regarding this topic.)
173
Id., at 240 and 245. (The research concluded that there was no statistical distinction regarding the
differences in the results as they pertain to these two probable systems.)
174
Id., at 236 to 237 and 245. (The result showed that 71.3% of Taiwanese society tended to support the
unique lay observer system, while only 61.7% tended to apply for the general lay participation system when
they were the defendants in criminal cases.)
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participation system constituted no statistical distinction when the experimental subjects
saw themselves as victims in criminal cases:175
Judgment decided by
Judgment decided by both
176
professional judges only
professional judges and laymen177
Strongly Support
10%
11.6%
Support
61.3%
50.1%
Oppose
14.8%
18.7%
Strongly Oppose
7.0%
9.3%
No Comment
6.8%
10.2%
Figure 8:
Question: When viewing yourself as a defendant, what is your position regarding these
two different situations?
Judgment decided by
Judgment decided by both
178
professional judges only
professional judges and laymen179
Strongly Support
13.1%
16.2%
Support
59.3%
50.8%
Oppose
12.6%
17.5%
Strongly Oppose
8.2%
7.7%
No Comment
7.0%
7.9%
Figure 9:
Question: When viewing yourself as a victim, what is your position regarding these two
different situations?
This research summed up that, regardless of whether a general lay participation
system or a unique lay observer system would be established, the majority of Taiwanese
175

Id., at 238 to 239 and 245. (The result showed that 72.4% of Taiwanese society tended to support the
unique lay observer system. At the same time, there were also 67% who would accept the general lay
participation system when they were the victims in criminal cases. The differences (5%) between these two
systems did not represent a statistical distinction.)
176
Id., at 237. (There were 1,073 people took part in this research. Of the respondents, 108 people would
strongly support the unique lay observer system, and 658 people would support it. On the other hand, 159
of the 1,073 respondents would not support the unique lay observer system, and 75 people would strongly
oppose it. Of the respondents, 73 people did not declare their views regarding this topic.)
177
Id. (There were 1,073 people took part in this research. Of the respondents, 125 people would strongly
support the general lay participation system, and 538 people would support it. On the other hand, 201 of the
1,073 respondents would not support the general lay participation system, and 100 people would strongly
oppose it. Of the respondents, 109 people did not declare their views regarding this topic.)
178
Id., at 239. (There were 1,073 people who took part in this research. Of the respondents, 141 people
would strongly support the unique lay observer system, and 636 people would support it. On the other hand,
136 of the 1,073 respondents would not support the unique lay observer system, and 86 people would
strongly oppose it. Of the respondents, 75 people did not declare their views regarding this topic.)
179
Id. (There were 1,073 people who took part in this research. Of the respondents, 173 people would
strongly support the general lay participation system, and 545 people would support it. On the other hand,
187 of the 1,073 respondents would not support the general lay participation system, and 82 people would
strongly oppose it. Of the respondents, 85 people did not declare their views regarding this topic.)
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society would support any probable systems as the Judicial Yuan’s criminal justice
reform measure.180 When viewing themselves as part of criminal cases, the Taiwanese
people preferred the unique lay observer system over the general lay participation system.
Accordingly, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan began to draft the proposed law for its original
idea, which was to frame a lay observer system under the Taiwanese criminal justice
system. After the proposed law was completed, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan further
assigned three public mediums to survey public opinion:181

180

Id., at 252 and 256.
The three pubic media were: The Era News Survey Center, the TVBS Poll Center and the Gallup
Market Research Corp., Taiwan; available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/Guan-Shen/study03.asp (last
visited on Nov. 23, 2013).
181
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Would you support the lay observer Are you willing to be a layman in
system?
the trial proceedings?
Yes
No
No Opinion
Yes
No
No Opinion
182
183
184
185
186
Era News
72%
9.1%
18.8%
59%
32.3%
8.8%187
188
189
190
191
192
TVBS
73%
15.3%
11.6%
56.3%
33.5%
10.2%193
Gallup
79.2%194 11.3%195
9.4%196
56.7%197 32.6%198
10.7%199
Figure 10:
Comparative results of the approval of the lay observer system and the general public’s
inclinations toward being a lay observer in Taiwan

182

The Era News Survey Center, The Investigative Report Regarding the General Public’s Inclinations
toward the Lay Observer System (2012), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/GuanShen/download/%E9%99%84%E4%BB%B65%EF%BC%9A%E5%B9%B4%E4%BB%A3%E6%B0%91%E7%9C%BE%E5%B0%8D%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%80%E5%AF%A9%
E5%88%B6%E5%BA%A6%E7%9C%8B%E6%B3%95%E6%B0%91%E6%84%8F%E8%AA%BF%E6
%9F%A5%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A.pdf (last visited on Nov. 23, 2013). (There were 1,070 people who
took part in this poll; 28.6% strongly supported the lay observer system, and 43.4% supported it.)
183
Id., at 13. (There were 6.6% who did not support the lay observer system, and 2.5% were strongly
opposed to it.)
184
Id.
185
Id., at 16. (There were 1,070 people who took part in this poll; 20% are willing to be a lay observer, and
39% might accept to serve a lay observer when he or she was selected.)
186
Id. (Of the respondents, 23.6% might refuse to be a lay observer; and 8.7% would decline this position.)
187
Id.
188
The TVBS Poll Center, The Investigative Report Regarding the General Public’s Inclinations toward
the Lay Observer System (2012), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/GuanShen/download/%E9%99%84%E4%BB%B66%EF%BC%9ATVBS%E6%B0%91%E7%9C%BE%E5%B0%8D%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%80%E5%AF%A9%
E5%88%B6%E5%BA%A6%E7%9C%8B%E6%B3%95%E6%B0%91%E6%84%8F%E8%AA%BF%E6
%9F%A5%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A%20.pdf (last visited on Nov. 23, 2013). (There were 1,075 people
who took part in this poll; 33.4% strongly supported the lay observer system, and 39.6% supported it.)
189
Id., at 8. (Of the respondents, 11.1% do not support the lay observer system, and 4.2% are strongly
opposed to it.)
190
Id.
191
Id., at 10. (There were 1,075 people who took part in this poll; 22.1% are willing to serve as a lay
observer; and 34.3% might agree to accept this position when he or she was selected.)
192
Id. (There were 22.4% might refuse to be a lay observer; and 11.1% would decline this position.)
193
Id.
194
The Gallup Market Research Corp., Taiwan, The Investigative Report Regarding the Issues of General
Public Participation in Trial Proceedings (2012), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/GuanShen/download/%E9%99%84%E4%BB%B67%EF%BC%9A%E8%93%8B%E6%B4%9B%E6%99%AE%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E5%8F%83%E8%88%87%E5%AF%A9%E5%88%A4%E7%9B%B8%E9
%97%9C%E5%95%8F%E9%A1%8C%E6%B0%91%E6%84%8F%E8%AA%BF%E6%9F%A5%E5%A0
%B1%E5%91%8A.pdf (last visited on Nov. 23, 2013). (There were 1,071 people who took part in this poll;
34.8% of the experimental subjects would strongly support the lay observer system, and 44.4% would
support it.)
195
Id., at 9. (Of the respondents, 8.8% do not support the lay observer system, and 2.6% would strongly
oppose it.)
196
Id.
197
Id., at 11. (There were 1,071 people who took part in this poll; 16.8% of the experimental subjects
would be willing to be a lay observer, and 40% might agree to serve as a layman if selected.)
198
Id. (Of the respondents, 24.2% might refuse to be a lay observer, and 8.3% would decline this position.)
199
Id.
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Each of these three polls addressed different topics. For example, the Era News
poll investigated whether Taiwanese society was aware of the lay observer system.200 The
result showed that only 23.4% of the experimental subjects knew that the Taiwanese
Judicial Yuan was promoting the lay observer system, while 76.5% did not know.201
TVBS also explored the public inclinations toward implementing a jury system,202 and it
concluded that the majority of Taiwanese society still relied on professional judges’
determination during criminal trial proceedings.203 A Gallup poll examined the public
opinion on implementing a general lay participation system, and the results revealed that
Taiwanese society was hesitant about whether judgments could be made by both
professional judges and laymen.204

When the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan endeavored to investigate the general public’s
inclinations toward its proposed lay observer system, some critics challenged that these
results had come from either promotional events205 or official forums. Therefore, the
critics stated that these results were “biased samples” because people who attended these
events could be assumed to potentially give their support to or at least show interest in the

200

See the Era News Survey Center, The Investigative Report, supra note 182, at 12.
Id.
202
See the TVBS Poll Center, The Investigative Report, supra note 188, at 12.
203
Id. (Of the experimental subjects, 79.3% stated that the possibility of wrongful judgments would
become greater if only laymen were permitted to decide a case.)
204
See the Gallup Market Research, The Investigative Report, supra note 194, at 13. (Although 41.2% of
the experimental subjects would support the general lay participation system, 45.3% of the experimental
subjects do not agree with this system; 13.5% of respondents did not share their views regarding this issue.)
205
See the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan, THE INVESTIGATION REPORT OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC OPINIONS
ABOUT THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM (ONE) AND (TWO); available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/GuanShen/study03.asp (last visited on Nov. 24, 2013). (The Judicial Yuan held four events between November
2012 and April 2013; these events were designed to promote their proposed system. Participants completed
938 questionnaires, and almost 90% of the experimental subjects stated that they would support the lay
observer system in Taiwan.)
201
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lay observer system.206 Accordingly, the high approvals of the lay observer system might
not have statistical significance.

Hence, three researchers with Academia Sinica207 decided to engage in other
aspects of investigation that focused more on whether the general lay participation system
would also be accepted by Taiwanese society when the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan focused
heavily on its lay observer system in its polls.208 In this academic investigation, the
research group explored three main topics. They first looked at whether Taiwanese
society would support the general lay participation system.209 In addition, they assessed
whether people in Taiwan would be willing to act as laymen in the trial proceedings with
professional judges. Moreover, they sought to determine which of the probable systems
would be Taiwanese society’s preference, the general lay participation system or the lay
observer system.

With regard to the approval of the general lay participation system, 23.4% of the
experimental subjects stated that they would strongly support the general lay participation
system, and 43.6% would accept the Taiwanese criminal justice system’s move to adopt
it.210 On the other hand, 27.7% of the experimental subjects stated that they would not

206

See Chen Gongping (陳恭平), Huang Guochang (黃國昌) and Lin Changqing (林常青), Taiwan
Renmin Duiyu Guomin Canyu Shengpan zhi Taidu- yi 2011 Nian Fenzheng Jiejue Xingwei Shizheng Yanjui
Yushi Diaocha Jieguo wei Jichu (台灣人民對於國民參與審判之態度-以 2011 年 “紛爭解決行為實證研
究” 預試調查結果為基礎) [The Taiwanese People’s Attitudes on Participating in Trial ProceedingsBased on the Results of Research Conducted in 2011], 177 TAIWAN FAXUE ZAZHI [TAIWAN LAW JOURNAL]
15, 17 (2011).
207
This academic institution is the highest research center in Taiwan.
208
See Chen, Huang and Lin, The Taiwanese People’s Attitudes on Participating in Trial Proceedings,
supra note 206.
209
Id., at 19. (The research group explained to the subjects that the general lay participation system would
grant the layman the same right to decide the case along with professional judges.)
210
Id.
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accept this system, and 5.3% would strongly oppose its introduction.211 Based on these
results, the research group further found that whether the experimental subjects knew of
or had heard of the general lay participation system was crucial to the results.212 It
showed that 61.3% of the experimental subjects were familiar with the general lay
participation system, and 38.7% were not.213 By a comparative analysis, people who
knew of the lay participation system revealed more positive intentions on supporting it.214
Support
Oppose
Strongly Oppose
45.1%
20.1%
3.7%
41.0%
40.0%
8.0%
Figure 11:
The correlation between knowing the lay participation system and the general public’s
inclinations toward the approval of the lay participation system

Know
Did Not Know

Strongly Support
31.1%
11.0%

Furthermore, the research group discovered that the same factor also influenced
the general public’s decisions regarding which kind of system, the general lay
participation system or the lay observer system, would obtain more approval:215
Prefer Lay
Participation
System
47.3%
25.0%
38.9%

Prefer Lay
Both Are
Both Are
Observer
Acceptable
Not Acceptable
System
Know
41.2%
9.1%
2.4%
Did Not Know
55.0%
8.0%
12.0%
As a Whole216
46.4%
8.7%
6.0%
Figure 12:
The correlation between knowing the lay participation system and the general public’s
inclinations toward the choices between the two probable systems
Finally, as to the inclinations regarding whether the Taiwanese people would
agree to serve as laymen during criminal trial proceedings, 11.2% of the experimental

211

Id., at 20.
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id., at 25.
215
Id., at 26.
216
This result did not distinguish whether or not the experimental subjects are familiar with and understand
the lay participation system.
212
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subjects expressed that they would be eager to serve in this capacity.217 Additionally,
39.8% of the respondents stated that they might accept this position when they are
selected.218 On the other hand, 35.7% of the experimental subjects stated that they might
accept to serve as laymen, and 13.4% would decline to serve in this capacity during trial
proceedings. 219 In sum, only half of the experimental subjects would be willing to
participate in a criminal trial in Taiwan.

Per these results, it is evident that the lay observer system proposed by the
Taiwanese Judicial Yuan had obtained the majority of Taiwanese society’s approval, and
this remained the case even when the experimental subjects had to choose between it and
the general lay participation system. However, people’s opinions and inclinations with
regard to serving as lay observers in Taiwan might become a concern because no more
than 60% of the experimental subjects claimed that they would act as lay observers
during trial proceedings:

Election Study Center of the
National Chengchi University220
Era News
TVBS
Gallup
Academia Sinica

Lay Observer System
Lay Participation System
Support
Oppose
Support
Oppose
76.8%
17.5%
71.3%
24.1%

72.0%
9.1%
N/A
73.0%
15.3%
N/A
79.2%
11.3%
N/A
46.4% preference
38.9% preference
Figure 13:
Comparative results of the approval rate between the lay observer system and the lay
participation system

217

See Chen, Huang and Lin, The Taiwanese People’s Attitudes on Participating in Trial Proceedings,
supra note 206, at 20.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – THREE, supra note 170, at 247 to 248.
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Agree
Election Study Center of the
National Chengchi University
Era News
TVBS
Gallup
Academia Sinica

Decline
71.8%

23.7%

59.0%
56.3%
56.7%
51.0%

32.3%
33.5%
32.6%
49.1%

Figure 14:
Comparative results of the inclinations toward being a layman under the criminal trial
proceedings in Taiwan

B. The Inclinations of People Who Are Engaged in Legal Practice
Both the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan and the academic institutions placed emphasis
on the general public’s inclinations regarding the unique lay observer system and the
general lay participation system. Although these two probable systems indeed need
society’s support before they can be implemented, the inclinations of professional judges,
prosecutors and defense lawyers should also be of considerable value because these
people stand on the front line. Therefore, their experiences and opinions would be useful
in exploring whether a lay participation system is necessary to the Taiwanese criminal
justice system and, if it is, what kind of system would be more suitable in Taiwan.

(a). The Inclinations of Professional Judges
When the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan declared that the lay observer system would
be its next criminal justice reform measure, six official forums were held by different
district courts in order to introduce the lay observer system to professional judges.221
After these policy illustration meetings were completed, the Judicial Yuan also assessed

221

See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 118 to 120.
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the professional judges’ opinions with regard to the implementation of the unique lay
observer system into the Taiwanese criminal justice system.222

The first issue to be addressed had to do with whether professional judges would
agree that laymen’s participation is better than professional judges’ sole determination
under the criminal trial proceedings.223 43.3% of the professional judges stated that it is
better if only the professional judge was in the position to hand down judgment in a
criminal case.224 In contrast, 35.7% of judges agreed that the criminal justice system
should allow the general public’s participation. 225 At the same time, 21.1% of the
professional judges believed that both situations were acceptable under the Taiwanese
criminal justice system.226

Upon exploring professional judges’ inclinations regarding which kind of system
is more suitable when laymen take part in Taiwanese criminal trial proceedings,227 it was
determined that 45.2% of the professional judges would support the unique lay observer
system,228 38.1% would support the jury system229 and 16.8% would support the general
lay participation.230

222

See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – TWO, supra note 160, at 458 to 473 and 500 to 520.
223
Id., at 459. (There were 190 questionnaires delivered during the six forums, and 171 were received by
the Department of Statistics of the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan.)
224
Id., at 466. (74 of 171 judges stated that only professional judges should determine judgments.)
225
Id. (61 of 171 judges stated that both judges and laymen should have the ability to determine judgments.)
226
Id. (36 of 171 judges stated that a judgment could be determined either exclusively by professional
judges or by both professional judges and laymen.)
227
Id., at 460. (There were 190 questionnaires delivered during the six forums, and 155 were received by
the Department of Statistics of the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan.)
228
Id., at 466. (70 of 155 judges stated that the unique lay observer system would be more suitable for the
Taiwanese criminal justice system.)
229
Id. (59 of 155 judges stated that the jury system would be more suitable for the Taiwanese criminal
justice system.)
230
Id. (26 of 155 judges stated that the general lay participation system would be more suitable for the
Taiwanese criminal justice system.)
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In sum,231 42.6% of professional judges would accept the lay observer system as a
criminal justice reform measure in Taiwan,232 and 3.4% would agree to introduce this
unique system into the criminal trial proceedings as soon as possible.233 However, 54.1%
of professional judges considered it unnecessary for the Taiwanese criminal justice
system to introduce a lay observer system at the same time.234

(b). The Inclinations of Prosecutors and Defense Lawyers
The inclinations of prosecutors and defense lawyers were also analyzed during the
six policy illustration meetings held by the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan.235 There were fiftythree persons engaged in legal practice who took part in these six investigations,236 and
forty-four of these people provided their views and opinions with regard to whether or not
the Taiwanese criminal justice system should adopt the lay observer system.237 The
results indicated that although people engaged in legal practice would accept the lay
observer system as a measure of criminal justice reform in Taiwan, their inclinations were
more conservative than those of the general public:

231

Id., at 462. (There were 190 questionnaires delivered during the six forums, and 148 were received by
the Department of Statistics of the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan.)
232
Id., at 467. (63 of 148 judges stated that the unique lay observer system would be acceptable for the
Taiwanese criminal justice system.)
233
Id. (5 of 148 judges stated that the unique lay observer system would be more suitable for the
Taiwanese criminal justice system.)
234
Id. (80 of 148 professional judges stated that the unique lay observer system would not be helpful for
the Taiwanese criminal justice system.)
235
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE and TWO, supra notes 162 to 164.
236
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – TWO, supra note 160, at 475. (Of the experimental subjects, 287
people answered the questions pertaining to their careers; 53 of them stated that their occupations were
legal in nature, and 228 of them stated that they were not engaged in any legal practice.)
237
See id., at 499.
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Percentage of People Engaged in
Legal Practice
Percentage as a Whole241

Agree
15.9%238

Accept
77.3%239

Decline
6.8%240

45.1%
52.0%
2.9%
Figure 15:
Comparative results between the inclinations of people engaged in legal practice and the
inclinations including both the general public and people engaged in legal practice

C. Conclusion
Before introducing a lay participation system into the criminal trial proceedings in
Taiwan, regardless of whether it would be the unique lay observer system or the general
lay participation system, this criminal justice reform measure would need to receive the
approval of the general public because a lay participation system cannot be implemented
without society’s support. According to public polls and the research conducted, both the
unique lay observer system designed by the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan and the general lay
participation system would obtain over 70% of Taiwanese societal approval.242 Therefore,
it could be concluded that the majority of the Taiwanese people would agree with the
introduction of a lay participation system under its criminal justice system.

At the same time, the attitudes and the inclinations of those engaged in legal
practice must also be taken into account and must hold even more weight than the
inclinations expressed by the general public because those legal professionals are on the
front line of the criminal trial proceedings. Therefore, their opinions should be more
practical than the general public. According to the six investigative reports completed
238

Id. (Among 44 people whose work involved a legal practice, there were 7 people who agreed that the
Taiwanese Judicial Yuan should adopt the lay observer system into its criminal justice system.)
239
Id. (Among 44 people whose work involved a legal practice, there were 34 people who accepted that the
lay observer system as a criminal justice reform in Taiwan.)
240
Id. (Among 44 people whose work involved a legal practice, there were 3 people who opposed the lay
observer system as a criminal justice reform in Taiwan.)
241
Id., at 483. (The Initial Research.)
242
See Figure 13.

43

after the official forums, it seemed that the professional judges, 243 prosecutors and
defense lawyers244 would be more conservative than the general public in their views
regarding laymen’s participation.245

However, these practical results had, in fact, already been more positive than
before. In early 2011,246 a regional research was conducted regarding the practical views
as they pertained to the introduction of a lay participation system.247 According to the
results, these legal professionals were extremely opposed to the introduction of the lay
participation system that was proposed by the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan in 2007:248

243

See the Inclinations of Professional Judges, supra notes 227 to 230.
See Figure 15.
245
See Figure 6.
246
Dong Liangyou (董良友), Guomin Canshen Shixing Tiaoli Canan zhi Fa Shizheng Yanjui- yi Jiayi Diqu
Sifa Renyuan wei Zhongxin (國民參審試行條例草案之法實證研究-以嘉義地區司法人員為中心)
[Researches in Quantitative Methods on the Draft of Citizen Participation in the Judicial Decision Making
Process- Centering on Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers in Chiayi County], NATIONAL CHUNG CHENG
UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT AND GRADUATE INSTITUTION OF CRIMINOLOGY (2011).
247
Id., at 119 to 120, 141 and 160 to 161.
248
Id. (The author explored the inclinations of professional judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers
regarding the issues of introducing a lay participation system, called “Guomin Canshen Zhi” under the
Taiwanese criminal justice system.)
244
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Professional Judges
Prosecutors
Defense Lawyers
249
250
Yes
6.0%
0%
23.5%251
252
253
No
83.0%
66.7%
23.5%254
No Opinion
11.0%255
33.3%256
47.0%257
Did Not Answer
N/A
N/A
6.0%258
Figure 16:
Question: Is the lay participation system suitable for the Taiwanese criminal justice
system?
These results revealed that neither professional judges nor prosecutors considered
laymen’s participation necessary under the Taiwanese criminal justice system at that time.
Further, although defense lawyers’ overall rate of support was higher than that of
professional judges and prosecutors, their general attitude with regard to establishing a
lay participation system in Taiwan was, in fact, cautious because more than 50% of them
did not state their viewpoints about whether a lay participation system is suitable for the
Taiwanese criminal justice system.

However, comparing this early regional research to later polls and investigative
reports demonstrates that the practical attitude toward introducing a lay participation
system into the Taiwanese criminal justice system become more positive:

249

Id., at 119. (The author delivered 30 questionnaires to the judges and received 18 back. Only one judge
supported the introduction of the lay participation system in Taiwan.)
250
Id., at 141. (The author delivered 30 questionnaires to the prosecutors and received 18 back. None of the
prosecutor supported the introduction of the lay participation system in Taiwan.)
251
Id., at 160 to 161. (The author delivered 30 questionnaires to the defense lawyers and received 17 back.
Four defense lawyers supported the introduction of the lay participation system in Taiwan.)
252
Id., at 119. (Fifteen judges were opposed to the introduction of the lay participation system in Taiwan.)
253
Id., at 141. (Twelve prosecutors opposed to the introduction of the lay participation system in Taiwan.)
254
Id., at 160 to 161. (Four defense lawyers opposed to the introduction of the lay participation system in
Taiwan.)
255
Id., at 119. (Two professional judges declined to share their views regarding this issue.)
256
Id., at 141. (Six prosecutors declined to share their views regarding this issue.)
257
Id., at 160 to 161. (Eight defense lawyers declined to share their views regarding this issue.)
258
Id. (One defense lawyer did not answer this question.)

45

Professional Judges
In 2011 Current259
6.0%
46.0%
83.0%
54.1%
11.0%
N/A

Prosecutors
Defense Lawyers
260
In 2011 Current
In 2011
Current261
Support
0%
93.2%
23.5%
Same as
Oppose
66.7%
6.8%
23.5% Prosecutors
No Opinion
33.3%
N/A
47%
Figure 17:
Comparative results of whether the lay participation system is suitable for the Taiwanese
criminal justice system
In sum, with both the general public’s high approval rating and the positive
attitudes of those legal professionals, the possibility of introducing a lay participation
system into Taiwan’s criminal justice system seems reasonable and should perhaps be
anticipated.

259

See the Inclinations of Professional Judges, supra notes 227 to 230. (Of the professional judges, 42.6%
stated that the lay observer system would be acceptable for the Taiwanese criminal justice system, and
3.4% would agree to adopt it into the Taiwanese criminal trial proceedings.)
260
See the Inclinations of Prosecutors and Defense Lawyers, supra note 235. (Of the prosecutors and
defense lawyers, 15.9% would support the introduction of a lay observer system, and 77.3% would accept
the adoption of it into the Taiwanese criminal trial proceedings.)
261
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – TWO, supra note 160, at 475. (The results were the same as the
prosecutors’.)

46

CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE INTRODUCITON OF CURRENT
LAY PARTICIPATION SYSTEMS
Today, there are different kinds of lay participation in different judicial systems
around the world. Examples include the jury systems in the United Kingdom and the
United States, the lay participation systems in France and Germany, and other innovative
approaches as the Japanese Saiban-in system and the South Korea’s Citizen Participation
system. In order to figure out of the most suitable lay participation system for the
Taiwanese criminal justice system, exploration regarding to the origins of each system is
needed for comparing it with the goals that the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan hopes to achieve.

2.1 The Jury System

(1). The United Kingdom

A. The Historical Background of the Jury System in the United Kingdom
The origins of the jury system in the United Kingdom can be traced back to the
Norman Conquest in 1066.262 Since the Norman Dynasty began in Great Britain, the
Germanic People brought the way that they used to solve property disputes to England.263
After King Henry II declared the “Constitution of Clarendon” and the “Assize of
262

See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 24; see also Zhan Weiyao (詹惟堯), Zhuanjia Canshen Zhidu zhi Tantao (專家參審制度
之探討) [Study on the Expert Acting As Lay Judge in Trail Proceedings], SHIHHSIN UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL
OF LAW (2005) at 4.
263
Wang Tainyu (王天宇), Peishen Zhidu zhi Yanjiu- Jianlun Woguo Junshi Shenpan Canshen zhi Lifa ji
Peitao (陪審制度之研究-兼論我國軍事審判參審之立法及配套) [The Study of the Jury System- The
Policy and Legislation of Military Personnel Assigned as the Member of Military Judge at Courts-Martial],
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, MANAGEMENT COLLEGE, DEPARTMENT OF LAW (2009) at 17.
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Clarendon” in 1164 and 1166,264 respectively, a system was similar to the Grand Jury was
proposed under which jurors (or lay participants) should bring to the court accusations
against suspects of murder, burglary, robbery and other crimes.265 This trial system was
affirmed by the “Statutes of Westminster I” in 1275. 266 Afterwards, all criminal
indictments must be confirmed by an accusation jury before a trial could proceed.

Before the accusation-jury system was officially established in Great Britain, the
Pope announced the abolition of the Ordeal in 1215 because such superstitious
practices267 had gradually come to be thought of as barbaric.268 However, without such
ancient methods, there were no specific procedures for determining the defendant’s guilt
or innocence.269 Accordingly, in addition to the accusation-jury system, the trial-jury
system was established in 1352 in Great Britain.270

264

Bai Tsunyu (白尊宇), Lun Pingmin Canyu Shenpan Zhidu de Shehui Yihan- Cong Goumin Canshen
Shixing Tiaoli Caoan Guancha (論平民參與審判制度的社會意涵-從國民參審試行條例草案觀察) [The
Social Implication of Lay Participation- An Observation on the Lay Participation Trial Act], NATIONAL
TAIWAN UNIVERSITY, COLLEGE OF LAW (2010) at 23; see also Xie, Citizen Involvement in Taiwanese
Criminal Procedure, supra note 111, at 19.
265
Id.; see also Wang, The Study of the Jury System, supra note 263, at 18.
266
Wu Wenhua (吳文華), Renmin Canyu Sifa Shenpan- Yange, Leixing yu Hexian Xing (人民參與司法審
判-沿革、類型與合憲性) [The Citizens’ Participation in the Trial Proceedings- the Origins, the Category
and the Constitutionality], NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY, COLLEGE OF LAW (2012) at 18; see also
Wang, id.
267
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 24. (Those superstitious behaviors included compurgation, ordeals, trial by battle, etc.)
268
See You Boxiang (尤伯祥), Linyuan Lubing, Zhanzhan Jingjing, Faner Mieding? Shi Ping Renmin
Guanshen Shixing Tiaoli Caoan zhi “Biaoyi Bu Biaojue” Sheji (臨淵履冰，戰戰兢兢，反而滅頂？-試評
人民觀審試行條例草案之「表意不表決」設計) [An Analysis of the Unique Design under the Proposed
Act of the Lay Observer System], 16:4 QUAN GUO LU SHI [TAIWAN BAR REVIEW] 49, 52 (2012); see also
Bai, The Social Implication of Lay Participation, supra note 264, at 24.
269
See You Boxiang (尤伯祥), Lun Guomin Canyu Shenpan- yi Lishi yu Bijioa Fa de Kaocha wei Jichu
(論國民參與審判-以歷史與比較法的考察為基礎) [The Citizens’ Participation in the Trial ProceedingsBased on the Exploration of History and Comparative Law], 11 JIAN CHA XIN LUN [TAIWAN PROSECUTOR
REVIEW] 256, 258 (2012).
270
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 27; see also Wang, The Study of the Jury System, supra note 263, at 18.
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Under this system, twelve citizens would be brought together to determine the
facts of the indictment that the grand jury had issued.271 In sum, the jury system under the
United Kingdom’s criminal justice system was divided into two functions: to bring an
accusation against the defendant and to hold trials for determining the truth of the
accusation against the defendant.

To ensure the independent positions of the jurors under the British judicial system,
the selection process for jurors was further improved by the British Bill of Rights in 1689
that each juror should be officially appointed in accordance with the law procedures.272
However, after several hundred years’ development, the grand jury system was abolished
in 1948 because it had turned into a rubber stamp of the prosecutor’s accusations.273

It could be concluded that in the past, in Great Britain, the jury system played a
crucial role in weakening the feudal nobles’ control over the judicial power so that
judgments would be executed more fairly.274 In other words, the jury system was a “tool”
under the criminal justice system for filling up a procedural loophole and balancing
power between the imperial authorities.275 However, because there were not enough
trained judges to take over the legal system, lay participation became an inevitable
trend276 as an administrative measure to function the judicial system.277
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Id.
See Xie, Citizen Involvement in Taiwanese Criminal Procedure, supra note 111, at 22. (The author
pointed out that Article 11 of the British Bill of Rights regulated that jurors shall be selected and appointed
officially.)
273
See Wang, The Study of the Jury System, supra note 263, at 18; see also Wu, The Citizens’
Participation in the Trial Proceedings, supra note 266, at 18.
274
See Xie, Citizen Involvement in Taiwanese Criminal Procedure, supra note 111, at 21.
275
See Bai, The Social Implication of Lay Participation, supra note 264, at 24 to 25.
276
Id.; see also Xie, Citizen Involvement in Taiwanese Criminal Procedure, supra note 111, at 20.
277
YI YANYOU (易延友), PEISHEN TUAN SHENPAN YU DUIKANG SHI SUSONG (陪審團審判與對抗式訴訟)
[JURY TRIAL AND ADVERSARY SYSTEM] 32 (San Min Book Co., Ltd., 1st ed. 2004); see also Wang, The
Study of the Jury System, supra note 263, at 18.
272
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In the first few years of the jury system, the positions of the selected citizens were
similar to that of witnesses; 278 both testified as such and judged the defendant’s
accusation.279 However, this put the defendant in an unfavorable situation because the
jurors were in fact not distinguishing the investigation stage from the deliberation
process.280 Therefore, to ensure that the defendant received an impartial trial, in addition
to a prudent jurors selecting process,281 there were three more developments designed for
controlling the jurors in trial proceedings:282

(a). Jurors would only decide the facts concerning the accusation against the
defendant, i.e., the final judgment remained with the professional judges’ determination.
(b). Jurors might be punished by an “Attaint” issued by the Courts of Star
Chamber when their decisions about the facts were overruled by a latter jury’s verdict.283
(c). Jurors’ decisions had to be determined by unanimous vote so that they would
all be punished by an attaint if their decision were overturned later.284

Furthermore, when the British government gradually established the state’s ability
to investigate evidence, jurors no longer had to testify as witnesses against defendants in
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the courtroom.285 On the contrary, beginning in the 15th and 16th centuries, their duties
were extended from mere lay participation to decision-makers, thus setting the stage for
the contemporary British jury system. 286 In other words, after the jury system was
affirmed as a predominant way to process trial proceedings, the juror assumed a
significant role, rather than being a mere rubber stamp of the prosecutor’s accusations.287

After the jury system was implemented in Great Britain, it became the direct
method to realized greater judicial justice, thus ensuring the people’s freedom and
protecting the rights of citizens.288 Moreover, in order to resist autocratic rules, further
steps were undertaken to systematize the jury system in order to ensure jurors’
independent position.289 Thus, in modern times, the jury system was became a symbol of
judicial democratization.290

B. The Current Jury System in the United Kingdom
Beginning with the “Industrial Revolution” that occurred in the 17th and 18th
centuries, the importance of the British jury system began to faded away291 because the
revolution brought a tremendous change of the societal construction at that time.292 The
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King and the noble were no longer the dominant members of society in the country,293
while middle-class individuals and blue-collar workers began to predominate.294 This
change of the societal construction triggered the restriction of the jury system in the later
19th century.295

The main factor that obstructed the development of the jury system was a series of
political reforms after ordinary British citizens began to be represented in Parliament.296
The necessity of the jury system was reduced because the king and the nobility lost their
control of the government when the people could assert their rights directly in
Parliament. 297 Besides, those new dominant political classes valued efficiency of a
judicial system beyond all other procedural requirements of the jury system.298 As a result,
the “Administration of Justice Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 1933”299 strictly restricted
the application of the grand jury and the “Criminal Justice Act” (1948) abolished it.300

After the grand jury was abandoned by the British judicial system, the magistrates’
court regained the earlier key role to process the prosecution review stage.301 When first
established in the 14th century, this kind of court was designed to determine both the
defendant’s guilt and punishment.302 To compare tasks of this court to the jury system,
the most significant difference is the respective roles of magistrates and the jurors. In jury
293
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system, each juror brings personal experiences into the courtroom for discovering the
truth concerning a crime. 303 In contrast, the magistrates’ court was established for
assembling the societal consensus in order to find the possibility of excusing a defendant
who committed a petty crime.304

(a). An Introduction of the Magistrates’ Court
There were three procedural forms that developed in the British criminal justice
system:305 First, if the defendant were charged with a petty crime, the trial would be held
by the magistrates’ court and the appeal procedure would be processed by the Crown
Court.306 Second, if the defendant was charged with general crimes, the first trial would
be held by the Crown Court and the Court of Appeal would take charge of the appeal
proceedings.307 The final court for these two circumstances would be the Supreme Court
of the United Kingdom. 308 However, under the third circumstances of “either-way
offenses”, which means that both the Magistrates’ Court or the Crown Court, had
jurisdiction to try the case, the Magistrates’ Court would hear both parties’ opinions
before determining which procedure would be adopted.309
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With regard to the jury trial under the criminal justice system in the United
Kingdom, the Crown Court as a general court310 would apply to the jury system when the
defendant pleaded “not guilty.”311 In contrast, the Magistrates’ Court would not be an
eligible venue for a jury trial because it usually dealt with simple proceeding cases by
appointed laymen.312

As to the qualifications of a magistrate, a person whose age is below sixty-five
and who is not engaged in specific occupations, such as the police or military, could be
appointed as a magistrate in Great Britain.313 In practice, before these qualified citizens
are officially appointed as magistrates by the advisory committees of each district,314 they
are recommended by political parties, volunteer groups, trade or labor unions, or even
self-recommendation.315 The appointed magistrates discover the facts of the case and
apply them to existing laws with assistance from the justice clerk.316 In addition, the
discretion of the suspect’s detention or bail is also under the magistrates’ authorities.317

During the trial proceedings, the magistrates’ court proceeds with two to three
magistrates under a collegiate bench style.318 In practice, 95 - 97% of accusations are
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resolved by the magistrates’ court.319 Therefore, this court plays a crucial role under the
British criminal justice system because of its function of mitigating the general courts’
trial burden.320

(b). The Jury System of the United Kingdom

I. The Qualifications of the Jurors
Before 1825, the “Jury Act” decreed that only citizens whose property was worth
at least thirty pounds in London or twenty pounds in other areas could be selected as a
juror. 321 After 1974, this Act abolished the financial requirement and added new
requirements on prospective jurors.322 According to the amended requirements, a citizen
would be qualified for being a juror at ages 18-65 and when he or she had registered
residence in the United Kingdom for over five years.323

However, these requirements were further amended by the “Criminal Justice Act”
in 1988.324 Under which, the qualified age for being a juror was raised from sixty-five to
seventy.325 Besides, being a juror became an obligation of citizenship: if the selected juror
declined to perform his or her jury duty without statutory excuses, a maximum of one
thousand pounds punishment was imposed.326
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Furthermore, the Act also codified some circumstances as barring a person from
jury service. For instances, when a person was engaged in certain vocations;327 had a
previous criminal record or was without capacity to be a juror because of physical or
mental obstacles, he or she could not participate in trial proceedings.328 Besides, this Act
also had statutory grounds for the selected jurors to receive an exemption from jury
duty,329 as when his or her occupation is related to the public benefit;330 or when he or she
had been served as a juror within the past two years.331

II. The Formation of the Jury and the Juror’s Duty
In order to organize twelve jurors as a jury,332 the court must first randomly select
three or four times the number of the jurors from the list of prospective jurors (panel)333
and then draw lots for a further list for processing the selection.334 Before 1988, a
defendant would challenge the selected jurors in two ways: (1). A peremptory challenge
which excludes any juror without a statutory cause.335 (2). A general challenge that both
the defendant and the public prosecutor could apply for deleting a specific juror from the
panel with a statutory cause.336
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The main duty of the jury under the United Kingdom’s criminal justice system
was to determine the facts of the crimes.337 According to the Criminal Justice Act, the
jury’s final decision had to be by a unanimous vote.338 However, the law also stated that
if the jury could not reach the consensus after a two-hour deliberation, a vote by ten jurors’
approval would be also legally acceptable.339 If the jury could not reach a decision even
by this super-majority vote, this situation would be called “hung jury” and the court
would dismiss the jury and grand a retrial.340

After the jury declared its verdict, if the defendant were not guilty of his or her
accused crime, the case would be closed and the prosecutor could not appeal to a higher
court.341 On the contrary, if the jury concluded that the defendant was guilty, the judge
would further apply the facts that the jury determined to the laws for considering the
punishment of the crime.342 In sum, under the United Kingdom’s criminal justice system,
the jury’s decision with regard to the factual issues would be binding on both the
prosecutors and the judges.343

(2). The United States of America

A. The Historical Background of the Jury System
The jury system was implemented in America because the British colonized much
of North America, including what became the United States in 1776, before the U.S.
337
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government was established.344 Therefore, the U.S. jury system was also a significant
factor that influenced both the judicial and political development in the States as well as it
did in the United Kingdom.345

The U.S. jury system was rooted in British domination of the American colonies
during the 17th century.346 The earliest record can be traced back to 1606, when the King
James I promised the colonists in Virginia the jury trial.347 After the 1630s, Massachusetts
established the grand jury348 in order to resist British oppression in all aspects.349 At the
same time, the U.K. government expanded the authority of military tribunals for the
substitution for the application of the grand jury instead.350 This restriction on the U.S.
citizens to apply to jury trials induced the protest from the society and the “American War
of Independence” was thus occurred.351

One year before the War of Independence started, the Continental Congress had
assured the right to request a jury trial under its common law system in 1774. 352
Therefore, the deprivation of this right was deemed as one of the grievances against the
344
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British government in the Declaration of Independence in 1776.353 Furthermore in 1791,
the Bill of Rights defined the jury trial as a scheme to protect the people’s fundamental
rights.354 As a result, along with the development of other American societal and cultural
norms,355 the jury system gradually became a core value of the U.S. judicial system,356 an
indispensable procedure for guaranteeing the people’s constitutional rights.357

There are four articles related to the jury system under both the U.S. constitutional
law and the Bill of Rights. According to the Constitution, it stated that all crimes should
be tried by jury. 358 The Fifth Amendment 359 guaranteed that people would only be
accused of capital or felony crime by a grand jury indictment.360 Also, the Sixth361 and
Seventh 362 Amendments regulated that people had the right of trial by jury in,
respectively, criminal and civil cases.
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The period between the end of 18th and the beginning of 19th century was the
“golden era” of the jury system in the United States.363 At that moment, jurors not only
took charge of discovering the truth of the case before them, but also ruling on most legal
issues under the trial proceedings.364 In other words, the jury played the most crucial role
in the courtroom because the jurors determined both the factual and legal issues of a case.

However, around the middle of 19th century, people suddenly lost their
enthusiasm for the jury system because of three major reasons.365 First, the jury system
had been established while there were not enough legal professionals in the country.366
But once professional judges more common, these legally trained persons gained more
trust than jurors within American society.367 Secondly, the standards of evidence were
introduced into the American legal system. Accordingly, the jurors were instructed to
determine their verdict in accordance with legal standards and discard their purely
subjective opinions on a case.368 Third, the jury system often was an expensive but
inefficient trial proceeding.369 As a result, the application of a jury trial was substituted by
other proceedings under the American judicial system.370

B. The Modern Jury System under the U.S. Judicial System
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(a). The Formation of the U.S. Jury System
The formation of a jury system might influence whether the trial proceedings are
just and fair without prejudice against any party in the courtroom.371 Under the U.S.
judicial system, being a juror is not only a citizen’s right, but also his or her obligation.
However, there is no unified code with regard to the jury system because each state has
authority over its own judicial system. What follows is a general introduction of the U.S.
jury system.

I. The Qualifications of Prospective Jurors
The prerequisite requirements of a prospective juror under the American judicial
system are a person’s nationality and registered residence372 because becoming a juror
means practicing basic American citizenship rights.373 In addition, the possible range of a
juror’s age is also required by the states374 in order to ensure the trial proceedings are just
and fluent.375 In most states, the legal juror age range is twenty-one to seventy years
old.376 Someone younger than twenty-one years old might be too young to have enough
social experiences for judging a case while a person older than seventy might be too old
to sit through and listen attentively to the entire trial proceedings.377 Along with the age,
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intellectual capacity, such as the basic ability to hear, speak, read and write, are
prerequisites to ensure that the jury performs its duty adequately.378

In addition to these prerequisite requirements, there were also other restrictions on
the prospective juror. For example, a citizen should not be paneled as a juror when the
nature of his or her job is related to the public benefit, such as doctors, nurses, police
professionals or firefighters.379 Besides, citizens who work as legal-related professions,
such as lawyers, professional judges or prosecutors cannot be participated in the trial
proceedings as a juror because their occupational prejudice might influence other
jurors.380

Furthermore, one who had a serious or specific criminal record would also be
excluded because his or her biased experiences of previous trial proceedings might taint
his or her thoughts of the pending case. 381 Moreover, in order to expect a proper
discretion of the pending case, the prospective juror’s physical and mental condition
would be also taken into account, i.e., only when a prospective juror can comprehend the
entire trial proceedings will he or she be considered to be a juror in the American judicial
system.382
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II. The Selection Process
A jury system gains more societal trust when the system is representative of the
society at large.383 Accordingly, the selection process was carefully designed under the
U.S. jury system to form a cross-section representation to participate in trial
proceedings:384

First, the court collects an initial list of the prospective jurors from the roster of
voters, a telephone directory and a list of taxpayers in the state.385 With a case is pending
to be tried by jury, the court randomly selects the needed amounts of the prospective
jurors from the initial list and the procedure of “voir dire” begins,386 which involves an
examination stage and an exclusion stage.387

During the examination stage, both parties ask prospective jurors about their
thoughts regarding the issues surrounding the case.388 Afterwards, during the exclusion
stage, in addition to the voluntary recusal by a selected juror,389 there are two kinds of
challenges allowed for both the public prosecutor and the defense lawyers to reject
unfavorable jurors. First, challenge for cause allows either side to apply to the judge with
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the reasons regarding why a specific juror should be eliminated from the jury.390 Second,
a peremptory challenge allows either side to exclude a prospective juror without having to
provide any reason for doing so.391

In practice, the selection process is more significant to the defendant than to the
public prosecutor because the jury exclusion stage could eliminate a case-related person
who might be prejudiced against the suspect. 392 In sum, the selection process was
expected to choose an impartial jury, so that each juror could give objective opinion
under the trial proceedings, thus allowing the defendant a fairer, more just verdict.393

(b). The Grand Jury and The Trial Jury (The Petit Jury)
The American jury system would be also divided into two functions, the grand
jury and the trial jury, like the British jury system. The grand jury’s main task is to
investigate crimes. Therefore, its nature would be closer to an investigative than a judicial
body.394 When a prosecutor brings a public prosecution, he or she must submit a bill of
indictment to the grand jury.395 Afterwards, this jury investigates evidence and questions
witnesses or suspects confidentially under a professional judge’ supervision.396 Once the
investigation procedure is completed, the grand jury might approve the prosecutor’s
indictment when evidence indicates sufficient probable cause against the suspect.397
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After the trial begins, the trial (petit) jury participates in the entire trial
proceedings and follows the judge’s instructions in order to evaluate evidence before
making the verdict.398 When the jury deliberates its verdict, the judge is responsible for
applying the result to existing laws and determines the defendant’s punishment.399

(c). The Trial Proceedings
There were three crucial proceedings under the U.S. jury system: the judge’s
instructions, the jury’s deliberation and judge’s decision-making process.

I. The Professional Judge’s Instructions
The function of the judge’s instructions during the trial proceedings is to guide the
jurors in determining the case according to the law because all the jurors are laymen.400
According to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,401 the professional judge should
offer his or her instructions to the jury at two times:402 (1). After the jury has been
selected and before the trial begins,403 and (2). After both parties’ arguments are finished
and before the jury begins to deliberate.404
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Concerning the contents of the instructions, after the jury had been selected, the
judges explain the nature of the trial proceedings, the jury’s duty, and things that the jury
should focus on during the trial.405 Besides, before the jury deliberates its verdict, the
judges also restate the factual issues of the case, the arguments of both parties, and the
standards of proof because the jury needs to have a clear view of the case.406 In addition,
both parties prepare in writing or orally a statement of points they would like the jury to
pay attention to during the deliberation process.407

When the professional judges give the instructions to the jury, they must be
objective and avoid personal opinions. 408 Otherwise, if the judges give wrongful or
improper instructions to the jury, that would provide a legal basis for both parties to
appeal or even apply for a new trail.409

II. The Deliberation Process
After both sides’ closing arguments are completed, the jury begins to
confidentially determine the factual issues regarding the case in order to reach its
verdict,410 which generally must be unanimous.411 If the jury cannot reach a consensus
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with regard to the case, this constitutes a hung jury and the judge declares a mistrial,412
dismissing the jury in order to retry the case.413

III. The Decision-Making Process
The jury would return the verdict, which only states whether the defendant is
guilty or not without offering concrete reasons, once a unanimous conclusion had been
made.414 If the jury declares that the defendant is not guilty, the case is closed.415 If the
defendant is pronounced guilty, the judge determines his or her sentence in accordance
with laws.416 After the jury declares its verdict, the trial proceedings are completed and
the jury dismissed.417

2.2 The Lay Participation System

(1). France: A System that Transforms from the Jury System to the Lay
Participation System

A. The Historical Background
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Before the French Revolution in 1789, the country’s judicial system involved an
inquisitional process 418 in which professional judges, who were called “Magistrats,”
would take charge of the trial proceedings,419 and review both parties’ written reports
confidentially without allowing cross-examination.420 At that time, this inquisitional trial
pattern was seriously criticized by the French society because only rich people or others
in the privilege classes of society would be the magistrats.421

In time, the idea of judicial equality under the British jury system gradually
attracted the French society’s attention422 and many advocated a transparent trial that
contained the stage of oral argument. 423 To respond to societal wishes, the French
government established the jury system after the Revolution, 424 with the French
Constitution admitting the jury system as the way of its legal system in 1791.425 Moreover,
the French criminal justice system adopted both the grand and the trial jury in the same
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year. 426 In short, the British jury system was generally adopted, with a few minor
exceptions by France at this time.427

Concerning the accusation jury, it was devised as a second stage of the
preliminary proceedings under the French criminal justice system.428 The main task of the
accusation jurors was to review the magistrats’ decision on whether the prosecutor’s
indictment was proper or not.429 Concerning the trial jury, it was practiced only in the
felony cases,430 which were exclusively trialed by a court named “Cour d’assies.”431 The
defendant would be found guilty when ten out of twelve jurors voted for his or her
guilt.432 In other words, the defendant would obtain a “not guilty” verdict as long as three
trial jurors declined to join the majority after the deliberation.433 The jury’s verdict was
final and both parties could not appeal it to a higher court.434

However, the introduction of the United Kingdom’s jury system did not improve
the French criminal justice system as was expected. Instead, people in France gradually
found out this jury system cannot comply with their societal value. For example, both the
grand and the trial jurors would only be selected from men who had the right to vote, had
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certain property and were over twenty-five years old.435 According to the population of
France at that time, only 1% of its population was qualified to be a prospective juror.436
Therefore, to the most of the French, the jury system, as well as the inquisitional system,
was exclusively favorable to the privileged class, rather than all citizens.437

Besides, the grand jury was viewed as a delay of both the prosecutor’s indictment
and the trial proceedings. 438 Furthermore, the percentage of not-guilty verdicts was
considered by French society too high to maintain the social order and to realize the
justice.439 As a result, beginning in 1799, the government had to restrict the application on
the jury system and to promote a series of judicial reforms.440

The most significant during that time was the law Code d’ instruction criminelle,
which abolished the accusation jury.441 The power of prosecution was therefore exclusive
to the nation’s judiciary under the French criminal justice system afterwards.442 With
regard to the trial jury, in order to restrict the jurors’ right to deliberate in the trial
proceedings, the law regulated that twelve jurors should determine the facts surrounding
the case with five professional judges.443 This crucial change had triggered the later
transformation from the jury system to lay participation system under the French criminal
justice system because the judges could also be the decision-makers of factual issues.
435
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B. The Modern Development of the French Criminal Justice System
The French trial jury underwent many changes from the early 18th century until
20th century. During this period, the French judicial system began to balance the
relationship between the professional judge and the juror. Some of these proposals
revealed the characteristics of the lay participation.444 For example, in order to assist the
trial jury could deliver a more accurate verdict, the judge, the prosecutor and the defense
lawyer should discuss and answer questions that were addressed by the trial jurors during
their deliberations.445

In 1932, the divided authority between the judge and the jurors shifted to a more
cooperative and equal relationship.446 The trail jury, along with the professional judges,
not only deliberated whether the defendant is guilty or not, but also determined what
punishment was to be imposed on the defendant.447 These changes were considered as the
origins of the lay participation system in France.448 However, although many in France
criticized its trial jury system, only a few proposed to abolish it because it was a symbol
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of democracy and still valued important beyond its flaws.449 Therefore, transformation
from a jury system to lay participation system resumed after the World War II.450

In 1939, the German government established the Vichy regime in France and
introduced the German lay participation system to the French judicial system. 451
Although the new system maintained its name as a jury system, its procedures in fact
were the same as a lay participation system in Germany. For example, three professional
judges and six jurors together determined both the factual and legal issues by a majority
vote.452 In short, the jurors had the same authority as the professional judges in the
courtroom.453

This trial system remained even after the Vichy regime was overthrown.
Furthermore, its application was expanded on the rage of prospective juror that a woman
would be selected as a juror beginning in 1944 and the number of jurors was raised from
six to seven under the trial proceedings.454 Afterwards, the new criminal procedural law,
“Code de Procedure Penile” increased the jurors from seven to nine and a two-third vote
was needed to reach a verdict.455

However, even though the deliberation process of the French jury system had
shifted to the lay participation system, it was still defined as a “middle way” because the
449
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significant characteristics of a jury system were retained.456 The verdict could be returned
without the jurors offering their reasons.457 Thus, neither party could appeal the jury’s
decision based on the factual issues of the case.458

The reason that the French judicial system kept the nature of the traditional jury
system was because of both the principle of the judicial democracy and the realization
that the national’s sovereignty were significant values in France.459 In sum, the French
judicial system was expected to be independent and neutral by manifesting the essential
characteristics of the jury system.460

Meanwhile, the French appeal system was established as retrial proceedings in
order to grant the appellant a second opportunity461 to avoid what he or she thought was a
wrongful charge. 462 Furthermore, in 2000, the standards for filing an appeal were
modified so that each party could appeal in accordance with both the factual issues and
whether the defendant had received a just punishment.463 These modifications moved the
French criminal justice system closer to the lay participation system.

In short, although the French judicial system introduced the jury system beginning
with the French Revolution, both the deep-rooted nature of the inquisitional pattern and
456
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its national character finally transformed it into a lay participation system.464 Yet the
professional judge had never been a mere “procedural director” under its inquisitional
system.465 In other words, the French society still expected and relied on the judge’s
determination of a case under its criminal justice system.466

In addition, the centralization of the French political system made French leaders
concerned with how to maintain the social order as a governmental priority.467 In this
context, the jury system would be deemed as too populist because only lay people could
determine verdict. Therefore, the lay participation system required the lay people to
cooperate with professional judges under the judicial system.468 However, the concern of
preventing the professional judge from infringing on people’s rights under the judicial
system was crucial to the French society.469 As a result, after a series of reforms, the
jurors’ right to vote was never removed from the trial proceedings in French.470

(2). The German Lay Participation System

A. The Historical Background
In German history, no regime before 1870 dominated the current territory of
Germany; therefore, it is difficult to trace back the Germanic people’s historical
464
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development of the legal system.471 Between 768 and 814 A.D., Karl the Great processed
a series of judicial reforms and established a system called “Scabini.”472 Under this
system, the district nobles who were familiar with its common laws would be appointed
by the trial court and would introduce the district laws to the judges.473 Accordingly, the
judges would determine a case in accordance with the Scabini’s advice.474

While Great Britain allowed its citizens to participate in trial proceedings, the
Germanic people decided to hand over its jurisdiction to authorized persons exclusively,
such as judges and Scabini, for the purpose of assuring that its legal system would be
practiced only by legal professions.475 Therefore, the inquisitional system was established
so that those professionals would obtain correct information as part of their investigation
process under the judicial system.476

Afterwards, political developments in continental Europe centralized government
in Germany, which helped the governmental authorities to maintain the social order.477
This circumstance also strengthened the legal system by making it became more
471
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exclusively comprised of professionals so that the government could further control
judicial power.478 However, when the French Revolution occurred in the late 18th century,
the spirit of liberalism and the principle of democracy suddenly influenced the
Continental Europe.479

In the post-revolutionary era, education was not widely available to most citizens
and only men in the higher classes had the opportunity to be trained and be appointed as
judges. 480 The society thus treated these judges as the government’s spokesmen. 481
Accordingly, the concept of judicial independence, under which a legal system should not
be an institution subordinate to either the king or the privilege class of a society, was
deemed as a crucial value by German society.482 Consequently, although German society
still relied on the judges’ professionalism in trial proceedings, people who supported the
jury system still endeavored to introduce it to prevent citizens’ rights from being
infringed by the professional judges.483

In addition to the judicial independence, people who supported the jury system
pointed out that its implementation would split the roles under the trial proceedings into a
procedural director and a decision-maker.484 In other words, they believed that the trial
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proceedings would be better when the professional judge (the procedural director) guide
the citizens (the decision-maker) in determining a case. The German National Congress
finally followed the structure of the French jury system, which it codified as part of the
Constitution of the Paulskirche in 1848.485

Under the German jury system, there were three to five professional judges and
twelve appointed jurors, with the verdict determined by a vote of an absolute majority of
jurors.486 Before the jury made the final decision, they had to respond to each element that
constitutes the crime with which the defendant is charged rather than simply return a
verdict without reasons.487 Because this special deliberation process was significantly
different from the Anglo-American’s jury system,488 the German jury system was defined
as a civil-law pattern.489

However, this particular decision-making process attracted criticism from the
society. In practice, the jurors’ ability to determine a case was questioned because the
legal and factual issues were difficult to define during the trial.490 Accordingly, the jury
might not respond to the judges about whether the facts they discovered would comply
with the legal elements of the crime that the defendant was charged with.
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Under these circumstances, in order to assure the reliability of the jury’s decision,
the judges had the responsibility on interpreting the factual and legal issues during the
trial proceedings.491 This could be time-consuming and sometimes significantly delay the
trial with the attending increase in court costs and human resources.492 As a result, the
jury system became an unpopular trial pattern under the German judicial system because
many people began to oppose it.493

However, although the jury system was seriously criticized by many people, its
symbolic meaning in terms of representing principles of liberty and democracy was still
respected by the nation.494 Therefore, the most significant priority tasks for German
judicial institutions to accomplish were to reform and improve its jury system.495

B. The Origins of the Lay Participation System
In 1877, the German “Court Organic Act” was passed, which regulated that a
nation-wide lay participation system would be established to its judicial system.496 This
change was largely due to the person who was later named “the founding father of the lay
participation system,” Friedrich Oskar von Schwarze.497
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(a). The Development of the Modern German Criminal Justice System
According to the 1877 Act, the German criminal justice system would be a
combination of both the jury and the lay participation systems.498 The trial court would be
distinguished in accordance with the level of the crime. 499 The first type of court
(Schoffengericht) involved lay participation pattern, which was formed by one
professional judge and two appointed lay participants in the courtroom.500 This court
would take charge of middle-level crimes and the judge and laymen had equal authority
during the trial proceedings.501

The second type was a district court, which was further divided into two kinds of
proceedings. The first one was the criminal court (Strafkammer), which had only five
professional judges who solely took charge of the trial.

502

The other court

(Geschworenenbank), which heard felony cases, was run according to the jury system and
contained three professional judges and twelve jurors.503 Its proceedings were similar to
the French jury system, i.e., the jurors determined both the factual and legal issues by an
absolute majority vote.504
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However, six years after Germany lost World War I, in 1924, the German
government began to restrict the application of the jury system because the financial
issues caused there was no budget for maintaining the jury system.505 This situation was
getting worse after the World War II occurred.506 At that time, the German government
was forced to suspend all types of the trial proceedings that had participation by either
jurors or laymen.507 After the war ended, only the lay participation system was reestablished under the criminal justice system in Germany in 1950;508 the jury system was
officially abolished by the German judicial system since that time.509

The current German judicial system is still established with diverse trial
proceedings.510 There are two types of trial courts for criminal cases:511 (1). The district
court, at which trials for middle to serious crimes take place, and which consists of one
professional judge and two lay judges. 512 (2). The Great court, which hears cases
concerning felony crimes and appeals of the district court’s judgment and which consists
of three professional judges and two lay judges.513
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(b). The Selection Process and the Qualifications of the Lay Judge
The basic requirements of being a lay judge in German are German nationality
and at least one-year residence in the country.514 Since the lay judge is an honorary
position under the German criminal justice system,515 only those who have not been
deprived of their citizenship rights or been punished with over six-months
imprisonment516 are qualified in order to ensure objectivity and reasonableness.517

Furthermore, the lay judge should be between twenty-five and seventy years old
with competent knowledge of German.518 Moreover, the German judicial system also
regulates the certain property requirements of lay judges so that they will not be tempted
to take bribes.519 Other disqualifications that exclude citizens from being a lay judge
include whose occupations are related to the public interests or legal practice, or a serious
mental or physical disability.520

The prospective lay judge is first recommended by the district committee
(Gemeinde)521 and is screened according to such criteria as gender, ages, occupation and
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social position in order to establish a list that can represent the residents of the district
where the court is located.522 Afterwards, the election committee chooses a final list,
which requires approval by two-thirds of its members.523 After the final list of prospective
lay judges is confirmed by the court, those appointed lay judges have the opportunity to
decline the position before the trial begins if being a lay judge would be a burden to their
occupational or personal life.524

(c). The Trial Proceedings
The appointed lay judge has an obligation to participate the entire trial
proceedings; otherwise he or she would have to pay an administrative fine.525 Except for
the procedural issues, the lay judges can question the relevant parties to the case along
with the professional judges in order to discover the truth of the facts.526 Furthermore,
during the deliberation process, both the professional and lay judges have the same
authority before reaching a verdict by an absolute majority vote.527

In sum, under the German criminal justice system, the legal position of the lay
judges is the same as that of the professional judges528 so that both kinds of judges could
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determine factual and legal issues together. 529 Under this cooperation pattern, the
professional judges offer correct legal information to lay judges to avoid the wrongful
decision.530 At the same time, lay judges bring the societal values to the deliberation so
that the verdicts generally conform to these values. Both prosecutor and defendants can
appeal in accordance with factual or legal issues in the judgment.531 In practice, only 3 4% of criminal cases come before the lay participation system in Germany each year.532

2.3 New Systems

(1). The Japanese Saiban-in System

A. The Historical Background: the Taishou Jury System
In Japan, during the “Meiji Restoration” period began in 1868, both the
government and the rest society were eager to introduce the European and the American
thinking and practices.533 After the Meiji Restoration ended, the Japanese judicial system
was deeply influenced by the French legal system 534 and implemented jury trial
proceedings under its criminal justice system.535 At that time, in order to reduce the
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possibility that professional judge might wrongfully affirm the prosecution during the
pre-trial process,536 a majority of three professional judges and ten jurors were needed to
convict the defendant.537

However, many questioned whether the implement of the jury system in Japan
was improper because it does not function like a political debate, i.e., judiciary should not
be solved by a majority vote.538 Besides, there was no fine line between a factual and
legal issue during the trial proceedings so that the jurors might encounter a legal issue
which they were not expected to understand.539 As a result, neither legal professionals nor
Japanese society as a whole trusted the jury process.540 Ultimately, this jury system was
abolished in 1880.541

During the development of the Meiji Constitution, Japanese intellectuals viewed
the principles of democracy and liberty as significant values that would improve the
nation.542 At that time, the prosecutor’s power was too great because the government
persecuted those who did not conform to its policies.543 In 1910, to protect people’s rights
and to implement judicial democratization, 544 the Japanese parliament agreed to reestablish the jury system, although both professional judges and prosecutors were
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strongly against this.545 The legislative process surrounding the jury system was too
controversial to have a societal consensus until the key person, Hara Takashi, who had
proposed the jury system was assassinated in 1921.546 The Jury Act was finally passed in
1923 and was enacted in 1928.547

(a). The Eligible Circumstances
The Jury Act established the “Taishou jury system” in the Japanese history. Under
this system, when the defendant pleaded not guilty in a capital case, this would constitute
a statutory factor under which the jury trial became mandatory.548 Besides, defendants
who were charged with other crimes would also request their trial to be processed by the
jury in accordance with personal own will.549

(b). The Selection Process and the Qualifications of a Juror
It was the district government’s responsibility to make a preliminary list of the
prospective jurors for the district court to draw lots.550 At that time, only men over 30
who had at least two-year residence in the district were qualified to be named in the
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list.551 These individuals would then be screened in terms of the property they owned and
their Japanese comprehension.552

Furthermore, those who were under the disfranchisement or adjudication of
bankruptcy, had physical disabilities, or having previous crime records, would be
eliminated from the jury list.553 Moreover, people whose occupation is judge, prosecutor,
defense lawyer, doctor, teacher or student would be removed from the list.554 After the
preliminary list was completed, the district court would select randomly the needed
number of prospective jurors before the trial proceedings began so that both parties
question and challenge those candidates until twelve jurors were appointed.555

(c). The Deliberation Process and the Jury’s Verdict
After the trial proceedings ended, the verdict would be returned if at least six
jurors vote for it.556 However, the jury’s decision was not final until the three professional
judges’ deliberation was made.557 If the professional judges accepted the jury’s verdict,
the process of sentencing would begin. 558 But if the verdict was denied by the
professional judges, the judges would dismiss the jury and announce a retrial.559 Thus,
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under the Taishou jury system, the jury’s verdict was not binding on the professional
judges.560

In practice, between 1928 and 1943, there were four hundred and forty eight
mandatory jury cases, twelve at the defendant’s request, and twenty-four retrial cases that
were held under the Taishou jury system.561 The total percentage was only 2% of all
criminal cases and the percentage dropped each year.562 Because of this low-percentage,
the Taishou jury system was suspended by the Japanese parliament in 1943.563

(d). The Reasons that Caused the Failure of the Taishou Jury System
In exploring the reasons that caused the Taishou jury system to be failed, one can
conclude that both the jurors’ qualifications and the mandatory cases were too narrow to
practice this system widely.564 Also, the nature of the Taishou jury system did not favor
of the defendant so that it also reduced the defendant’s will to apply to be tried under this
system.565 For example, the evidentiary rules, especially the exclusionary rules, were not
developed sufficiently enough for both the jury and the professional judges to discover
560
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the truth in accordance with laws so that the defendant was under unfavorable position in
the trials.566

In addition, the jury’s verdict was not binding on professional judges, and the
judges’ discretion with regard to the jury’s verdict would not allow the defendant the
right to appeal. 567 Furthermore, the defendant had to pay the expenses of the trial
proceedings when he or she applied to a jury trial.568 These circumstances led most
defendants to wish to be tried by professional judges, rather than a group of jurors.

Japan experienced an economic depression beginning in 1929; thereafter, the
government could not afford the costs of implementing the jury system under its judicial
system.569 Also, international and domestic wars undercut notions of democracy under the
Japanese society.570 In addition, the percentage of the jury’s not-guilty verdicts was
obviously higher than the ordinary trial proceedings so that the professional judges,
prosecutors and other leaders of Japanese society gradually lost their trust in jury
decisions.571 In sum, the Taishou jury system in all aspects was rejected by professional
judges, prosecutors, defendants and many in Japanese society and thus was dropped as
part of the Japanese judicial system.
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B. The Modern Development of the Japanese Criminal Justice System
The Japanese prosecutor’s authority again was too widespread after World War II
ended.572 At that time, guilty-decisions by professional judges followed the prosecutor’s
charges was 99.9%;573 in other words, the trial proceedings were mere a rubber stamp of
the prosecution. Thus, proposals of a further judicial reform were raised in Japanese
society.

People who supported judicial reform stated that introducing an adversarial trial
process was the best method for improving the Japanese criminal justice system.574
However, the contemporary Japanese criminal justice system was not stable enough for
discussing whether it should establish a jury system or a lay participation system because
the wars had just ended and the government preferred to stabilize the domestic situation
first.575 Therefore, this issue remained controversial until the 1980s.576

During the 1980s, four wrongful executions suddenly displayed the flaws of the
Japanese criminal justice system when the professional judges had exclusive
jurisdiction.577 Japanese societal concerns about wrongful convictions again raised the
issue whether layman should participate under the trial proceedings and attracted the
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government’s attention.578 Therefore, in 1999, a series of judicial reforms were proposed
by the Japanese government to improve the criminal justice system.579

The Judicial Reform Council was established to clarify that what role the Japanese
judiciary should play in Japanese society.580 However, the issue of how to improve the
Japanese judicial system so that it would be closer to national expectations was still hotly
debated581 when the members of the council discussed whether the jury system or the lay
participation system would be a more efficient way to increase trust in the Japanese
judicial system.582

In the end, there was no consensus among the members of the council. Therefore,
the final resolution regarding the criminal justice reform in Japan was not to particularly
focus on either system before a further research regarding the Japanese criminal justice
system and national conditions was explored.583

C. The Saiban-in System
The council’s resolution masterly left more room for both legal professionals and
academic scholars to determine what kind of system would be more suitable for Japanese
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criminal trials. 584 In 2001, a Japanese criminal scholar, Matsuo Kōya, proposed an
innovated title for the expected Japanese criminal trial pattern as the “Saiban-in”
system.585 In the following three years, the Japanese government completed the structures
of the Saiban-in system,586 resolved potential constitutional issues,587 and enacted the
“Act on Criminal Trials with Participation of Saiban-in” in 2004.588 After five years of
development, the Saiban-in system was officially implemented under the Japanese
criminal justice system in 2009.589

(a). The Formation of the Japanese Saiban-in System
The Japanese Saiban-in system was in fact a compromise between the jury and the
lay participation systems.590 The trial bench included three professional judges and six
saiban-ins (layman) 591 because the system was expected to be communicative and
collaborative.592 Regarding the characteristics of the ordinary lay participation system,593
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saiban-ins would discover the truth of the case, determine the legal issues and decide the
sentence with the professional judges.594

In addition, the Japanese Saiban-in system structured an extraordinary
deliberation process. Each saiban-in would be an independent decision-maker and have
the same authority as a professional judge.595 To prevent the professional judges from
making decision arbitrarily and to avoid the saiban-ins from overriding the legal
professionals,596 a guilty judgment had to be reached by a majority vote with at least one
professional judge’s approval.597 Further, the defendant’s punishment would be voted on,
from the most severe sentencing to the lightest one, until that sentencing had a majority
vote.598

(b). The Eligible Circumstances
Act on Criminal Trials with Participation of Saiban-in regulated that when the
defendant committed capital crimes or caused the victim’s death with more than one-year
imprisonment, the Saiban-in system would be mandatory. 599 The Japanese judicial
institution estimated that around 3% of the criminal cases in one year were eligible for the
Saiban-in system.600 There were three reasons why the Japanese judicial system limited
the application of the Saiban-in system to such a low percentage:
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The defendant under the Saiban-in system could not decline to have his or her
case be tried by the saiban-in because of the previous failure of the Taishou jury
system.601 In other words, once the defendant was accused of the statutory eligible crimes,
the trial proceedings had to involve lay participation under the Japanese criminal justice
system.

However, the Japanese judicial system did not intend to put too much burden on
its nationals so that Japanese society would not take this new system as a pressure of their
daily life. 602 In addition, the Japanese judicial institution looked at other countries’
systems603 and concluded that lay participation would be better for cases that raised
significant societal attention because the nature of these cases was usually related to the
public interest.604 Moreover, the judicial budget might not cover all the criminal cases in
each year. Therefore, this specific trial process should be limited to significant crimes in
Japan605 and to ensure that a certain amount of cases would be conducted under the
Saiban-in system.606

(c). The Qualifications of being a Saiban-in
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With regard to the saiban-in’s qualifications, the Act on Criminal Trials with
Participation of Saiban-in regulated that as long as a Japanese nationals have the
qualifications to be the Japanese House of Representatives, he or she is also qualified to
be a prospective saiban-in.607 However, a person who does not complete his or her
compulsory education, had physical disabilities or previous records of imprisonment,
would be disqualified.608

And, in accordance with the constitutional principles of checks and balances and
the judicial independence, people who work in an administrative or legislative capacity in
the Japanese government cannot be saiban-ins. 609 Moreover, to ensure genuine “lay
participation,” legal professionals e.g., professional judges, prosecutors, law professors
and one who are taking the legal training, are eliminated from the candidacy of being
saiban-ins.610

Furthermore, even though a person might be on the list of prospective saiban-in,
he or she might still be eliminated from the selection pool because of being related to the
case.611 In addition to this recusal factor, the prospective saiban-in would also refuse to be
appointed because of his or her age, occupation, education, physical inconvenience,
problems of transportation, and other reasons.612

(d). The Selection Process
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The selection process of the Japanese Saiban-in system incorporated the nature of
the ordinary jury system.613 Unlike the general lay participation system, the Japanese
saiban-in was appointed randomly. 614 The district court informs the district election
committee how many citizens are needed in order to cover the overall criminal cases in
that year.615 The committee then assembles a list of possible saiban-ins by drawing lots
for the court to further examine and eliminate those citizens who were dead or who have
lost their right to election, thus yielding a “short list”.616

When a case is brought to the court, the court selects a certain amount of
prospective saiban-ins randomly from the short list for both prosecutors and defense
counsels to question and screen them so that the court will appoint only qualified saibanins before the trial proceedings begins.617

(e). Conclusion
In addition to framing the Saiban-in system, the Japanese criminal justice system
also modified its trial procedures in order to improve trial functioning. For example, the
preliminary hearing was strengthened in order to clarify the issues before the trial
begins.618 Besides, the disclosure of evidence before the trial was required so that both
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Xingzhi xia zhi Xingshi Sifa Gaige (日本「裁判員制度」新制下之刑事司法改革) [The Japanese Justice
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parties could intensively prepare their arguments.619 Furthermore, after the trial begins,
the process focuses on issues that were clarified during the preliminary hearing in order to
streamline the trial proceedings.620

In sum, the Japanese Saiban-in system offered an innovated design that was
between the Anglo-American jury system and the civil-law lay participation system.621
With regard to civil-law lay participation system, the authority of the saiban-in was the
same as the professional judges from the process of discovery the truth of case to the
process of deliberation.622 In contrast, the selection process and the duration of the saibanin were structured as jury system in a case-by-case pattern.623 This unique nature of the
Japanese Saiban-in system is one that could not only cooperate with professional judges,
but also implement judicial democratization under the criminal justice system.

(2). South Korea

A. The Modern Development of the South Korea’s Criminal Justice System
South Korean society did not trust of its criminal justice system for a long time
especially because of the professional judges’ seeming arbitrariness.624 According to a
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2003 survey, 83.7% of South Koreans questioned the fairness of its judicial system.625
The South Korean government therefore organized a “Judicial Reform Committee” under
the (Supreme) Court of Korea. Also in 2003, the committee passed a resolution to
introduce a trial system for its citizens to participate in the criminal justice system.626

Concerning this judicial reform, 78.6% of South Koreans indicated that they
would support a new trial system627 and 65.2% would be willing to participate in it.628 In
addition, 53% of professional judges and prosecutors would be in favor of the
introduction of lay participation trials under the criminal justice system.629

This highly support rate resulted from the fact that South Korean judicial
institutions also leaned toward strengthening judicial democratization by the citizen
participation in its judicial system.630 Besides, the judicial institution anticipated that the
crisis of trust in its legal system would be resolved631 after citizens had an opportunity to
participate directly in the trial proceedings and realize the fairness and transparency of the
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country’s judicial system.632 The later legitimate purposes of establishing the citizen
participation system in South Korea also complied with these expectations.633

After the Judicial Reform Committee decided to establish lay participation under
the criminal justice system, issues regarding which kind of pattern would be most suitable
one for South Korea became the first question to solve. People who supported this
proposal wanted to implement an Anglo-American style of jury system because it would
not only allow citizens to participate fully in the trial proceedings, but also would induce
an overall review and reform of the entire current criminal justice system in South
Korea.634 On the other hand, people who against the Anglo-American system tended to
favor implementing the German lay participation system because it maintains the
professional judges’ leading position during trial proceedings.635

B. The Introduction of the Citizen Participation System under the Criminal Justice
System
The Committee had already considered the culture, history and legal values in
South Korea636 before the “Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials” was passed in
2007.637 Committee members were concerned that there had been no experience with
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practicing similar models under the South Korea’s judicial system.638 Therefore, either
the jury system or the lay participation system might conflict with the principle of judicial
independence639 under the South Korea’s Constitution.640

Consequently, the Committee decided to establish a mix of the jury and lay
participation systems641 along with the reforms of the criminal procedural laws642 as the
first step in introducing citizen participation in trials under the criminal justice system.643
After five-year observation duration, the judicial institution would further examine that
whether this mixed tribunal is suitable for the South Korea’s legal system in all aspects.644

(a). The Eligible Circumstances and the Defendant’s right to Choose
The South Korea’s citizen participation system was implemented in 2008.645
According to the Act on Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials, the defendant has the
right to choose whether his or her trial will be adjudicated according to the citizen
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participation system646 when he or she was charged by significant crimes, such as crimes
that causes death, robbery, and rape.647

In addition, the (Supreme) Court of the South Korea could also determine by
administrative ordinance that trials around other crimes could be tried by the citizen
participation system.

648

The legitimate purpose of this two-pronged statutory

circumstance649 was to limit the eligible cases to 100-200 per year so that the citizen’s
burden to participate in trials could reduce at the same time.650

With regard to the defendant’s right to choose,651 in fact, the implementation of
the citizen participation system might trigger a constitutional challenge in South Korea.652
Therefore, the defendants’ determination regarding which type of trial proceedings, the
original bench trial or the citizen participation system, in his or her case was further
defined as a citizen’s right under the South Korean citizen participation system.653

In practice, there were only a few cases that operated according to the citizen
participation system in the first two years after the new law was passed.654 During 2008 -
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2009, 5.2% of the eligible cases were trialed by the mixture tribunal.655 Apparently, only
a few defendants knew that their cases could be processed by the citizen participation.656
In addition, the new trial system also imposed a heavy burden for the defense lawyer
because they assumed the trial proceedings would not favor the defendant.657 As a result,
the defense lawyers often convinced defendants not to apply for the new trial pattern.658

In 2009, to extend the application of the citizen participation system, the
(Supreme) Court of South Korea expanded, by administrative ordinance, the eligible
crimes to include sexual assault.659 The Act was further modified that as long as a case
would be conducted by an ordinary bench trial, the defendant could apply to have his or
her case under the citizen participation system, beginning in 2013.660

(b). The Qualifications for Being a Juror under the Citizen Participation System
Under South Korea’s citizen participation system, appointed citizens were named
as “jurors” in order to help them understand their duties and further smoothly participate
in criminal trial proceedings.661 With regard to the prerequisites for being a juror, South
Korean nationality and being over twenty years old are regulated by laws.662 In contrast,
statutory factors that would disqualify someone from being a juror include having an
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announced disfranchisement or on parole,663 engaged in such occupations as professional
judge, prosecutor, lawyer, being in the military, or serving as a councilor.664

In addition, if a juror is an interested party of the case, he or she must be excluded
from the jury list.665 Also, if being a juror would be difficult for the person because of
aging or health problem (e.g., difficulty walking or a severe disease), he or she could
resign this position before the trial begins.666

(c). The Selection Process
To process the selection of jurors, the Public Administration and Safety of South
Korea submits the initial list to the district court from the list of resident qualified to be
prospective jurors.667 After a case is pending in court, the court selects randomly a certain
number of prospective jurors from the initial list before processes other selection
procedures, such as question and challenge against prospective jurors, in a closed
courtroom.668 During the selection proceedings, both parties question and sometimes
challenge every prospective juror until the number of jurors needed is appointed by the
court.669

(d). The Formation of the Trial Court under the Citizen Participation System
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The organization of the trial court varies in accordance with the alleged crime.670
According to the Act,671 along with three professional judges, there are nine jurors in a
capital case or a crime whose punishment would be life without parole. Other criminal
cases have seven jurors unless the defendant pleads guilty, in which case only five jurors
participate in the trial proceedings. To prevent alternate jurors from distracting during the
trial proceedings,672 the Act especially permitted the court not to inform the appointed
jurors whether they are alternate juror until the deliberation process begins.673

(e). The Pre-Trial and the Trial Proceedings
In South Korean criminal trials under the citizen participation system, preparatory
proceedings are significant674 to form a trial plan including arguments and evidence for
the jurors to read.675 Therefore, the prosecutor, defendant, and defense lawyer should
prepare their statements and disclose their evidence to the court clearly.676 These pretrial
proceedings would be open to the public. 677 However, the jury is prohibited from
participating in or even attending the preliminary proceedings678 in order to avoid tainting
their mind before the actual trial proceedings begins.
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After the proceedings do begin, the procedures must process continually and the
court should focus on issues centralized in the trial plan. 679 The jury’s main
responsibilities are to discover the facts of the case, to apply them to the laws and to
present their personal opinion with regard to the defendant’s sentencing.680

Unlike the Japanese Saiban-in system, the jury in South Korea can only request
the professional judges to question witnesses or defendants indirectly, in a written
form.681 After the conclusion of arguments, the judges give the instructions to the jury
before the deliberation process. 682 In practice, these instructions usually contain the
prosecution’s charge, the applicable laws, both parties’ arguments, and the competency of
evidence. The judges also point the jurors might pay particular attention to when
deliberating, such as the principles of presumption of innocence and the free evaluation of
evidence through inner conviction.683

During the deliberation process, the professional judge’s opinion would vary
based on the nature of jury’s verdict. If the jury had a unanimous decision, the
professional judge would present his or her opinion about evidence when over half of the
jury request him or her to do so.684 Under this circumstance, the jury has the discretion
whether or not to follow the professional judge’s opinion. However, if the jury cannot
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return a verdict unanimously, the professional judge’s opinion is mandatory and the
verdict is returned by a majority vote.685

Regardless of whether or not the professional judge’s opinion is mandatory, the
judge can only stated his or her explanations with regard to the evidentiary issues; rather
than his or her viewpoints about the defendant’s guilt.686 Besides, even though the jury
would follow the professional judge’s opinion, the deliberation process would be still
undertaken by the jurors independently;687 in other words, the professional judges cannot
participate in the jury’s vote on the verdict.688

(f). The Jury’s Verdict
The most particular feature of the South Korean citizen participation system is
that the jury’s opinion is only a “relevant trial record” to the court.689 That is, neither the
jury’s verdict nor their opinions about the defendant’s sentencing are binding on the
professional judges.690 This unique design resulted from the concern among many that
only the professional judges can make the final decision under the South Korean
Constitution.691 If the judges decided not to adopt the jury’s verdict, the Act further
required that the court should explain the reasons in the judgment for doing so.692
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(g). Conclusion
Although the South Korea’s citizen participation system was defined being close
to the Anglo-American jury system,693 in fact, its deliberation process contains many
crucial characteristics that distinguish it from the ordinary jury system. 694 First, the
professional judge has an opportunity to present his or her opinion on evidentiary issues
to the jury. Second, the jury’s verdict is by a majority vote rather than a unanimous
decision. Third, the verdict or opinions regarding sentencing would not be binding on the
professional judges. 695 Fourth, each juror might state his or her opinion about the
defendant’s sentence to the court. In sum, the South Korean citizen participation system,
like the Japanese Saiban-in system, is a kind of compromise between the ordinary jury
and the lay participation systems.696

693

See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 133 to 134.
694
Id., at 139; see also Wu, THE CITIZENS WOULD ALSO BE JUDGES, supra note 290, at 75.
695
ACT ON CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 646, art. 46, para. 5 (S. Kor.).
696
See Lee, The Current Situation and Lessons of the Citizen Participation System of South Korea, supra
note 629, at 29; see also You, The Citizens’ Participation in the Trial Proceedings, supra note 269, at 267
to 268.

106

CHAPTER THREE
THE PREREQUISITE ISSUES BEFORE ESTABLISHING A LAY PARTICIPATION
SYSTEM IN TAIWAN
Before the lay observer system was announced as the next criminal justice reform
in Taiwan, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan had already attempted, on four different
occasions, to implement various forms of the lay participation system. In order to avoid a
fifth failure, it is necessary to analyze those previous experiences and to explore
contemporary concerns with regard to how to constitutionally establish a lay participation
system under the Taiwanese judicial system.

3.1 Previous Attempts at Introducing the Lay Participation System in Taiwan

(1). Junshi Shenpan Fa (The Code of Court Martial Procedure) (1956-1999)697
Before this code was amended in 1999, according to its previous Article Thirteen,
Section 3 (1956),698 the definition of judges under the military tribunals system in Taiwan
included not only military judicators but also military officers. This “quasi” lay
participation system was described as a “historical coincidence” because the nature of the
special trial proceedings was not structured as the general lay participation system.699

At that time, allowing military officers to participate in military trial proceedings
was based on an out-of-date concept; the martial court was under the power of military
697
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command, rather than under the power of the judiciary in Taiwan.700 Accordingly, in the
previous Article Thirty-two, Section 1 (1956),701 the military rank of the judicator was
required to be higher than the defendant’s rank. Therefore, the nature of this particular
military tribunals system was based on the requirements of pertaining to military
administration in Taiwan.702

However, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court made interpretation No. 436 in
1997 and corrected the legal position of the military tribunals system from the power of
military command to the judicial system.703 The Justices also clearly ruled that even
though the concerns of national safety and particular military aspects would justify the
military tribunals system in establishing its special trial proceedings,704 it would not
conclude that the military department had exclusive rights on judging military crimes
without complying with constitutional requirements.705 Therefore, the Court held that the
military tribunals system must be improved in accordance with the principles of
independent trial required by Taiwanese Constitutional law.706

700
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Hence, the Taiwanese Executive Yuan and the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan pursued
the necessary modifications that would ensure the code adhere to constitutional
requirements.707 The situations that allow military officers to participate in martial trial
proceedings were sharply reduced to cases that require professional or technical
knowledge.708 Additionally, the military officers’ participation was altered such that it
was no longer mandatory and instead become optional.709

This “quasi” lay participation system still remained a part of martial tribunals
system after the modifications were proposed to the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan in 1999.
The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense contended that most martial cases contain
special facts that necessitate the application of special laws.710 Therefore, the military
officers’ participation could provide judicators with the professional and technical
knowledge during the trial proceedings.711 The Ministry of National Defense believed
that without this information, the judicators might not be able to find full facts and apply
correct laws to cases.712

However, the Legislators worried that administrative influence could not be
completely eliminated from the military tribunals system as long as the Ministry of
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Id.; see also Li, The Study of the Civilians Benched in the Criminal Trials, supra note 279, at 130. (The
author described the legitimate background of the amendments of the Code of Court Martial Procedure.)
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National Defense could appoint military officers as judicators to martial cases. 713
Therefore, the Legislative Yuan refused to maintain these particular trial proceedings or
to allow military officers to participate in military tribunals.714 This rejection terminated
the quasi lay participation system that had been a part of the Taiwanese criminal justice
system for forty-three years.715

(2). Xingshi Canshen Shixing Tiaoli (1989-1998)716
In 1988, the President of the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan, Lin Yanggang, held a
“Second National Judicial Conference.” 717 During this conference, President Lin
proposed a motion, as a policy of judicial reform, which was the possibility of
introducing a lay participation system in Taiwan.718 This policy brought on a heated
discussion between people who work in practical and criminal academics.719

At that time, the only consensus with regard to framing a lay participation system
in Taiwan was that, this issue would not be solved until the parties involved carefully
considered both foreign experiences and domestic necessities.720 The conference also

713

See Li, id., at 131.
Id.; see also Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial
Procedure, supra note 6, at 262.
715
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 3.
716
This proposed law was not sent to the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China (Taiwan) for
deliberation; therefore, this law does not have an official English translation. Its literal translation is close to
“Proposed Act of the Lay Participation System under the Criminal Justice System.”
717
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 3.
718
See Zhang, The Introduction of the Lay Participation System, supra note 423, at 104.
719
Id.; see also Wang, The Study of Criminal Trial Systems, supra note 84, at 86. (During the conference in
Taiwan, professional judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, academics and criminal experts discussed this
policy.)
720
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 3 to 4.
714
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reached the following conclusions: The Judicial Yuan must explore the essence of lay
participation in the Taiwanese judicial system and, compare its significance to current
domestic demand. In addition, the conference also required the Legislative Yuan to
examine whether or not the Taiwanese judicial system would benefit from adopting it
before make its deliberation regarding the proposed act.721

Accordingly, the Judicial Yuan organized a Commission whose sole purpose was
to research those related issues proposed during the conference.722 The goal of this
Commission was to draft needed laws pertaining to the framing of a lay participation
system under the Taiwanese criminal justice system.723 After a five-year discussion, the
Commission completed an act in 1994.724

The suggested lay participation trial proceedings would be similar to the German
system.725 For example, only limited cases, such as those involving severe crimes or
crimes necessitate the use of technical and professional knowledge, qualified for being
tried by lay participants.726 Additionally, those laymen would perform all tasks within
their three-year term along with the professional judges such as discovering the truth,
applying laws to the facts that they confirm, concluding whether or not the defendant is
guilty, and deciding to what punishment the defendant would be sentenced.727

721

Id.; see also Zhan, Study on the Expert Acting as Lay Judge in Trail Proceedings, supra note 262, at 52.
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 4.
723
Id.
724
Id.; see also Wang, The Study of Criminal Trial Systems, supra note 84, at 86.
725
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 4; see also Zhang, A Study of the Proposed
Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure, supra note 6, at 263.
726
Id.
727
Id.
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Before this proposed act was sent to the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan first
submitted it to the Executive Yuan so that it could obtain policy support.728 At the same
time, Taiwanese society noticed this criminal justice reform and presented many
dissenting opinions. The most controversial concern regarding this proposed policy was
that, the essence of the lay participation system might fundamentally conflict with
Taiwanese tradition.

In Taiwan, the society usually values “group” above “individual.”729 In other
words, as long as the potential defendant has an influential relationship with society or
with the lay participants, then a fair result cannot be expected because either society as a
whole or the participating citizens might possess a bias toward the defendant that would
impact their ability to objectively deciding whether he or she is guilty or not and what his
or her punishment should be.730

Additionally, the Executive Yuan paid close attention to the constitutionality of
framing such a lay participation system under the Taiwanese criminal justice system.731
The first issue was whether the participating citizens could be defined as a “judge” under
Taiwanese constitutional law.732 Furthermore, lay participation might infringe upon the
judges’ independence protected by the Constitution during the decision-making

728

Si Fa Yuan, (83) Yuan Tai Ting Xing Yi Zi No. 08556 Hao Han (May 7,1994). (司法院 (83) 院台廳刑
一字第 08556 號函); see also Zhan, Study on the Expert Acting as Lay Judge in Trail Proceedings, supra
note 262, at 53. (In practice, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan usually delivers its proposed acts to the Executive
Yuan first for consulting opinions.)
729
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 265.
730
Id.
731
See Wang, The Study of Criminal Trial Systems, supra note 84, at 86.
732
Id.; see also CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 98.
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process.733 Moreover, the Executive Yuan also worried that the proposed lay participation
system had only a slight possibility of being accepted by Taiwanese society.734 These two
significant constitutional issues and the concerns regarding the violation of societal
inclinations resulted in the Executive Yuan’s decision not to approve the Judicial Yuan to
establish a lay participation system in Taiwan.735

After the Taiwanese Executive Yuan declined to proceed with this judicial policy,
the Commission continued focusing on the issues having to do with the constitutionality
of the proposed lay participation system.736 However, after several meetings in 1995,737
even the Commission itself was unable to reach any further consensus or come away with
any possible solutions with regard to the constitutional issues. Ultimately, the Xingshi
Canshen Shixing Tiaoli was terminated in 1998.738

(3). Zhuanjia Canshen Shixing Tiaoli (1999-2006)739
Before the Taiwanese National Judicial Reformation Conference began in July
1999, its preparatory committee brought forward a motion to introduce another lay

733

See Wang, The Study of Criminal Trial Systems, supra note 84, at 86; see also CONSTITUTION, id., art.
80 (1947).
734
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 264 to 265.
735
Xing Zheng Yuan, Tai 83 Fa Zi No. 36352 Hao Han (Sep. 24,1994) (行政院台 83 法字第 36352 號函);
see also Li, The Study of the Civilians Benched in the Criminal Trials, supra note 279, at 131.
736
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 264.
737
There were four meetings held to discuss the possibility of framing the lay participation system
constitutionally in Taiwan: 1. February 14th,1995; 2. January 12th,1996; 3. June 27th, 1997; and 4. June
30th,1998.
738
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 264.
739
This proposed law was not sent to the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China (Taiwan) for
deliberation; therefore, this law does not have an official English translation. Its literal translation is close to
“Proposed Act of the Experts Participation System.”

113

participation system in Taiwan.740 During the preparation process, both the Taiwanese
Ministry of Justice and some non-governmental judicial reformation organizations741
agreed that, in order to prevent professional judges from so rigidly adhering to laws and
making judgments that were discordant with societal emotions, a lay participation system
was needed, especially in professional cases or cases centered around specific crimes.742
Accordingly, this system was expected to allow the Taiwanese judicial system to regain
the trust of the citizens.743

With regard to the constitutional issues of establishing a lay participation system
in Taiwan, the preparatory committee suggested to divide the framing process into two
steps:744 The first step is, before assuring an amendment of Taiwanese constitutional law
is necessary, the laymen’s opinions should not bind on professional judges’
determination.745 Secondly, if an amendment of the Taiwanese Constitution is needed, the
next step is to amend the Constitution so that the lay participation system could be
constitutionally introduced into the Taiwanese judicial system.746

740

See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 5; see also Zhou, Study on the Layman Acting
as Lay Judge in Trial Proceedings, supra note 422, at 170.
741
See Gu Lixiong (顧立雄), Zhuanjia Canshen zhi Youlai (專家參審之由來) [The Origins of the Experts
who Participate in the Trial Proceedings], 253 LUSHI ZAZHI [TAIPEI BAR JOURNAL] 5, 6 (2000). (The
author listed those non-governmental judicial reformation organizations that took part in the conference:
Taiwan Law Society, Taiwan Bar Association, Taipei Bar Association, etc.)
742
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 5; see also Zhang, A Study of the Proposed
Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure, supra note 6, at 265. (The preparatory
committee suggested that cases involved in the issues of juveniles, families, labor, intellectual property,
medical disputes and significant crimes should practice via lay participation trial proceedings.)
743
Id.
744
See JUDICIAL YUAN, DEPARTMENT OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, QUANGUO SIFA GAIGE HUIYI SHILU
SHANG (全國司法改革會議實錄(上)) [THE MINUTES OF THE NATIONAL JUDICIAL REFORM- ONE] 484 to
485 (The Judicial Yuan, Department of Judicial Administration, 1st ed. 1999); see also Zhou, Study on the
Layman Acting as Lay Judge in Trial Proceedings, supra note 422, at 171.
745
Id.
746
Id.
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After the “National Judicial Reformation Conference” officially began on July 6th,
1999, this motion was passed as a resolution without any objection.747 However, in this
passed solution, the proposed lay participation system was changed from citizens’
participation to experts’ consultation without clear explanations provided by the
Conference. 748 In 2000, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan implemented the first step
recommended by the preparatory committee and issued a guideline with regard to how
experts would take part in the trial proceedings under the Taiwanese judicial system.749

At the same time, without solving the potential constitutional issues that the
“Xingshi Canshen Shixing Tiaoli” had confronted, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan
organized a Commission and assigned it to draft laws with regard to framing the experts’
participation system in 2000.750 After forty meetings over the course of five years, the
proposed law, “Zhuanjia Canshen Shixing Tiaoli,” was finally completed. This act was
also sent to the Executive Yuan for its approval so that the Legislative Yuan would
further deliberate the proposed law.751

747

See JUDICIAL YUAN, DEPARTMENT OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, QUANGUO SIFA GAIGE HUIYI SHILU
XIA (全國司法改革會議實錄(下)) [THE MINUTES OF THE NATIONAL JUDICIAL REFORM- TWO] 949 to 965,
1403 to 1404, 1527 and 1652 to 1653 (The Judicial Yuan, Department of Judicial Administration, 1st ed.
1999); see also Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial
Procedure, supra note 6, at 266.
748
See Zhang, id. (The author conjectured that the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan might not have a clear thought
regarding what kind of lay participation system the Taiwanese judicial system needed. The author further
suggested that this confusion caused a lack of understanding with regard to the preparatory committee’s
suggestions.)
749
The guideline is called “ZHUANJIA CANYU SHENPAN ZIXUN SHIXING YAODIAN” (專家參與審判諮詢試
行要點); see also Si Fa Yuan, (89) Tai Ting Ming Yi Zi No. 10577 Hao Ling (May 2, 2000) (司法院 (89)
台廳民一字第 10577 號令).
750

See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 6; see also Zheng, A Comparative Study of the
Lay Participation System, supra note 561, at 92.
751
See Si Fa Yuan, Yuan Tai Ting Ming Yi Zi No. 0950018850 Hao Han (Aug. 21, 2006) (司法院院台廳
民一字第 0950018850 號函).
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In this act, the proposed experts participation system was similar to Germany’s lay
participation system.752 That is, only when the defendant applies to the court or the
professional judges make a ruling would the experts participation trial proceedings be
processed under the Taiwanese criminal, civil and administrative justice system. 753
Moreover, especially with regard to the criminal justice system, before ruling on whether
or not the experts could participate in trials, the professional judges should seek out the
prosecutor’s opinion on the matter.754

As to the experts’ qualifications, a selection committee formed by the judicial
institution would examine prospective experts before compiling a list and forwarding it to
the court.755 Within their four-year terms of duty,756 these qualified experts would have
the same authority as the professional judges during the trial proceedings757

However, the Taiwanese Executive Yuan denied this proposed act, and this
decision was based on the same concerns regarding its potential unconstitutionality.758
According to the Executive Yuan,759 there was still an unresolved issue regarding whether
the experts, or citizens other than the professional judges, could have the same authority
752

See Wang Meiying (王梅英), Zhuanjia zai Fating shang de Jiaose- Jianding huo Canshen? (專家在法
庭上的角色- 鑑定或參審?) [The Role of the Experts Who Participate in the Trial Proceedings- Expert
Witnesses or Lay Participants?], 253 LUSHI ZAZHI [TAIPEI BAR JOURNAL] 29, 33 (2000).
753
ZHUANJIA CANSHEN SHIXING TIAOLI [PROPOSED ACT OF THE EXPERTS PARTICIPATION SYSTEM] art. 5,
6 and 7 (2006) (Taiwan); see also Yang Huayan (楊華嚴), Zhuanjia Canshen Zhidu zhi Jieshao Shang (專
家參審制度之介紹(上)) [The Introduction of the Experts Participation System- One], 29 SIFA XIN QUSHI
[NEW CURRENT OF LAW] 134, 140 to 141 (2007).
754
PROPOSED ACT OF THE EXPERTS PARTICIPATION SYSTEM, supra note 739, art. 6 (2006); see also Zhang,
A Policy Analysis of the Experts Participation System, supra note 95, at 66 to 68.
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PROPOSED ACT OF THE EXPERTS PARTICIPATION SYSTEM, id., art. 13 and 14 (2006).
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Id., art. 12 (2006).
757
Id., art. 2 and 3 (2006).
758
See Li, The Study of the Civilians Benched in the Criminal Trials, supra note 279, at 132; see also
Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure, supra
note 6, at 267 to 268.
759
Xing Zheng Yuan, Yuan Tai Fa Zi No. 0960080213 Hao Han (Jan. 10, 2007) (行政院院臺法字第
0960080213 號函).
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as professional judges during the trial proceedings.760 In addition, there was also a
concern regarding whether the experts’ opinions could bind on the judges’ decisions.
These issues had to be considered before the experts participation system could be
properly framed in Taiwan.761 Ultimately, in 2007, this third attempt at establishing a lay
participation system failed.

(4). Guomin Canshen Shixing Tiaoli (2006-2007)762
Although the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan had already failed at introducing a lay
participation system three times since 1999, in 2006, the President of the Taiwanese
Judicial Yuan, Weng Yuesheng, remained dedicated to the framing of a suitable lay
participation system under the Taiwanese judicial system. 763 President Weng was a
Justice of the Constitutional Court, during the time the Judicial Yuan proposed the
“Xingshi Canshen Shixing Tiaoli”;764 therefore, he appointed the Criminal Department of
the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan to reconsider the spirit of the “Xingshi Canshen Shixing
Tiaoli” and to propose another law that would help to establish lay participation system in
Taiwan.765
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See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 268.
761
Id.; see also Wang, The Role of the Experts Who Participate in Trial Proceedings, supra note 752, at 34
to 35. (The author worried that there was no procedural requirements to examine the experts’ opinions in
the proposed Act. The only standard with regard to whether to adopt these opinions was the defendant’s
agreement to apply for the expert participation.)
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This proposed law was not sent to the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China (Taiwan) for
deliberation; therefore, this law does not have an official English translation. Translated literally, it is close
to “The Lay Participation Trial Act.”
763
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 268.
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Id., at 263.
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See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 7; see also Yang, Based on the Study of Nation
Participation Judiciary to Investigate the Feasibility of Military Personnel Assigned as the Member of
Military Judiciary, supra note 86, at 161.
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There was a noteworthy difference between this attempt to establish a lay
participation system in Taiwan and previous attempts; this time, the Judicial Yuan neither
organized a Commission nor invited any academics or experts to discuss related issues.766
On the contrary, this later proposed law, Guomin Canshen Shixing Tiaoli, was in fact
drafted via the internal meetings of the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan between July and
October of 2006.767

The first draft was completed on November 20th, 2006.768 The Judicial Yuan not
only put the draft on an internal forum of its website so that all professional judges could
access it and express their thoughts regarding the proposed system directly,769 but it also
held four public hearings in Taipei, Taichung, Kaoxiong and Hualian in order to gather
public opinion. 770 The Judicial Yuan also arranged an official visit of the Japanese
Saiban-in system in order to explore more practical experiences related to the lay
participation system under a criminal justice system.771
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See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 28.
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Id. (These internal meetings were held from July 14th to October 31st, 2006.)
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See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 7.
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See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 268. (The internal forum was called “Fa Guan Lun Tan” (法官論壇).)
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See the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan, Guomin Jiangke Canshen Zhongda Xingan- Guomin Canshen Shixing
Tiali Caoan Chugao Chulu (國民將可參審重大刑案-國民參審試行條例草案初稿出爐) [Citizens Would
Take Part in Significant Criminal Cases- the Draft of the Proposed “Guomin Canshen Shixing Tiaoli” was
Completed ] 1314 SIFA ZHOUKAN 1, 1 (Nov. 23, 2006); see also Li Taizheng (李太正), Peishen yu
Canshen- Jiantan Riben Kaochao Suojian (陪審與參審-兼談日本考察所見) [The Jury System and the Lay
Participation System- Also Discuss the Japanese Experiences], 2 JIAN CHA XIN LUN [TAIWAN
PROSECUTOR REVIEW] 205 (2007).
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See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 7.
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In August of 2007, the second version of this act was modified according to public
opinion and the Japanese experiences.772 To further rationalize the implementation of the
proposed system, the Judicial Yuan also held two additional public hearings for
discussing the structure of the system so that it would be more practical in Taiwan.773 The
final version of the Guomin Canshen Shixing Tiaoli was completed in September of
2009.774 It was no surprise that the fourth proposed lay participation system was similar to
the Japanese Saiban-in system.775 This proposed system is only applied to the following
situations:776 1. The defendant declares his or her innocence; 2. The defendant is charged
with committing severe crimes;777 3. The laymen’s participation is requested by the
litigants or is issued via the court’s ruling.778

With regard to the duty of the laymen, their right to deliberate would be equal to
the professional judges’ during the deliberation process. 779 In other words, both the
professional judges and the lay participants make decisions together by way of vote.780
The most obvious difference between the fourth attempt and the previous attempts to
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Su Sue (蘇素娥), Woguo Xingshi Shenpan Shifou Caixing Guomin Canshen zhi Yanjiu (我國刑事審判
是否採行國民參審之研究) [A Study regarding Whether the Taiwanese Criminal Trial Proceedings Should
Adopt the Lay Participation System], 177 YUEDAN FAXUE ZAZHI [TAIWAN LAW REVIEW] 192, 194 (2010).
773
Id.; see also Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial
Procedure, supra note 6, at 268 to 269.
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See Zhang, id.
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See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 7.
776
See Su, A Study regarding Whether the Taiwanese Criminal Trial Proceedings Should Adopt the Lay
Participation System, supra note 772, at 197 to 198.
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GUOMIN CANSHEN SHIXING TIAOLI [THE LAY PARTICIPATION TRIAL ACT] art. 6, § 1 (2007) (Taiwan).
(Only a crime whose punishments are the death penalty, life without parole or more than ten years’
imprisonment would qualify for being tried via the lay participation system.)
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Id., art. 7 and 8 (2007). (The litigants include both the defendant and the prosecutor.)
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Id., art. 3 and 45 (2007).
780
Id., art. 49 (2007).
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implement an act was that the lay participants would be appointed by case, rather than
have a term of duty.781

However, once the act was announced, a large proportion of the citizenry made it
evident that they were opposed to the establishment of a lay participation system under
the Taiwanese criminal justice system.782 As such, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan was
unable to promote its proposed lay participation system without first taking into account
the people’s objections.783 In the end, the Judicial Yuan concluded that it was essential to
further evaluate the necessity of the proposed system in Taiwan and suspended the
implementation of the proposed lay participation system.784

3.2 The Constitutionality of the Lay Participation System: The Silence of the
Taiwanese Constitutional Law
The constitutional issues surrounding the four systems that had been proposed
were the primary reasons that all four prior attempts failed. Therefore, the Taiwanese
Judicial Yuan had adopted a new strategy in establishing the proposed lay observer
system that is designed to circumvent these constitutional concerns; the new system has
been structured such that the lay observers’ opinions are not binding on the professional
judges.785
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See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 7; see also Zhang, A Study of the Proposed
Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure, supra note 6, at 269.
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See Zhang, id.
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Id. (The Taiwanese Judicial Yuan thought that it was necessary to address and quiet those objections
and to keep evaluating the possibility of framing a lay participation system in Taiwan.)
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Id.
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See Chen, The New Age of the Justice Reforms, supra note 53, at 8.
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The constitutional concerns were significant because these issues were related to
not only the principles of the separation of powers but also to the people’s fundamental
rights under the Taiwanese Constitution. Accordingly, it is necessary to resolve any
potential issues of a proposed system’s constitutionality before introducing it into the
Taiwanese judicial system. Otherwise, even uniquely designed system, such as the lay
observer system, will still undermine the spirit of Taiwanese constitutional law.786

In Taiwan, people who doubted the constitutionality of the lay participation
system stated that Taiwanese constitutional law did not clearly admit its citizens to play a
role in the trial proceedings.787 Therefore, any kind of lay participation system or jury
system would violate the principles under the Taiwanese Constitution. However, it might
be too great a leap to conclude that allowing laymen to participate in the trial proceedings
would be inevitably unconstitutional simply because of this omission in Taiwanese
constitutional law.788

(1). The Japanese Experiences
The Japanese judicial system encountered the same obstacle when it introduced
the Saiban-in system because, like Taiwanese constitutional law, Japanese Constitution
did not state whether or not its citizens could serve as active participants in the courtroom.
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See Wang, The Study of Criminal Trial Systems, supra note 84, at 87. (The author pointed out that the
proposed lay participation system, no matter whether it was the Xinshi Canshen or the Zhuanjia Canshen,
should have strong and legitimate theories regarding the constitutional issues before its legislation is
completed.)
787
See Zhou, Study on the Layman Acting as Lay Judge in Trial Proceedings, supra note 422, at 155.
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Id.; see also Lin Junyi (林俊益), Lin Xinxu (林信旭), Renmin Canyu Shenpan Chutan- yi Renmin
Guanshen Shixing Tiaoli Caoan Chugao wei Zhongxin (人民參與審判初探-以人民觀審試行條例草案初
稿為中心) [Explore the Issues of the Lay Participation- Focused on the Draft of the Proposed Act of the
Lay Observer System], 16:4 QUAN GUO LU SHI [TAIWAN BAR JOURNAL] 5, 11 (2012).
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Therefore, it is helpful to refer to the Japanese experiences before exploring the
inclinations of Taiwanese constitutional law under the same circumstances.

According to Japanese constitutional law, the clauses related to the judicial power
were regulated in Articles Seventy-six through Eighty-two.789 However, just as with the
Taiwanese Constitution, the details regarding the organization of its judicial system were
not codified.790 Therefore, people who opposed the lay participation system stated that
implementing the lay participation system under the Japanese judicial system was
unconstitutional because of the constitutional silence on the matter.791

However, the Japanese Courts held that the lack of codification was not sufficient
to oppose the implementation of a lay participation system. In 2010, the Tokyo High
Court stated that,792 the Saiban-in system was constitutional because even though the
Japanese Constitution did not codify the organizations of its lower courts, 793 the
constitutional law itself did not prohibit people other than the professional judges from
participating in trial proceedings.794 One year later, the Supreme Court of Japan came to
the same conclusion; its decision was reached via the following two methods:795
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ZHANG SHIXIAN (張世賢), GEGUO XIANFA TIAOWEN HUIBIAN (各國憲法條文彙編) [A COLLECTION
FOREIGN CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS] 142 to 145 (Rui Xing Tu Shu, 1st ed. 1995); see also Zhan, Study on
the Expert Acting As Lay Judge in Trail Proceedings, supra note 262, at 75.
790
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793
See CONSTITUTION (Japan), supra note 790.
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First, the Court explored the existing concepts that were the basic principles of the
sovereign power under the Japanese Constitution, the Japanese criminal jurisdiction and
the historical background of constitutional law in order to assess that whether the Saibanin system would conflict with the spirit of the Japanese Constitution. Second, the Court
analyzed the scheme of the Japanese Constitution itself in order to ensure that the Saibanin system would comply with the principles of Japanese constitutional law. Ultimately,
the Japanese Justices again confirmed the constitutionality of the Saiban-in system.796

(2). The Silence of Taiwanese Constitutional Law
After referring to the Japanese Courts’ judgments, the issues regarding the
constitutionality of establishing a lay participation system in Taiwan should be also
examined in accordance with both the principles and the scheme of the Taiwanese
Constitution via the following methods regarding explanation of laws:797

A. The Literal Meaning of the Taiwanese Constitution
Under this means of explanation, the issue of whether or not the lay participation
system is constitutional should be determined via the contents of the articles under
Taiwanese constitutional law.
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Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 14, 2011, Hei 22 (a) no. 1196.
SU YONGQIN (蘇永欽), SIFA GAIGE DE ZAI GAIGE (司法改革的再改革) [REFORM THE JUDICIAL
REFORMS] 65, 77 (Yuan Zhao Chu Ban, 1st ed. 1998).
797

123

According to Article Seventy-seven of the Taiwanese Constitution,798 the Judicial
Yuan has full jurisdiction on scheming out the trial proceedings under its legal system.
Additionally, Article Eighty-two799 states that, the organizations of the judicial system
must be regulated by laws. In other words, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan has flexibility in
how it establishes its legal system800 as long as the legislative institution approved the
necessary details in laws required per Taiwanese constitutional law. 801 As a result,
admitting laymen to participate in trial proceedings is not an unconstitutional system in
Taiwan because it is under both the Judicial Yuan and the legislation’s discretion to
establish or modified the system.802

B. The Historical Background of the Taiwanese Constitution
Under this means of explanation, whether or not the lay participation system is
constitutional in Taiwan depends on the Founding Fathers’ discretion toward this issue
when they drafted Taiwanese constitutional law.

According to historical records in 1944, the Founding Fathers once discussed and
resolved that, it was not necessary to codify the issue regarding whether the jury system
should be adopted into the Taiwanese judicial system because of the national conditions
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and the considerations of judicial budget.803 Accordingly, it is obvious that the Founding
Fathers intended to leave this issue for a later determination rather than denied
introducing a jury system in Taiwan. 804 Therefore, citizens’ participation in trial
proceedings should not be declared unconstitutional because the Taiwanese Constitution
did not define its position toward this issue.

C. The Scheme of the Taiwanese Constitution and the Means of Explanation
regarding the Possible Constitutionality
In general, a Constitution contains only principles rather than specific details in all
aspects because the more abstract its contents are, the more flexible its system is.
Accordingly, with regard to the structure of the judicial power in Taiwan, it is inevitable
that the constitutional law left some legislative space for the legislative institution to
address and make decisions regarding the necessary details.805

Additionally, according to a legal explanation method that assesses the probable
constitutionality toward an issue, it could be concluded that as long as the lay
participation trial proceedings are defined as a constitutional system by any means of
explanation, the nature of the citizens’ participation would not violate the principles of
the Taiwanese Constitution in the long run.

In sum, after analyzing both the literal meanings and the historical background of
the Taiwanese Constitution, it could be concluded that Taiwanese constitutional law does
803
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not prohibit citizens from acting as laymen in the trial proceedings and that the
implementation of a lay participation system would be constitutional as long as its
proposed act was approved by the legislative institution and its design complied with the
constitutional principles of the Taiwanese Constitution.

(3). The Contemporary Debate: The Theory of Judicial Democratization
When the countries of East Asia, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, tried to
explore concepts other than already established constitutional principles before
implementing the lay participation system under their criminal justice systems, the theory
of judicial democratization induced societal debates regarding whether a judicial system
should democratize, as administrative and legislative system do, so that the laymen could
participate in trial proceedings and make decisions along with the professional judges.806

A. The Debate in Japan
The preface of the Japanese Constitution stated that:807
“Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived
from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the
people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people.”
Accordingly, the ability of the Japanese government to act at all is reliant upon
the people’s trust. With regard to the dispute against the theory of judicial
democratization, the Japanese Supreme Court concluded, in 2011, that, after referring
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to both this theory’s origins and its development in the West, the lay participation
system would strengthen national jurisdiction so that the legitimacy of a judicial
system would be ensured.808 Therefore, the Japanese Justices defined lay participation
as a direct way to realize the theory of judicial democratization in Japan.

However, during the lawmaking process of the Saiban-in system, the judicial
democratization theory encountered a great question.809 The arguments that the nature
of a judicial system should not be realized by democratic process became the fatal
challenge to the theory of judicial democratization in Japan. 810 The opponents
reasserted that even though the Japanese people authorized judicial power to the
judiciary, the implementation of a lay participation system under the Japanese judicial
system was not definitely constitutional because the Japanese Constitution did not
directly grant people to practice judicial power by themselves.811

In order to avoid this controversy during the lawmaking process, the proposed
act of the Saiban-in system finally discarded the adoption of judicial democratization
and further defined the purposes of this system as a way of both increasing the
people’s understanding and their reliance on the Japanese judicial system.812

B. The Debate in Taiwan
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Similar to Japanese constitutional law, the general provisions of the Taiwanese
Constitution also state that national sovereignty belongs to the Taiwanese people.813 In
addition, Taiwanese constitutional law further emphasizes that national sovereignty is
based on the principle of democracy of the Constitution itself.814 Accordingly, people
who support the theory of judicial democratization have stated that, under the judicial
system, jurisdiction is a concept of practicing the judicial power; therefore, the citizens’
participation would be constitutional because the Constitution did not authorize
jurisdiction exclusively to the professional judges in Taiwan.815

Furthermore, the same conclusion could be also affirmed by the means of
explanation on issues regarding the judicial democratization under the Taiwanese
Constitution. The scheme of Taiwanese constitutional law makes it evident that the
sovereignty belongs to the Taiwanese people because the principle of democracy is under
the chapter of the general provisions in the Constitution.816 Therefore, all of the national
behaviors, including those that are administrative or legislative in nature as well as
judicial power, should permit the citizens to take part either directly or indirectly.817

In short, with regard to the practice of judicial power in Taiwan, people who have
supported the theory of judicial democratization asserted that the implementation of a lay
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participation system is the direct way to realize the principles of democracy required by
Taiwanese constitutional law.818

In contrast, people who have denied that the judicial system should practice
democratically stated that the nature of a judicial system is to prevent the majority’s
opinion from oppressing the minority’s freedom.819 Accordingly, the significant goal of
the judicial power under Taiwanese constitutional law is to protect the legal interests of
the minority. In addition, it is almost impossible for any judicial system to explore the
“majority opinion” because no matter how a lay participation system selects its laymen
who will participate in trial proceedings, those selected citizens cannot be expected to
represent the whole country.820

As a result, to those opponents, the true value of judicial power is to restrain the
character of democratization because the main task during the trial proceedings is to
discover the truth of the fact, and this task cannot be fulfilled by a majority’s vote in a
courtroom because of the impossibility to explore the national consensus in trials.821 In
short, the principle of judicial democratization should not be a practical theory to support
the implementation of a lay participation system in Taiwan.

C. The Taiwanese Judicial Yuan’s Standpoints
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When the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan declared that the introduction of the lay
observer system would be the next criminal justice reform measure to the Taiwanese
criminal justice system, the members of the Commission organized by the Judicial Yuan
also discussed whether the theory of judicial democratization would be the basis of the
proposed lay observer system in order to ensure the system’s legitimacy under Taiwanese
constitutional law.822

According to the Commission’s minutes, the views of the Judicial Yuan regarding
the theory of judicial democratization gradually became conservative. In the first two
conferences, the members of the Commission brought up the idea of judicial
democratization as a legitimate basis for the proposed system.823 However, the official
representative of the Commission, the Vice-President of the Judicial Yuan, responded to
the idea that the theory of judicial professionalization is the core spirit of the Taiwanese
judicial system; therefore, the introduction of the proposed system should not simply be
based on the theory of judicial democratization.824

When the options between the principles of judicial democratization and judicial
professionalization brought concern among the Commission’s members, the Taiwanese
Judicial Yuan invited a Japanese scholar to address the Commission and discuss the
experiences of the Japanese Saiban-in system.825 Per the Japanese experiences, it was
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concluded that the laymen’s verdict did not represent the general consensus of Japanese
society.826

Moreover, with regard to the legitimate basis of the Saiban-in system, the function
of the lay participation in Japan was ultimately defined as a direct way to bring the
laymen’s personal experiences and thoughts to the courtroom so that the trial proceedings
would better represent the societal values.827 Finally, in the end of lawmaking process
regarding the Saiban-in system, the Japanese judicial system abandoned the theory of
judicial democratization.828

To further discuss the constitutional issues with regard to the implementation of
the lay participation system in Taiwan, the Judicial Yuan held a seminar829 and some
Taiwanese scholars suggested not to adopt the theory of judicial democratization as a
means of legitimizing the lay participation because this issue was too controversial.830
Furthermore, by referring to the Japanese experiences, these scholars concluded that the
issue regarding whether the Taiwanese criminal justice system should adopt a lay
participation system should not focus on the debate between the judicial
professionalization and the judicial democratization, but on the expected functions and
the purposes of the proposed system.831
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After the Commission completed its task of exploring the possibility of
implementing a lay participation system in Taiwan, the Judicial Yuan began the
lawmaking process as it pertained to its proposed lay observer system. According to
Article One in the draft of the lay observer system,832 the purposes of the proposed
system are to increase judicial transparency, to better reflect societal values and to
improve the people’s understanding of and reliance on the Taiwanese judicial system.
Accordingly, the Judicial Yuan also discarded the theory of judicial democratization as a
means of legitimizing the lay participation system in Taiwan just as the Japanese Saibanin system did.833

(4). Conclusion: A Modified Theory of Judicial Democratization
Although Taiwanese constitutional law did not regulate whether people would
participate in the trial proceedings and make decisions with the professional judges, it
does not mean that the Constitution would definitely prohibit the adoption of a lay
participation system under its judicial system. The same conclusion would also be
inferred from the Taiwanese constitutional interpretations.

The Judicial Yuan Interpretation Nos. 436 and 591 both indicated that,834 any
special trial proceedings under the Taiwanese judicial system would be accepted by the
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Constitution as long as these special proceedings comply with the principles of
Taiwanese constitutional law.835

With regard to the debates between the theory of judicial democratization and
judicial professionalization, the Japanese experiences showed that a judicial system
would still need the citizens’ experiences and thoughts in order to avoid a judgment
arbitrarily or secretly determined by the professional judges.836 At the same time, both the
Taiwanese Constitution and one Judicial Yuan’s interpretation confirmed that “the
principle of sovereignty of and by the people” is the general concept under the Taiwanese
Constitution.837 Therefore, the judicial power in Taiwan should not be isolated from the
administrative or the legislative power even though the Judicial Yuan did not accept the
theory of judicial democratization in its proposed Act of the lay observer system.838

As such, in order to strengthen the legitimacy of citizens’ participation in the
judicial system, the theory of judicial democratization must be further modified so that it
can serve as a flexible basis in this era.839 Under the modified theory, a lay participation
system would grant the society opportunities to understand, to be familiar with and to
comprehend the criminal justice system. 840 According to the proposed Act of the
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Taiwanese lay observer system, 841 it adopted this modified theory 842 so that the lay
observers would increase their understandings of the Taiwanese criminal justice system
by exchanging their opinions with professional judges and interacting with professional
judges during the trial proceedings.843

3.3 The Lay Participation System and the Principle of Judicial Independence
Article 80 of the Taiwanese Constitution (1947) states:
“Judges shall be above partisanship and shall, in accordance with law, hold trials
independently, free from any interference.”
Article 81 of the Taiwanese Constitution (1947) states:
“Judges shall hold office for life. No judge shall be removed from office unless
he has been found guilty of a criminal offense or subjected to disciplinary measure, or
declared to be under interdiction. No judge shall, except in accordance with law, be
suspended or transferred or have his salary reduced.”
These two articles were defined as the principle of “Judicial Independence”
guaranteed by the Taiwanese Constitution in order to protect judges’ independent
positions under the judicial system. According to the Taiwanese Executive Yuan’s
previous views regarding the lay participation system, 844 the laymen’s participation
during trial proceedings is the most controversial part regarding the constitutional issues.
It sincerely worried that people other than professional judges might interfere with
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professional judges’ discretion in the decision-making process when the Taiwanese
constitutional law did not clearly admit the citizens to play a role in the courtroom.845

(1). The Japanese Experiences
When the Japanese Supreme Court encountered the same issues in the Saiban-in
system,846 the Justices first held that the Japanese Constitution did not prohibit its citizens
from participating in the trial proceedings and affirmed the Saiban-in system’s
constitutionality because this system had already been completed its lawmaking process
required by the Japanese constitutional law.847 Accordingly, the Justices pointed out that,
it would be inevitable that the final judgment might result from a compromise between
the majority of the professional judges and the laymen after implementing the Saiban-in
system under the Japanese judicial system.848

(2). The Definition of the Principle of Judicial Independence in Taiwan
In order to explore the constitutional possibilities of implementing a lay
participation system under the Taiwanese judicial system, it is necessary to examine
whether the Taiwanese Constitution authorizes judges a “completely independent
determination” under the judicial system without any constitutional boundary. Before
analyzing the constitutional boundary, the definition of “Judicial Independence” under the
Taiwanese constitutional law should be first discussed.
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The origins of judicial independence in Taiwan resulted from the need to protect
judicial power from being influenced by political or other improper pressure; this was to
ensure fairness among trial proceedings and to encourage judges to decide cases in
accordance with the laws.849 Along with the theory of judicial professionalization, the
principle of judicial independence is another constitutional gateway that promises
defendants a just and proper legal system in Taiwan.850 Accordingly, the nature of judicial
independence is a significant method used to ensure that the professional judges make
their decisions solely based on the laws to which they are expected to adhere.851

The Taiwanese Constitution regulated Articles Eighty and Eighty-one for the
same purposes: not only to provide an independent space for the judges to be away from
any unnecessary stresses or pressures, but also to require that they would conclude cases
only by way of the laws.852 Accordingly, within this independent space created by
Taiwanese constitutional law, judges also need to discard their subjective views and
determine cases via the free evaluation of evidence through their inner conviction.853

After defining the principle of judicial independence as a means of to ensuring
that the trial proceedings would be just and proper, the next step is to further examine
whether the laymen’s participation would infringe upon the professional judges’ “free
evaluation of evidence through their inner convictions” by analyzing the constitutional
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boundary regarding the principle of judicial independence under the Taiwanese
Constitution.854

A. The Inner Boundary of Judicial Independence under the Taiwanese Constitution
With regard to the definition of “free evaluation of evidence through inner
conviction,” the Taiwanese Code of Criminal Procedure requires that professional judges
should determine the probative value of evidence by ways of their experiences and
logic.855 In addition, there was one Taiwanese Supreme Court judgment that held that all
evidence would be examined by the judges’ sole discretion856 and this discretion must
also comply with the “rule of thumb” and the “rule of rational.”857

The rule of rational would be described as the professional judges’ logic required
by Taiwanese criminal procedural law, and this logic would be obtained from the judges’
legal trainings and would be further improved by their practical experiences. 858 In
contrast, the rule of thumb is usually defined as the societal values that the judges might
lack due to their devotion of time in the courtroom. 859 In other words, the judges’
experiences would be more “professional” than “societal” in Taiwan.860 Accordingly, the
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laymen’s opinions were complementary to professional judge’s discretion under the
Taiwanese criminal justice system after implementation of the lay participation system.

In any case, even without the laymen’s participation, under current Taiwanese
criminal justice system, professional judges also have to consider the prosecutor’s, the
defendant’s, the defense lawyer’s and the victim’s statements during the trial proceedings
before the court pronounces the final decision. 861 Therefore, neither the Taiwanese
Constitution nor the Taiwanese criminal procedural laws admitted that judges could be
absolutely isolated with their own discretion under the criminal justice system.

One expected function of the proposed lay participation system in Taiwan is to
improve the judges’ knowledge regarding societal values so that the judgments will be
more in line with the citizens’ anticipations.862 Consequently, the nature of the laymen’s
opinion does not make it one that lends itself to interference with regard to decisionmaking process.863 In sum, the professional judges’ “free evaluation of evidence through
inner conviction” would be enhanced, rather than be impaired because of the laymen’s
participation. Hence, the implementation of the lay participation system would not cross
the constitutional inner boundary in Taiwan.

B. The Outer Boundary of Judicial Independence under the Taiwanese Constitution
Under a criminal justice system, in addition to a sound decision, the stability of
the judge’s discretion is another crucial factor to gain trusts from the society. Accordingly,
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Taiwanese constitutional law also drew an outer boundary for the principle of judicial
independence because one judge’s decision would not be sufficient to constitute an only
and final judgment.864 In other words, even under the judicial system itself, the judge
might have to take other judges’ opinions into account.

In practice, the design of the collegial penal and the appeal system were structured
under the Taiwanese legal system in order to enhance the judicial steadiness.865 With
regard to the collegial penal, the Taiwanese Court Organic Act requires that a final
conclusion must be comprised of a majority decision.866 That is to say, the minority
should obey the majority’s opinion during the deliberation process.867 The appeal system
works the same way; the lower court must follow or concede to the higher court’s
decision.868 These two designs indicated that the Taiwanese Constitution accepts the
judicial system to frame the needed schemes even though the scheme might place
restrictions on an individual judge’s discretion.869

(3). Conclusion
According to these analyses, during the trial proceedings, judges do not have an
absolutely isolated space under Taiwanese constitutional law. On the contrary, the
Taiwanese Constitution offers the judges a space with some constitutional restrictions,
such as the inner and the outer boundaries of judicial independence. The purposes of
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these boundaries are to ensure that the Taiwanese judicial system is just, proper and
steady. Therefore, it might not conclude that the lay participation system is definitely
unconstitutional when the laymen’s participation could be within the constitutional
boundaries.

3.4 The Defendant’s Interests: the Right of Instituting Legal Proceedings
Article 16 of the Taiwanese Constitution (1947) states:
“The people shall have the right of presenting petitions, lodging complaints, or
instituting legal proceedings.”
After ensuring that both the implementation of the lay participation system and
the laymen’s opinion would not be absolutely unconstitutional in Taiwan, the next step to
confirm the overall constitutionality of the lay participation system is to explore its
extended issues through different viewpoints, such as those of the defendants and of the
lay participants. To the defendants, the most direct impact between the implementation of
a lay participation system and the right to institute legal proceedings under the Taiwanese
criminal justice system is whether people other than professional judges will be
competent enough to judge their cases.

(1). The Concepts of the Right of Instituting Legal Proceedings in Taiwan
Under the Taiwanese Constitution, the people’s right to institute legal proceedings
was only asserted by Article Sixteen without concrete contents regarding specific
constitutional requirements. Accordingly, the ways to practice this constitutional right
depends on the Taiwanese Constitutional Court’s interpretations. The Judicial Yuan
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Interpretation No. 396870 was the first one that connected the right to institute legal
proceedings to the due process clause871 under the Taiwanese Constitution.872 Afterward,
the concepts of the right to institute legal proceedings were extended from a mere
“beneficial right” to both the “right to defense” and the “right to request a fair trial.”873

With regard to the nature of the beneficial right, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan
Interpretations No. 416874 and 665875 both stated that the core value of the right to
institute legal proceedings was that the court should process its trial proceedings in
accordance with the due process clauses so that people would have just trails.876 In other
words, it is the court’s obligation to fulfill people’s rights to institute legal proceedings
guaranteed by Taiwanese constitutional law.877

As for the substantial contents of the defendant’s right to defense, the Taiwanese
Judicial Yuan Interpretations Nos. 582, 878 636 879 and 654 880 all confirmed that, the
concrete contents resulted from both the constitutional principles and the Taiwanese
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criminal procedural laws.881 For example, the defendants should have the full opportunity
to exercise their right to express personal opinions, 882 their right to request crossexamination, and their right to appoint a trusted defense lawyer, etc.883

In addition, the substantial contents of the defendant’s right to request a fair trial
were defined as a part of judicial independence.884 Therefore, this right included two
concepts under Taiwanese constitutional law. The first concept guaranteed that both the
judges’ discretion and the courts’ proceedings would comply with laws.885 The second
concept ensures the defendants that the trial proceedings would be processed in
accordance with the due process clauses.886

Along with these extended rights, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court further
clarified the nature of the right to institute legal proceedings.887 A defendant is entitled to
at least four claims in order to fulfill his or her right to institute legal proceedings under
the Taiwanese criminal justice system:888 First, the defendant should be judged by an
independent court; second, that independent court should follow just procedures; third,
the defendant has the right to expect the accuracy of the fact-finding of his or her case;
and fourth, the judges would correctly explain and apply the facts to laws.
881

See Li, The Basic Issues Regarding the Implementation of a Lay Participation System under the
Taiwanese Constitution, supra note 873.
882
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 229 to 230.
883
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884
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885
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See the Judicial Yuan’s Interpretations Nos. 418 (1996), 442 (1997), 512 (2000), 530 (2001) and 591
(2005).
888
See Kuo, Research on the Lay Participation, supra note 385, at 96; see also Chen Yuncai (陳運財),
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It could also say that, the defendant’s right to defense and the right to a fair trial
are the realization of the people’s right to institute legal proceedings under Taiwanese
constitutional law.889 Therefore, after the proposed lay observer system was established in
Taiwan, whether a defendant’s right to institute legal proceedings would be fulfilled
depends on whether the court could still maintain its independence, justice and fairness
guaranteed by the Taiwanese Constitution.890

(2). Theory Regarding the Unconstitutionality of the Laymen’s Legal Position
People who opposed the lay participation system stated that, after the Taiwanese
Constitutional Court connected the right to institute legal proceedings to the due process
clauses,891 only people who could fulfill the goal of maintaining an independent court
could practice jurisdiction under the Taiwanese judicial system 892 in order to guarantee
defendant a fair and just trial.893

Accordingly, the proposed lay observer system in Taiwan might infringe upon the
defendant’s right to institute legal proceedings because the citizens do not fully
comprehend most of the crucial principles in the Taiwanese criminal justice system,894

889
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See Wu, Research on the Japanese Saiban-in System, supra note 535, at 40; see also Kuo, Research on
the Lay Participation, supra note 385.
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892
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893
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Judge in Trial Proceedings, supra note 422, at 158.
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such as the principle of clarity and definiteness895 and the principle of presumption of
innocence.896 Therefore, people who opposed the lay participation system further state
that defendants should have the right to request professional judges to trial their cases.897

The Taiwanese Executive Yuan had the same query regarding the lay participant’s
ability to determine a case under the criminal justice system.898 Even if a lay participation
system could be constitutionally established in Taiwan when its trial proceedings
complied with the constitutional principles, the position of the selected laymen might still
be a constitutional issue because Taiwanese constitutional law has its requirements
regarding competent judges under Articles Eighty and Eighty-one.899

In sum, to the people opposed to the lay participation, the issue regarding whether
professional judges would be the only qualified individuals to preform the jurisdiction
during the trial proceedings in Taiwan constitutes the constitutional boundary of the right
to institute legal proceedings guaranteed by the Taiwanese Constitution.900

(3). The Constitutional Principle: The Definition of Statutory Judges

895

See CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 17, art. 1 (2013) (Taiwan): “A conduct is
punishable only when expressly so provided by the law at the time of its commission….”
896
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 154 (2013) (Taiwan): “Prior to a final
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897
See Zhou, Study on the Layman Acting as Lay Judge in Trial Proceedings, supra note 422, at 158; see
also Wang, The Study of Criminal Trial Systems, supra note 84, at 88.
898
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899
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900
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The principle of statutory judges was not codified in the Taiwanese Constitution;
however, this principle could be inferred from other constitutional principles.901 The main
purposes that Taiwanese constitutional law introduced the principle of statutory judges
were to prevent legislative, administrative or any other improper stresses interfere with
the judges’ determination and to maintain a fair court under the judicial system.902
Therefore, it could also interpret that the Taiwanese Constitution guaranteed that people
would not be judged by an institution that does not comply with the constitutional or legal
requirements, such as those outlined in Articles Sixteen and Eighty and the criminal
procedural laws in Taiwan.903

Under the principle of statutory judges, “judge” is defined as the person who can
practice jurisdiction independently.904 In other words, this principle was not designed to
serve as a prerequisite limitation on judges, but rather a protection against improper
influence on those decision-makers’ determination under the Taiwanese judicial
system.905 Accordingly, the Taiwanese Constitution does not limit that only people who is
competent with regard to the legal professions, such as explaining and applying the laws,
could exclusively practice jurisdiction in Taiwan.906

(4). The Relationships Among the Constitutional Articles
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See Hsu, The Constitutionality of Implementing Expert Participation in Taiwan’s Intellectual Property
Related Trials, supra note 838, at 23; see also Yang, Based on the Study of Nation Participation Judiciary
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note 86, at 115 to 116.
902
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See Wu, Research on the Japanese Saiban-in System, supra note 535, at 40.
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906
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Zhang, id.
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Article Eight of the Taiwanese Constitution guarantees that people will be tried by
a court in compliance with laws under the judicial system.907 The Constitution used the
term “court” rather than “judge” because whether the trial proceedings would comply
with the laws was more significant than whether the person who practiced the jurisdiction
was professional.908

With regard to the definition of the independent judge under the Taiwanese
Constitution, it involved two concepts that could be inferred from Articles Eighty and
Eighty-one:909 The first concept is the independent duty under the Article Eighty and the
other is the independent status outlined in Article Eighty-one. One could further
concluded that “judge” under Article Eighty was generally defined910 as a person who
needs the protection of judicial independence because of having the independent duty.911
In other words, as long as people, regardless of whether they are professional or laymen,
perform jurisdiction under the legal system, the constitutional law will protect their ability
to independently practice and fulfill their duty.912

On the other hand, the independent status was structured as a method to prevent
professional judges from being influenced by any improper interference under the
Taiwanese judicial system. It is necessary because of the lifetime nature of a judge’s
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position and duty.913 Accordingly, the definition of “judge” under Article Eight-one is
specific and is represented exclusively by professional judges.914

However, even though Article Eighty-one only protects professional judges, it
cannot be concluded that only people with this independent status meet the definition of
“judge” under the Taiwanese Constitution.915 In short, these two concepts did not draw a
fine line between the professional judge and the layman under constitutional law.916

With regard to the relationships among Article Sixteen and Articles Eight, Eighty
and Eighty-one, Article Sixteen was defined as a prerequisite concept of jurisdiction
under Taiwanese constitutional law. The Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 539917 first
explained that Article Eighty was a constitutional mechanism for regulating the judicial
independence as a guiding principle. 918 At the same time, Article Eighty-one was
structured to realize the constitutional goal of judicial independence so that professional
judges would fulfill the due process clause of Article Eight under the Taiwanese judicial
system. 919 Moreover, all these three articles were practical methods necessary to
guarantee people’s right to institute legal proceedings outlined in Article Sixteen.920 The
later Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 665921 reaffirmed the relationships among these
articles.922
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(5). The Current Exceptions in the Taiwanese Judicial System
In addition to the constitutional principles and the constitutional articles, under the
current Taiwanese judicial system, there were three exceptions that have permitted people
other than professional judges to practice jurisdiction:

The first exception was the previous organizations of the Taiwanese military
tribunals. Before the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan modified the code of court martial
procedure in 1999, the military tribunals allowed both military judicators and officers to
take part in the trial proceedings.923 Furthermore, although the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan
No. 436 interpretation corrected the legal position of the military tribunals system and
required that system to comply with the constitutional principles,924 the Justices did not
overrule the organizations of the military court that allowed military officers to
participate as laymen under the military trial proceedings at that time.925

The second circumstance involved the nomination of the Taiwanese Justices.
According to Article Six of the Organic Act of Judicial Yuan,926 people who qualify via
one of the following conditions will be nominated as the Justices of the Taiwanese
Constitutional Court:
1. has served as a judge of the Supreme Court for more than ten years with
distinguished contribution.
Convenient, Friendly and Reliable Judicial Reforms], 82 SIFA GAIGE ZAZHI [JUDICIAL REFORM MAGAZINE]
48, 50 (2011).
923
JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – TWO, supra note 160, at 3 to 4.
924
CONST. CT. INTERP. 436 (1997).
925
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supra note 6, at 232.
926
See COURT ORGANIC ACT, supra note 866, art. 6 (2013) (Taiwan).
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2. has served as a legislator for more than nine years with outstanding contribution.
3. has served as a law professor for more than ten years and has conducted specific
research.
4. has served as a judge of the international court or is an authoritative author of
public law or comparative law.
5. Has conducted research in the science of law and possesses political experience
and an eminent reputation.
Accordingly, the position of Justice of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court was
not exclusively prescribed to the professional judge. Moreover, the Judicial Yuan’s
Interpretation No. 601 indicated that,927 the eight-year term of the Taiwanese Justices did
not exclude them from the definition of judge under Taiwanese constitutional law.928

The third exceptions are the organizations of the attorney disciplinary
committee929 and the bar discipline review committees in Taiwan.930 The Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 378 defined both of these committees as judicial tribunals under the
Taiwanese legal system.931 Furthermore, with regard to the organizations of these two
committees, not only were the professional judges considered necessary members, but
also the prosecutors, lawyers and scholars were all included to be necessary member
under the Act.932
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930
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In short, the Taiwanese judicial system would admit people other than
professional judges to participate in the trial proceedings based on the nature of the
procedural specialty.933 At the same time, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court held that
the people’s right to institute legal proceedings would not be infringed upon by a court
that allows people other than professional judges to participate in.934

(6). The Japanese Experiences
When the Japanese Supreme Court dealt with challenges of the Saiban-in system
regarding whether it would infringe upon the people’s right to a fair court under
constitutional law,935 the Judges first reasserted that Japanese constitutional law did not
prohibit its citizens from participating in trial proceedings.936 Then, the Japanese Supreme
Court further clarified that the crucial issue with regard to its people’s right to a fair court
had to do with whether a court comprised of both professional judges and laymen would
still fulfill the constitutional requirements as they pertain to the criminal justice system.937
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See CONST. CT. INTERP., supra note 931. (In this interpretation, the Justice held that:
[A]rticle 16 of the Constitution prescribes the people's right of instituting legal proceedings, which
means the people in accordance with legal proceeding, have the right to request the court to adjudicate
on their respective legal disputes, and such right has already been interpreted by this Yuan (See
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interference, and the procedural rules applied are similar to the court proceeding. Then the people's right
of instituting legal proceedings is not violated should their respective disputes be adjudicated by such
institutions in accordance with law.)
934
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To ensure that the Saiban-in system would comply with the constitutional
requirements, the Japanese Supreme Court first examined the saiban-ins’ selecting
process.938 The Judges stated that only with a fair and neutral selection process would the
selected laymen play an independent role in the court and further secure the principle of
judicial independence required by the Japanese constitutional law.939

Afterward, the Court concluded that the saiban-ins’ participation would not
threaten the legal position of the professional judges because their opinions would
become part of judiciary after the system is constitutionally established in the criminal
justice system.940 Therefore, as long as the criminal procedures would still be practiced in
accordance with laws, the requirement of a fair court under Japanese constitutional law
would not further require all participants to have legal professions or trial experiences
because the professional judges would still be the most crucial participants in the
Japanese criminal justice system.941

(7). Conclusion
After analyzing both the Taiwanese constitutional principles and further relating
these constitutional theories to the Japanese experiences, the nature of the people’s right
to institute legal proceedings under the Taiwanese Constitution is concerned with whether

938
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defendants will have fair and substantial trial proceedings rather than a limitation that
only professional judges would be qualified to take part in trial proceedings.942

Furthermore, the lay participation would be defined as a direct measure for
Taiwanese society to supervise the judicial system,943 just as both the administrative and
legislative powers should be examined by the nationals.944 Under this circumstance, the
judges’ legal professions and their determination would not be replaced, but would,
instead, be complemented by the laymen’s opinion regarding to societal values. 945
Accordingly, in order to ensure the lay participation system would not infringe upon the
people’s right to institute legal proceedings, both the designs of the proposed system946
and the legislative discretion in the proposed law should be carefully considered in
Taiwan.947

3.5 The National’s Interests: the Imposition of New Constitutional Obligation
on the Taiwanese People
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The Taiwanese people have three obligations regulated by the Taiwanese
Constitution: to pay taxes,948 to perform the military services,949 and to receive a citizen’s
education.950 Accordingly, people who are opposed to the lay participation system have
stated that the proposed system might impose an unconstitutional obligation on
Taiwanese nationals.

(1). The Theory of Unconstitutional Obligation to the Taiwanese People
People who are opposed to the lay participation system have stated that, after
implementing the proposed lay observer system in Taiwan, the citizens will have to
suspend their regular jobs when they are selected as laymen to serve during the trial
proceedings. As such, the people’s right to work under Article Fifteen of the Taiwanese
Constitution951 might be infringed upon.952

In addition, Article Eighteen of Taiwanese constitutional law deliberated that its
people have the right to hold public office.953 However, it would be questionable with
regard to whether the nation could compel its people to take up public offices via legal
obligation. 954 Moreover, the obligation of performing military services is the only

948
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particular obligation regarding public roles under Taiwanese constitutional law. 955
Therefore, it might be suggested that Taiwanese constitutional law denies, by default, any
other obligation on its nationals to take public offices.956

Furthermore, unlike the jury system under the U.S. Constitution,957 the proposed
lay observer system is not regulated under Taiwanese constitutional law. Therefore,
Taiwanese people would not be aware of their obligation to serve as laymen under its
judicial system.958 As a result, people who are opposed to the lay participation system
have stated that there is no constitutional basis for requiring Taiwanese people to
participate in the trial proceedings, and it would be an unconstitutional obligation under
the Taiwanese Constitution.959

(2). The Japanese Experiences
Both the Tokyo High Court and the Supreme Court of Japan put their efforts into
reviewing and explaining the issue regarding whether implementing the Saiban-in system
would improperly limit Japanese people’s constitutional rights. People in Japan who
opposed the system questioned the laymen’s duty of confidentiality and claimed that the
financial punishment would constitute infringements on Articles Thirteen,960 Eighteen,961
Nineteen,962 Twenty-one963 and Twenty-nine964 of the Japanese Constitution.965
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In 2010, the Tokyo High Court explored whether or not the Saiban-in system
imposed unconstitutional obligations on its nationals. 966 The Court first held that to
improve the citizens’ comprehension of the judiciary and to increase societal trust in the
judicial system, 967 obligations under the Saiban-in system was justified because all
nationals were required to participate in this system equally.968

In addition, in order to reduce the nationals’ burdens related to participating in the
Saiban-in system, it was designed such that the selected laymen would be permitted,
under certain circumstances, to resign their positions. 969 Furthermore, the saiban-ins
would also have the right to request expenses.970 Moreover, although the nationals have a
duty to perform their obligations under the Saiban-in system, only administrative fines,
rather than criminal sanctions, would be applied to those selected laymen who are unable
to fulfill their obligations.971

961
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With regard to the people’s right to freely express their opinions under Article
Twenty-one and their right to own property under Article Twenty-nine, the Court stated
that the purposes of promoting the public or the societal benefits would justify the
limitation on these two constitutional rights.972 Therefore, the Tokyo High Court pointed
out that even though the nationals, under the Saiban-in system, would be punished if they
failed to keep the deliberation process in confidential, this obligation had already been the
slightly infringements upon the nationals in order to fulfill the functions of the Saiban-in
system.973 Accordingly, the implementation of this system would not violate the Articles
Thirteen, Eighteen or Nineteen under Japanese constitutional law.974

In 2011, the Supreme Court of Japan upheld the viewpoints of the Tokyo High
Court and restated that the obligation of participating in the Saiban-in system inevitably
would be a burden to the nationals.975 However, the Court denied that the nationals’
obligations to participate in the criminal trial proceedings would be characterized as
involuntary servitude prohibited by the Japanese Constitution.976 According to the Court’s
judgment, since the purposes of implementing the Saiban-in system resulted from the
theory of national sovereignty under Japanese constitutional law, the nature of the
nationals’ participation in the Saiban-in system would be equal to the nature of citizen’s
practicing their suffrage.977
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the Authority of the Judges- Also Discuss the Second Resolution of the Criminal Court under the Taiwanese
Supreme Court in 2012], 217 YUEDAN FAXUE ZAZHI [TAIWAN LAW REVIEW] 141, 146 (2013).
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(3). Other Nationals’ Obligations Admitted by the Taiwanese Constitution
With regard to whether Articles Nineteen through Twenty-one of Taiwanese
constitutional law were the only admitted obligations on the Taiwanese people, the
Justices asserted that Taiwanese constitutional law did not prevent legislative institution
from creating and subsequently placing additional obligations on its people.978 In other
words, Articles Nineteen through Twenty-one exemplified, rather than particularized the
constitutional obligations in Taiwan.979

The Justices further pointed out that, the purpose of codifying the nationals’
obligations under the Taiwanese Constitution was to avoid the government imposing
unreasonable servitude on its people during the feudal era.980 However, today, in order to
establish a more just and fairer country, the nation needs its people’s cooperation to
achieve the constitutional principle of a welfare state so that the disadvantaged minority
will have more opportunities to enjoy the public benefits.981 Therefore, as long as an
obligation complies with the principle of proportionality under Article Twenty-three of
the Taiwanese Constitution,982 the nationals should fulfill those obligations created by the
legislative institution as well as under Taiwanese constitutional law.983

978

CONST. CT. INTERP. 472 (1999). (The Justice Su Junxiong’s concurring reasoning.)
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 242.
980
See Zhan, Study on the Expert Acting As Lay Judge in Trail Proceedings, supra note 262, at 78.
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Id.; see also Zhou, Study on the Layman Acting as Lay Judge in Trial Proceedings, supra note 422, at
162.
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CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 98, art. 23 (1947): “All the freedoms and rights
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order or to advance public welfare.”
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There were at least two obligations imposed by the legislative institution that the
Taiwanese people have to perform. For example, the compulsory national health
insurance program requires people to participate because this social insurance system
improves people’s lives.984 In addition, the criminal procedural laws require people to
serve as witnesses985 because there is a need to find the truth by way of the criminal trial
proceedings.986

(4). The Principle of Proportionality under the Taiwanese Constitution
According to the Judicial Yuan’s Interpretation No. 443,987 the Justices indicated
that, except for ensuring social order or promoting public welfare, the people’s rights and
freedoms would be fully protected by the Constitution.988 In other words, only when the
people’s rights or personal freedoms might be infringed upon would the Taiwanese
constitutional law prohibit the legislative institution from creating or enforcing
obligations.989

However, at the same time, the Justices also pointed out that not all of the rights
or freedoms share the same level of the constitutional protection. 990 Even though
constitutional law protects the personal freedoms from being infringed upon by unlawful
984

CONST. CT. INTERP. 472 (1999).
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 176-1 (2013): “Everyone shall have the
obligation to be a witness in other's case unless otherwise provided by law.”
986
See Huang, Research on Citizens’ Participation in a Judicial System, supra note 100, at 70 to 71.
987
CONST. CT. INTERP. 443 (1997).
988
Id. (The Justices stated that: “The range of freedom and rights of the people stipulated in the
Constitution is very broad. Any freedom and right, which is not in contravention of the order of the society
and the public interest, is protected by the Constitution.”)
989
See Xie, Citizen Involvement in Taiwanese Criminal Procedure, supra note 111, at 110.
990
CONST. CT. INTERP. 443 (1997). (The Justices stated that: “Nevertheless, not every freedom and right is
protected in the same way in the Constitution.”)
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procedures; 991 laws could still restrict some freedoms or rights when those legal
constraints comply with the principle of proportionality under the Taiwanese
Constitution.992

The obligation imposed by the proposed act of the lay observer system required
the Taiwanese people to participate in the trial proceedings and would be a constraint on
the people’s right to work.993 Therefore, this requirement needs to meet the principle of
proportionality, otherwise Taiwanese constitutional law would prohibit the lay
participation as one of the nationals’ obligations.994

In order to meet the principle of proportionality, the obligation that includes
participating in the trial proceedings should be examined via the following three
standards:995 First, the purpose of the constraints (obligation) must be benefit to the public.
Second, the constraints (obligation) must be regulated via the law. Third, the constraints
(obligation) must be a necessary means of achieving their expected purposes.

According to the proposed Act of the lay observer system, the purpose of
implementing this system is to both improve the nationals’ understanding of the criminal
justice system and increase societal trust of the entire judicial system so that the
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legitimacy of jurisdiction will be strengthened in Taiwan.996 Although the proposed act
was still under the legislative process, the Executive Yuan had approved it in 2012.997
Accordingly, its approval by the Legislative Yuan is foreseeable. In short, one could
reason that the obligation on the Taiwanese people to participate in the trial proceedings
has met the first two standards of the principle of proportionality.

With regard to whether the obligation is a necessary means of achieving its
expected purposes, the result relies on the design of the proposed lay observer system. It
would also be analyzed based on the following criteria: 998 the level of the obligation, the
consequence of violating the obligation, and a proper scheme for the laymen to relieve
their obligation.

According to current proposed act of the Taiwanese lay observer system, only
cases involving punishment of over seven years imprisonment or cases involving the
victim’s death would qualify for the lay observer system.999 In addition, the lay observers
would be appointed to cases, rather than have a term of duty.1000 Furthermore, the court
will organize case-related issues during the preliminary proceedings and focus on those
issues during the trial proceedings so that the stages of investigating evidence and crossexamination will be accelerated. 1001 In short, one might conclude that, given these

996

See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S RESEARCH REGARDING THE
PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – TWO, supra note 8. (The instruction of Article 1.)
997
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 13.
998
Id., at 242 to 243.
999
See RENMIN GUANSHEN SHIXING TIAOLI CAOAN [THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM]
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1000
Id., art. 32 (The lay observers’ authorities would be terminated once the judgment has been announced.)
1001
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procedural designs, the lay observers’ obligation to participate in trial proceedings would
not present a heavy burden for the Taiwanese people.

In addition to the requirement of participating in the trial proceedings, the lay
observers also have the duty of confidentiality under the proposed act.1002 The purpose of
these two obligations is to realize the functions of the proposed lay observer system;
however, the associated punishments are different. When a lay observer fails to perform
his or her duty, a lighter punishment will impose on him or her because alternate lay
observer will substitute his or her position.1003 In contrast, when a lay observer fails to
retain the secrecy of deliberations, he or she might be sentenced up to one-year of
imprisonment, detention or one hundred thousand New Taiwan Dollars1004 because this
duty was designed to maintain a just and fair court so that each lay observer would
express opinions without hesitation.1005

The last analysis with regard to the necessity of obligations is to examine the
scheme in place by which the laymen are to relieve their obligations. According to the
proposed act of the lay observer system in Taiwan, the citizens could decline to serve as
lay observers under specific circumstances based on the laymen’s age, occupation,
physical difficulties, etc.1006

In short, the consequences of violating the obligations under the proposed lay
observer system comply with the principle of proportionality under Taiwanese
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constitutional law because these constraints are categorized based on their intended
purposes. As a result, the obligations of this proposed system placed by laws would not
infringe the people’s rights or impose improper or undue burdens on people.

(5). Conclusion
The same as the obligation to serve as a witness under the criminal justice system
in Taiwan,1007 the obligation to participate in the proposed lay observer system (and to
fulfill other extended obligations) is not designed as an obligation positioned under the
Taiwanese Constitution, but rather one placed within the legislative discretion. 1008
Accordingly, no matter what kind of lay participation system is established under the
Taiwanese criminal justice system in the long run, as long as its scheme would pass the
requirements of the principle of proportionality, the Taiwanese Constitution would not
prohibit the requirements it placed on the people because this system would improve the
public benefit in Taiwan.

1007
1008

See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 176-1 (2013).
See Kuo, Research on the Lay Participation, supra note 385, at 100.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY AMONG DIFFERENT KINDS OF LAY
PARTICIPATION FOR THE TAIWANESE CRIMINAL JUSITCE SYSTEM

4.1 The Jury System

(1). Advantages
There are three distinct advantages to the jury system – political, legal and social:

A. The Political Advantages: the Realization of the Judicial Democratization
When a jury system is established under a judicial system, the constitutional
principles of democracy are realized because the jury system is the most directly trial
means of practicing citizen sovereignty.1009 At the same time, the influence of the judicial
bureaucracy is lessened since the discovery of facts pertaining to the case is no longer
centralized on the professional judges but rather on jurors.1010As a result, the concerns
about the professional judge’s arbitrariness are eliminated1011 because of the citizens’
independent discretion concerning the case at hand.1012
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See Wu Jingfang (吳景芳), Meiguo Peishen Zhidu zhi Yanjiu (美國陪審制度之研究) [The Study of
American’s Jury System], 22:4 XINGSHI FA ZAZHI [CRIMINAL LAW JOURNAL] 10, 17 to 18 (1978); see also
Cai, Research on the U.S. Jury System under Its Criminal Justice System, supra note 360, at 17.
1010
See Yu Shun (虞舜), Gexin Sifa Ying Shishi Peishen Zhidu (革新司法應實施陪審制度) [The Needed
Reformation of the Judicial System Was to Implement the Jury System], 38:4 FA LING YUE KAN [THE LAW
MONTHLY] 15, 19 (1987); see also Kuo, Research on the Lay Participation, supra note 385, at 68.
1011
See Cai, Research on the U.S. Jury System under Its Criminal Justice System, supra note 360, at 20;
see also Zhang, The Introduction of the Lay Participation System, supra note 423, at 40.
1012
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 281.
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Jurors generally are selected randomly so that each juror is not subordinate to
either the government or the professional judges.1013 Given that the judge was still a
public servant and therefore be influenced by the government,1014 the jury system could
assure the independence and fairness of the criminal justice system by the returning
jurisdiction over verdicts to the citizens.1015

In sum, citizens’ participation in trial proceedings is society’s most direct method
of supervising its judicial system1016 because each verdict represents the jury’s discretion
in social experiences and values.1017 One can conclude that the principle of judicial
democratization is realized throughout the criminal justice system because the citizens
directly practice a kind of judicial sovereignty.1018

B. The Legal Advantages: the Protection of the People’s Rights
Under the jury system, the burden of the professional judges’ responsibilities is
reduced largely1019 to directing the trial proceedings.1020 Accordingly, the possibility that
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Dong, Researches in Quantitative Methods on the Draft of Citizen Participation in the Judicial Decision
Making Process, supra note 246, at 61.
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the professional judges might be subject to improper influence is also reduced1021 since
they only take charge of interpreting and applying the laws rather than determining the
facts of the case at hand.1022 Under these circumstances, the judges can focus on directing
the trial by giving proper instructions to the jury so that jurors will consider only the
proper evidence and information during the deliberation process.1023

In addition, in a jury trial, the principle of presumption of innocence can be
completely realized.1024 Before the trial begins, each juror should be completely open to
evidence regarding the pending cases. Therefore, the entire trial proceedings can proceed
in accordance with the procedural requirements of “direct trial proceedings” and “oral
defense stage” so that the jury can evaluate evidence and other information to reach a
verdict during the deliberation process.1025 As a result, the prosecutor’s burden of proof
would be strictly examined under these kinds of trial proceedings.1026

In sum, under the jury system, the defendant’s rights of litigation would be
protected because of the divided authority between jurors and professional judges.1027
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C. The Social Advantages: The Improvement of the Judicial System and Legal
Beliefs
The jury system both increases popular trust in the judicial system1028 and also
strengthens the citizen’s legal beliefs so that the social order would be further secured.1029

The jury could be a fairer and more neutral body than appointed professional
judges because each juror was selected randomly from the society.1030 Compared to the
judgments made by the professional judges, the jury’s verdicts will probably correspond
more to the social expectations1031 because the juror’s life experiences are closer to the
defendant’s or the victim’s.1032 As a result, the judicial system that features jury trials will
be more trusted by the broader society because societal values will be represented under
this system.1033

The jury system is also has a lower possibility of a wrongful verdict.1034 In general,
the professional judges focus on legal certainty more than the social values. 1035
Accordingly, sometimes a professional judge might determine a case without full
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consideration of all the factors because he or she lacks the social experiences.1036 In
contrast, under the jury system, a verdict is determined by twelve jurors1037 and each
juror’s experiences and knowledge would influence the others.1038 In short, the jury’s
collaborative deliberation process might well lessen the possibility of judicial
arbitrariness.

With regard to strengthening the citizen’s legal beliefs, the jury system has been
seen by some as a “socialized” and “civilized” trial pattern.1039 By understanding how a
court tries a pending case, many people’s critical attitude toward a criminal justice system
can decline because every citizen potentially has the opportunity to practice his or her
sovereignty directly in the courtroom.1040 Besides, the social cohesion would be improved
when more citizens have faith in the judicial system.1041 In other words, the more citizens
participate in a country’s criminal justice system; the greater will be widespread faith in
its jurisdiction.1042

(2). Disadvantages
The jury system also has four distinct disadvantages:
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A. Lengthy Trial Proceedings1043
There are many reasons that might cause the trial proceedings to last longer under
the jury system. For examples, in order to assure jury fairness, the selection process has to
be designed very carefully and in detail so that each party has the opportunity to examine
and reject any juror it consider improper.1044 In addition, since each juror has an open
mind on the pending case, both the public prosecutor and the defense counsel must
submit considerable evidence to convince the jury throughout the proceedings.1045 This
processing of evidence usually takes twice or three times as much time as a general
trial1046 before the twelve jurors to reach a unanimous verdict.1047 In sum, the jury system
can be a time-consuming trial proceeding.

B. The Quality of the Jury’s Decision1048
Some have argued that if the jury’s decision was not just or fair; the
implementation of the jury system would become a symbol of the populism rather than
the democratization.1049 In fact, the ability of a jury to determine the facts of the case has
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Study of the Citizens Participate in Judicial Judgment, supra note 28, at 32.
1044
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been questioned for a long time1050 because of the jury members often are distinct from
the nature of people at large.1051 In other words, the jury is formed by different classes,
occupations, gender or age of “only a part of” the society.1052 As a result, it would be hard
to conclude that a jury is representative of society as a whole.1053

Besides, a juror is not legally trained.1054 Accordingly, his or her decision on a
verdict might be swayed by emotions and thus be less than objective1055 especially when
he or she cannot adequately evaluate evidence.1056 Therefore, a verdict might be decided
in accordance with improper or irrelevant evidence.1057 Furthermore, it is possible that a
jury might refuse to judge a case according to the relevant laws1058 because of certain
prejudices its members had.1059

In practice, the jurors’ subjective viewpoints are constrained1060 by the litigation
skills of both the public prosecutor and the defense counsel during the selection
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process1061 and through the entire trial proceedings.1062 However, none of these factors
might be revealed because the verdict does not contain the reasons that underlie it.1063 In
addition, the fact that the jury reaches its verdict after a secret deliberation process leads
to some to believe that the jury system is untrustworthy because of the possibility of a
wrongful verdict. In short, to those opposed to the jury system, the jury’s verdict can
seem as arbitrary as the professional judge’s judgment.1064

C. The Excessive High Percentage of a Not-Guilty Verdict1065
Under the jury system, some have expressed concern that the percentage of notguilty verdicts is too high because of the difficulty of reaching a unanimous vote by the
jury.1066 The number of not-guilty verdicts might cause the judicial system gradually to
lose its prestige since those verdicts might not reflect the defendant’s actual
innocence.1067

D. The Over-Expenses on Judicial Resources1068
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Under the jury system, each procedural stage, including the jury selection, the trial
proceedings and deliberation process, should be properly directed by a professional judge
so that the jury can understand how to practice its authority.1069 As a result, with these
delicate procedural designs, some felt that the jury system might occupy too many
judicial resources for maintaining its functions.1070

4.2 The Lay Participation System

(1). Advantages
Three advantages of the lay participation system, which evolved from the same
historical background that produced the jury system, are:

A. The Political Advantages: the Judicial Democratization1071
After citizens participate in trial proceedings, they become a part of the trial
jurisdiction, along with the professional judges.1072 Accordingly, the trial proceedings
were no longer monopolized by the professional judges,1073 with their jurisdiction was no
longer the exclusive purview of the government.1074 Furthermore, the lay participation
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at 59.
1071
See Zhou, Study on the Layman Acting as Lay Judge in Trial Proceedings, supra note 422, at 26; see
also Zhan, Study on the Expert Acting As Lay Judge in Trail Proceedings, supra note 262, at 45.
1072
See Wu, The Citizens’ Participation in the Trial Proceedings, supra note 266, at 59; see also Wang,
The Study of the Jury System, supra note 263, at 82.
1073
See Su Yongqin (蘇永欽), Cong Xianfa ji Sifa Zhengce Jiaodu Kan Canshen ji qi Shixing (從憲法及
司法政策角度看參審及其試行) [A Study of the Lay Participation System and Its Practice Through the
Constitutional Law and the Judicial Policies], 20:3 XIAN ZHENG SHI DAI [THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW]
25, 35 (1995); see also Zhang, A Discussion about Introducing A Lay Participation System under A
Criminal Justice System, supra note 75, at 35.
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See Zhou, Study on the Layman Acting as Lay Judge in Trial Proceedings, supra note 422, at 26.
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system could diminish the judicial bureaucracy1075 and improve judicial independence as
well as the jury system does.1076 Its first function, then, is the realization of the principle
of judicial democratization.1077

In addition to the realization of judicial democratization, a judicial system has
more legitimacy when it includes both judicial professionalism and reflects the societal
values. 1078 The lay participation system could further advance the opportunity for
professional judges and ordinary citizens to exchange views on the legal and societal
values with each other. 1079 Under these circumstances, pending cases would be
determined in accordance with citizens’ social experiences, knowledge, and laws.1080 As a
result, the lay participation system can also lighten the judges’ burden1081 because the lay
citizens share the responsibilities to determine a case with them.1082

B. The Legal Advantages: the Judicial Accuracy1083 and Reasonableness1084
People who support the lay participation system believe that professional judges’
probable prejudices about a defendant when they read the prosecutors’ indictment1085

1075

See Huang, Research on Citizens’ Participation in a Judicial System, supra note 100, at 29.
See Cai, Discuss the Necessity and Possibility of Adopting a Lay Participation System in Taiwan,
supra note 104, at 10; see also Zhang, The Introduction of the Lay Participation System, supra note 423, at
19.
1077
See Zhang, A Policy Analysis of the Experts Participation System, supra note 95, at 45.
1078
See SU, REFORM THE JUDICIAL REFORMS, supra note 797, at 86.
1079
See Cai, Discuss the Necessity and Possibility of Adopting a Lay Participation System in Taiwan,
supra note 104, at 11.
1080
Id.
1081
See SU, REFORM THE JUDICIAL REFORMS, supra note 797, at 85.
1082
Id., at 86; see also Dong, Researches in Quantitative Methods on the Draft of Citizen Participation in
the Judicial Decision Making Process, supra note 246, at 70.
1083
See Wang, The Study of the Jury System, supra note 263, at 82.
1084
See Zhou, Study on the Layman Acting as Lay Judge in Trial Proceedings, supra note 422, at 27; see
also Li, The Study of the Citizens Participate in Judicial Judgment, supra note 28, at 49.
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would be lessened or eliminated after the laymen participate in trial proceedings because
the lay participants would bring social experiences in the courtroom.1086 By reflecting
societal values with the legal profession under the trial proceedings,1087 verdicts probably
would be more accurate because the laymen’s opinions were expected to represent as the
“reasonableness” of society.1088

In addition to “societal” reasonableness that laymen would benefit to the judicial
system when they participate in trials, “judicial” reasonableness could be further expected
at the same time because trial proceedings makes the working of the judicial system more
visible to society after the citizens participate in.1089 In order to implement the principles
of direct and open trials under the lay participation system, professional judges would
abandon over-reliance on oral or written evidence to ensure the lay participants to
determine the case by evaluating all relevant evidence.1090 Accordingly, judges would
explain issues regarding the case clearly1091 and direct the trial proceedings prudently
after the laymen participate in trials.1092

1085

See Cai, Discuss the Necessity and Possibility of Adopting a Lay Participation System in Taiwan,
supra note 104, at 12; see also Wang, The Study of the Jury System, supra note 263, at 42.
1086
See Dong, Researches in Quantitative Methods on the Draft of Citizen Participation in the Judicial
Decision Making Process, supra note 246, at 70; see also Zhang, The Introduction of the Lay Participation
System, supra note 423, at 20 to 21.
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See Zhang, A Policy Analysis of the Experts Participation System, supra note 95, at 46 to 47; see also
Wu, The Citizens’ Participation in the Trial Proceedings, supra note 266, at 59.
1088
See Su, A Study of the Lay Participation System and Its Practice Through the Constitutional Law and
the Judicial Policies, supra note 1073, at 34; see also SU, REFORM THE JUDICIAL REFORMS, supra note 797,
at 84.
1089
See Cai, Discuss the Necessity and Possibility of Adopting a Lay Participation System in Taiwan,
supra note 104, at 13; see also Li, The Study of the Citizens Participate in Judicial Judgment, supra note 28,
at 48.
1090
See Zhang, A Discussion about Introducing A Lay Participation System under A Criminal Justice
System, supra note 75, at 37.
1091
See Lin Yanggnag (林洋港), Yanni Canshen Shixing Tiaoli zhi Mude (研擬參審試行條例之目的)
[The Purposes of Proposing the Act of the Lay Participation System], 787 SHI JIAN [THE REALIZATION] 32,
36 (1989).
1092
See Zhang, A Policy Analysis of the Experts Participation System, supra note 95, at 46; see also Wang,
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Moreover, with citizens’ participation to the criminal justice system, 1093 the
burden of proof is imposed solely on the public prosecutor.1094 In addition, professional
judges can objectively and fairly question the defendant or witnesses1095 and thus the lay
participation system protects the defendant’s rights of litigation.1096

In short, under the lay participation system, judicial accuracy and reasonableness
would be reflected in the quality of the verdict1097 because verdicts would comply with
both the laws and the social expectations.1098 Further, it is foreseeable that people would
trust its judicial system more since the judgments are correspondent with the national’s
standards of the justice without the professional judges’ arbitrariness.1099

C. The Societal Advantages: Strengthen the National’s Legal Beliefs1100
In general, the lay participation system strengthens the national’s legal beliefs as
well as the jury system does because the ordinary citizens obtain legal knowledge by
experiencing the entire trial proceedings. 1101 Therefore, after more and more people
participate in the criminal justice system, the popularization of the lay participation
1093

See Zhang, Research on the German Criminal Lay Participation System, supra note 472, at 42.
See Zhang, A Discussion about Introducing A Lay Participation System under A Criminal Justice
System, supra note 75, at 37.
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Id., at 35.
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See Zhang, Research on the German Criminal Lay Participation System, supra note 472, at 42.
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See Cao Jinghui (曹競輝), Shilun Canshen Zhi zhi Kexing Xing (試論參審制之可行性) [The
Possibilities of Implementing the Lay Judge System], 35:4 JUNFA ZHUANKAN [THE MILITARY LAW
JOURNAL] 11, 13 (1989); see also Huang, Research on Citizens’ Participation in a Judicial System, supra
note 100, at 29.
1098
Id.; see also Zhou, Study on the Layman Acting as Lay Judge in Trial Proceedings, supra note 422, at
26.
1099
See Lin, The Purposes of Proposing the Act of the Lay Participation System, supra note 1091; see also
Cao, The Possibilities of Implementing the Lay Judge System, supra note 1097.
1100
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system1102 will help people understand how a criminal trial proceeds and make more
widespread the legal beliefs in the country.1103

(2). Disadvantages
Yet there are also several disadvantages under the lay participation system:

A. Lay Citizens Might Be Influenced By External Factors1104
The most significant concern for opponents of the lay participation system is that
whether the criminal justice system would be “hijacked” by a populist bias1105 because
external factors might influence the lay judge’s views during the trial proceedings.1106

In addition, under the lay participation system, the professional judges declare
profound legal knowledge and abundant litigation experiences1107 in front of the lay
judges who do not have legal professionalism. 1108 Under these circumstances, the
positions between the lay judges and the professional judges would be extremely

1102

See Wang, The Study of the Jury System, supra note 263, at 82.
See Cai, Discuss the Necessity and Possibility of Adopting a Lay Participation System in Taiwan,
supra note 104, at 10.
1104
See Wu, The Citizens’ Participation in the Trial Proceedings, supra note 266, at 60; see also Dong,
Researches in Quantitative Methods on the Draft of Citizen Participation in the Judicial Decision Making
Process, supra note 246, at 71.
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Id.; see also Zhang, The Introduction of the Lay Participation System, supra note 423, at 22.
1106
Id.; see also Zhan, Study on the Expert Acting As Lay Judge in Trail Proceedings, supra note 262, at
47.
1107
See Dong Xinru (董欣如), Taiwan Guanshen Zhi yu Sifa Baquan- Meiguo Faxueyuan Sheng Da Jingqi
(台灣觀審制與司法霸權-美國法學院生大驚奇) [The Taiwanese Lay Observer System and Judicial
Hegemonism- A Big Surprise to An American Law Student], 91 SIFA GAIGE ZAZHI [JUDICIAL REFORM
MAGAZINE] 24, 26 (2012).
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unbalanced during the trial proceedings.1109 Therefore, it is questionable that the lay
judges might determine the pending case in accordance with the professional judges’
inclinations.1110

Besides, the sources of information that the lay judges could receive regarding the
pending case are not as restricted as that received by jurors.1111 In practice, those eligible
for applying to the lay participation system cases usually draw larger attention from
society1112 so that the public media would be more likely to report the details of the
pending case. Accordingly, it is unavoidable that the lay judges might determine cases in
accordance with information obtained outside of the courtroom and reach a verdict on the
basis of personal emotions without adequately considering evidence.1113

B. Concerns About the Quality of The Verdict
People who do not support the lay participation system questioned the quality of
the judgment because:1114

First, the qualifications required of lay judges meant that only a specific limited
group from society would be eligible to be appointed.1115 Besides, the selection process is
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See the seminar, Guomin Canshen Zhidu Xueshu Yantao Hui (國民參審制度學術研討會) [The
Records of a Seminar Regarding the Lay Participation System], 128 TAIWAN FAXUE ZAZHI [TAIWAN LAW
JOURNAL] 156, 161 (2009).
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See Dong, The Taiwanese Lay Observer System and Judicial Hegemonism, supra note 1107.
1111
See Zhou, Study on the Layman Acting as Lay Judge in Trial Proceedings, supra note 422, at 27; see
also Zhang, The Introduction of the Lay Participation System, supra note 423, at 25.
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Id.; see also Zhan, Study on the Expert Acting As Lay Judge in Trail Proceedings, supra note 262, at
47.
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See SU, REFORM THE JUDICIAL REFORMS, supra note 797, at 88.
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See Wang, The Study of the Jury System, supra note 263, at 84; see also Zhan, Study on the Expert
Acting As Lay Judge in Trail Proceedings, supra note 262, at 47 and 49.
1115
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controlled by both the public prosecutor and the defense lawyer via their litigation skills
so that it is difficult to ensure the defendant a “neutral group” because both parties only
choose laymen who intend to favor themselves.1116 Therefore, the selected lay citizens
might not be as fair as being expected under the lay participation system.1117

Secondly, the possibility of a wrongful judgment attracts serious attention from
the society. In this age, scientific evidence plays a significant role under the criminal
justice system.1118 Given this, lay judges might reach an inaccurate result because they
lack expert knowledge and the trial experiences to evaluate evidence in accordance with
laws.1119 Accordingly, professional judges are more suitable for determining the case in
the criminal justice system because they are legally trained to exercise evidentiary
rules.1120

Third, issues regarding what punishment should be imposed on the guilty
defendant is a “high art” under a criminal justice system 1121 because sentencing is
influenced by such diverse factors as retribution, rectification and reformation.
Accordingly, these factors might be too complicated for the lay judges to ascertain
regarding the guilty party’s punishment.
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Id.
See Wang, The Study of Criminal Trial Systems, supra note 84, at 54; see also Huang, Research on
Citizens’ Participation in a Judicial System, supra note 100, at 31.
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See Lin, A Discussion of Lay Participation and the Adoption of the Lay Participation System, supra
note 426, at 6.
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C. The Undermining to the Judicial Efficiency1122 and Increase of Judicial Costs1123
People opposed to the lay participation system maintain that under it, the burden
placed on the professional judges in fact increases, rather than decreases.1124 For along
with directing the trial proceedings prudently, the professional judges must further
distinguish the factual and legal issues for the lay judges so that they can deliberate
accurately.1125 Therefore, the original criminal justice system might need some reforms
regarding how the lay judges cooperate with the professional judges during trials by
clarifying the professional judges’ duty.1126 As a result, it would cost additional money,
human resources and time for framing the collaborative trial system.1127

Moreover, to those opposed to the lay participation system, issues surrounding the
arbitrariness of the professional judges will not be solved when lay judges, who are not
members of the legal profession, only share but not replace authority with the
professional judges.1128 As a result, the reforms for establishing a lay participation system
would interfere with the original criminal trials.1129

4.3 The Japanese Saiban-In System

1122

See Zhang, The Introduction of the Lay Participation System, supra note 423, at 23 to 24.
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The Japanese Saiban-in system was established amid controversy over whether
the functions of the existing criminal justice system should be denied or affirmed.1130 If
the functions were approved, a lay participation system would be suitable for the
Japanese criminal justice system because existing issues would be solved by cooperation
between professional judges and ordinary citizens.1131

On the other hand, if the functions were rejected, a jury system would be more
suitable because professional judges had lost societal trust so that the jurisdiction over
trials should be returned to the people. 1132 However, because this issue was too
controversial to be decided by Japanese society, the Japanese criminal justice system
finally devised an innovative “Saiban-in system” that contains both the characteristics of
the jury system and the lay participation system.

After this new system was established under the Japanese criminal justice system,
trial proceedings are expected to be faster and more just and transparent because of
citizens’ participation.1133 In addition, concerns that professional judges might encounter
improper interference by the administrative institutions were therefore reduced because
citizens will determine the case along with professional judges in trials.1134 As a result,
judicial independence was the main advantage of the Japanese Saiban-in system.
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See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 104.
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See Sasakura Hiroki, The Movements of the Japanese Judicial Reforms (Two), supra note 573, at 226.
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「裁判員」制度的啟示-審判不能規避民意) [The Notice of the Japanese Saiban-in System- The
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25 (2009).
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(1). Transformations After the New System Was Implemented
After the Saiban-in system was established, the traditional principle under the
Japanese criminal justice system was gradually shifted from the concept of “Exact
Jurisdiction” to “Core Jurisdiction”.1135

With regard to the concept of “Exact Jurisdiction,” the previous Japanese criminal
justice system had emphasized the discovery of the truth concerning the case at hand
during the trial proceedings.1136 Accordingly, there were three main characteristics could
define the “Exact Jurisdiction”:1137

(1). The investigative institutions, such as police authorities and the public
prosecutors, circumspectly control the investigation process1138 so that evidence against
the suspect can be collected in all aspects before being submitted to the court.1139 (2). The
basic principles about the disclosure of evidence are not essential because the public
prosecutor is only required to submit an indictment to the court when filing an
accusation. 1140 (3). During the trial proceedings, both the public prosecutor and the
professional judges tend to rely on the records and written documents, especially the
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See Wang Zhengjia (王正嘉), Jiayi Difang Fayuan Liangci Moni Guanshen Shenpan zhi Guancha yu
Xinde (嘉義地方法院兩次模擬觀審審判之觀察與心得) [The Observation of and Thoughts on the Lay
Observer System after Watching Two Mock Trials at the Chiayi District Court], 16:4 QUAN GUO LU SHI
[TAIWAN BAR REVIEW] 41, 46 to 47 (2012); see also Wang, The Study of Criminal Trial Systems, supra
note 84, at 77.
1136
See Sasakura Hiroki, The Movements of the Japanese Judicial Reforms (Two), supra note 573, at 229.
(The author pointed out that, in fact, not only the court but also the Japanese society expected that before
the court decided whether a defendant is guilty or not and determined what punishment would be imposed
on the defendant, all of the facts, including the defendant’s background, living environment, the motivation
for committing the crime and the attitude after being accused, should be disclosed regardless of whether
they are relevant to the case.)
1137
See Wu, The Japanese Lay Participate in the Criminal Trial System, supra note 548, at 97.
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defendant’s confession.1141 Accordingly, the evidentiary rules become formalized because
the professional judges usually have their predetermined belief about the defendant’s guilt
or innocence by simply reviewing the prosecutor’s file.1142

Under the concept of exact jurisdiction, the entire trial proceedings are merely a
“performance” that the professional judges play to confirm the public prosecutor’s
accusation.1143 These characteristics make the defense more difficult for the defendants
and the defense counsels to prepare in advance and the defendants’ right to defense is
seriously infringed by the “file trial.”1144 In practice, there was 99.9% of the conviction
rate in Japan1145 and the possibility of wrongful conviction is high because, when the
principle of direct trial is neglected, the professional judges often seem to act as only the
prosecutor’s “ rubber stamp.”1146

Thus, the Saiban-in system was expected to improve the nature of the Japanese
criminal trial. With the saiban-ins’ participation, the concept of “Core Jurisdiction” would
replace the previous trial mode in Japan. For example, the principles of a direct and oral
trial would be emphasized by the professional judges, prosecutors and defense counsels
because the citizens could only hear and evaluate evidence in the courtroom. 1147
Accordingly, both the processes of questioning witnesses and the defendant, and of cross1141
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examination would become the primary evidentiary methods in trial proceedings1148
because these procedural stages would be the most direct methods to help the saiban-ins
to understand the pending case.1149

In addition, the investigative process before the trial procedures were improved as
well. 1150 Since file records and other written documents made by the investigative
institutions needed to be further examined by both the professional judges and the saibanins in the courtroom, 1151 the investigators, such as police authorities and public
prosecutors, should follow the due process clauses or otherwise evidence would be
excluded. Accordingly, after the implementation of the Saiban-in system, the defendant’s
right to defense was expanded under the investigative process.1152

Moreover, for the purpose of maintaining expeditious trials,1153 the professional
judges, public prosecutor and defense counsels would all focus their arguments on the
most significant issues because the saiban-ins could not afford to spend too many days on
the trial.1154 Consequently, trial proceedings in Japan would become more efficient under
the concept of core jurisdiction than under the previous system of exact jurisdiction.1155
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(2). The Statistics Regarding the Japanese Saiban-In System
According to an official report disseminated by the Supreme Courts of Japan in
2014,1156 since the Japanese Saiban-in system was established in 2009, there had been
7,771 defendants who were tried by the system.1157 In the past five years, 35,338 citizens
have served as a saiban-in and 12,075 citizens were selected as alternant saiban-ins.1158
H211159
(2009)
1196
838
346

H22
H23
H24
H25
H261160
(2010)
(2011)
(2012)
(2013)
(2014)
Defendants
1797
1785
1457
1464
72
Saiban-ins
8673
8815
8633
7937
442
Alternate Saiban-ins
3067
2988
2906
2622
146
Figure 18:
The amounts of the defendants, the saiban-in and alternate saiban-in since the year of
2009 until January 2014
With regard to the statistics under the Saiban-in system,1161 except for the first
year (2009), an average case took around nine months to complete the entire trial
proceedings (including the pre-trial proceedings). Meanwhile, the pre-trial proceedings
would take two-thirds of the entire proceedings. The main reason that the trial length was
increased from three to four and a half times in a case was the extension of the
deliberation process.

1156

See the Official Website of the Saiban-in System, The Statistics of the Saibain-In system (until January,
2014), http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/topics/pdf/09_12_05-10jissi_jyoukyou/h26_01_sokuhou.pdf
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Id., at 5.
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H21
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H26
(2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014)
The entire trial proceedings1162
5.0
8.3
8.9
9.3
8.9
8.3
months months months months months months
The pre-trial proceedings1163
2.8
5.4
6.4
7.0
6.9
6.4
months months months months months months
The trial proceedings1164
3.7
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6.2
7.4
8.1
7.5
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days
days
days
days
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The sessions of trial1165
3.3
3.8
4.1
4.5
4.5
4.2
times
times
times
times
times
times
The deliberation process1166
397.0
504.4
564.1
619.8
630.1
645.9
mins
mins
mins
mins
mins
mins
Figure 19:
The Average Duration of the Proceedings under the Japanese Saiban-in System
The Supreme Court of Japan also investigated both the citizens’ views before
implementing the Saiban-in system and their reactions after this system was practiced.
This was done so that the Japanese criminal justice system could explore popular views
as a reference prior for improving the Saiban-in system.1167 However, a surprising finding
of the latest report of March 20141168 was that popular interest in the practice of the
Saiban-in system had declined over the years:1169
More Interested

Indifference

Neutral

H21 (2009)
H22 (2010)
H23 (2011)
H24 (2012)
H25 (2013)

43.4%
1.1%
55.5%
50.4%
1.6%
48.0%
38.5%
1.7%
59.8%
37.1%
1.6%
61.1%
34.1%
2.0%
63.9%
Figure 20:
Individuals’ interest in the Saiban-in system under the Japanese criminal justice system
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If exploring the reasons for this decreasing interest regarding the Saiban-in system
in Japan, one likely factor was that the Saiban-in system had been implemented for more
than five years and Japanese society already had observed for a long time how this system
worked. Therefore, the attraction of this innovated trial pattern was gradually lessening.

Besides, the Japanese Supreme Court also investigated its people’s thoughts for
examining whether the Saiban-in system was improving the Japanese criminal justice
system according to people’s expectations.1170 In this official report, all subjects had to
declare views for three periods, that are, “the original criminal justice system (Before),”
“expectations before the Saiban-in system was implemented (Expectation),” and “feelings
after the Saiban-in system was implemented (After).”
A. Do you agree that the Japanese criminal justice system is just and fair?
1171

Before
Expectation1172
After1173

Totally Agree
18.8%
34.6%
9.5%

Agree
Neutral
25.4%
41.9%
32.8%
24.8%
31.1%
47.0%
Figure 21

Disagree
10.9%
5.9%
9.4%

Totally Disagree
3%
1.9%
3.1%

B. Do you agree with that the Japanese criminal justice system is reliable?
1174

Before
Expectation1175
After1176

Totally Agree
17.0%
30.4%
8.9%

Agree
Neutral
34.6%
36.0%
33.3%
27.5%
31.8%
47.3%
Figure 22
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Id., at 25.
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Disagree
10.1%
6.7%
9.7%

Totally Disagree
2.3%
2.1%
2.4%

C. Do you agree with that the Japanese societal values are reflected on the
judgments under the criminal justice system?
Totally Agree
Before1177
6.0%
1178
Expectation
28.5%
After1179
16.1%

Agree
Neutral
19.7%
49.8%
40.6%
23.4%
40.0%
34.2%
Figure 23

Disagree
19.2%
5.7%
7.7%

Totally Disagree
5.4%
1.8%
2.0%

D. Do you agree with that the truth of a case will be discovered in the courtroom
under the Japanese criminal justice system?
1180

Before
Expectation1181
After1182

Totally Agree
7.0%
22.6%
6.9%

Agree
Neutral
28.5%
44.5%
28.3%
37.0%
24.4%
53.1%
Figure 24

Disagree
15.2%
8.9%
11.8%

Totally Disagree
4.9%
3.3%
3.9%

E. Do you agree with that the trial proceedings are difficult (or should be easy) for
Japanese society to understand?
1183

Before
Expectation1184
After1185

Totally Agree
47.1%
22.2%
7.6%

Agree
Neutral
28.5%
17.6%
32.0%
33.3%
24.8%
49.1%
Figure 25

Disagree
4.6%
9.6%
13.5%

Totally Disagree
2.2%
3.1%
5.1%

According to these results, apparently the Saiban-in system was neither a more
just, fairer or more reliable system, nor could did people trust it more to discover the truth
than the original Japanese criminal justice system. Such cautiousness was borne out by
the results that showed that the belief in the court’s justness and fairness was reduced
from 44.2% to 40.6% and recognition of the judicial system’s reliability dropped from
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51.6% to 40.7%. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the function of discovery the truth was
decreased from 35.5% to 31.3%. Moreover, all these results after the Saiban-in system
was established were also much lower than the society’s expectations by about a 20%
gap.1186

However, the survey also found that people who had negative thoughts with
regard to the original criminal justice system became fewer after the Saiban-in system
was established,1187 with many shifting their viewpoints regarding the Japanese criminal
system to a neutral position regarding the topics in the survey. In addition, the percentage
of respondents who felt that decisions made by the Japanese criminal justice system now
complied with the societal values rose sharply from 25.7% under the original system to
56.1% under the Saiban-in system.

As a result, one could still conclude that the Japanese Saiban-in system at least
decreases Japanese society’s negative attitudes toward the original criminal justice system.

(3). Conclusion
Under the Japanese Saiban-in system, although the number of saiban-in under the
trial proceedings were twice that of professional judges, the judges still keep their
advantageous position in the courtroom because the unique majority vote requires that at

1186

According to the report, 63.7% of people expected justness and fairness from the Saiban-in system, but
after the system was established, this number fell to only 40.6%; pre-establishment, 63.7% relied on the
court, but this number fell to 40.7% after the system was established, and 50.9% believed that the system
functioned as a means of discovering the truth, but this number fell to 31.3% after the system was
established.)
1187
For example, the percentage of people who did not agree that the court was just, fair or reliable fell
from 13.9% to 12.5% and from 12.4% to 12.1%. Further, those who did not agree with that the function of
the system was discovering the truth decreased from 20.1% to 15.7%.
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least one professional judge should join the verdict.1188 As a result, the Japanese Saiban-in
system offered a balanced trial pattern because citizens prevent the professional judges
from being arbitrary in determining a case without considering societal values while the
judges preclude the citizens from dominating a trial because of they are twice than
judges.1189

However, some concerns remained under the current Japanese criminal justice
system after the Saiban-in system’s implementation. For example, trial procedures might
be too difficult for saiban-ins to understand because those citizens are not members of the
legal profession.1190 Given this, people worried that the professional judges might overinfluence the saiban-ins’ determination during the decision-making process.1191 Besides,
to explain procedural issues to the saiban-ins might undermine judicial efficiency.1192
Even having these concerns under the Saiban-in system, this new system still offered on
balance a better trial system.

4.4 The Citizen Participation System of the South Korea

(1). The Practical Outcome after the Citizen Participation System was Implemented
in South Korea
In 2008, the South Korea created a new trial system pattern that was also
contained both the characteristics of the jury system and the traditional lay participation
system. Under this citizen participation system, jurors did not share the jurisdiction with
1188

See Wu, The Japanese Lay Participate in the Criminal Trial System, supra note 548, at 107.
Id.
1190
See the question (e) of the Investigation Report of the Practice of the Saibain-In system, supra note
1167; see also Wu, Research on the Japanese Saiban-in System, supra note 535, at 36.
1191
See Wang, The Study of Criminal Trial Systems, supra note 84, at 77.
1192
See Lin, An Observation and Preview of the Japanese Saiban-in System, supra note 592, 128 to 129.
1189
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professional judges because their opinions were only considered as a point reference to
the professional judges. 1193 However, statistics show that the jurors’ opinions still
influenced the professional judges’ determinations in the trial proceedings.1194 As a result,
this so-called “factual influence” prevented the professional judges from determining
cases solely by the written files.1195 This was because both the public prosecutor and the
defense counsels now play the main roles in the courtroom, that of trying to persuade the
jurors before the deliberation process began.1196

After the South Korean citizen participation system was implemented under the
criminal justice system, the number of cases that were tried by the jurors was much lower
than expected.1197 According to the statistics gathered by the Supreme Court of Korea
after the first three years, 1198 there were only 1,006 cases applied for the citizen
participation trial system, while there were 19,431 eligible cases.1199 In other words, the
application rate was only 5.2%.

Also, the percentage of a not-guilty judgment became a concern under this new
system.1200 The percentage under the citizen participation system was 8.8 - 10%.1201

1193

See Kong Jierong (孔傑榮), Nanhan Peishen Tuan Zhi Kexing? (南韓陪審團制可行？) [Is the Jury
System Practical in South Korea?], 85 SIFA GAIGE ZAZHI [JUDICIAL REFORM MAGAZINE] 32 (2011).
1194
See You Boxiang (尤伯祥), Hanguo Peishen Zhidu Kaocha Baogao (韓國陪審制度考察報告) [The
Report on South Korea’s Citizen Participation System], 16:10 QUAN GUO LU SHI [TAIWAN BAR REVIEW]
17, 21 (2012).
1195
See Kong, Is the Jury System Practical in South Korea?, supra note 1193.
1196
See You, The Report on South Korea’s Citizen Participation System, supra note 1194.
1197
See Kong, Is the Jury System Practical in South Korea?, supra note 1193, at 33.
1198
See Lee, The Current Situation and Lessons of the Citizen Participation System of South Korea, supra
note 629, at 29.
1199
See Lee Donghee, translated by Wang Jinlin (李東熹, 王靜琳譯), Hanguo de Guomin Canyu
Shenpan- yi Yunzuo Zhuangkuang zhi Pingjia ji Jinhou zhi Keti wei Zhongxin (韓國的國民參與審判-以運
作狀況之評價及今後之課題為中心) [South Korea’s Citizen Participation System- Centered on the
Evaluation of the Current Practice Results and the Lessons for the Future] 1557 SIFA ZHOUKAN 1,18 (Jan.
20, 2011).
1200
See Wu, The Citizens’ Participation in the Trial Proceedings, supra note 266, at 145.
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Many people wondered whether verdicts of innocence would be extraordinarily higher
than under the original trial system1202 (3.1%).1203 These statistical results proved that the
jurors would in fact influence the professional judges’ determination during the trial
proceedings in South Korea.1204 In addition, some people also worried that the jurors
might be “tainted” by factors other than the objective evidence because they are not
legally trained. 1205 As a result, many defendants might prefer to be tried by the
professional judges than to apply for the citizen participation system.1206

(2). Results regarding the Social Thoughts of the Citizen Participation System
Before the South Korean citizen participation system was established, 67.3% of
people expected that this innovated trial pattern would increase the judicial reliance.1207
During the first three years (2008-2010) of implementation,1208 9,891 citizens attended
the selection process and 2,717 were appointed as jurors or alternate jurors.1209 The
selection rate was 27.5% and the average selection process took 88 minutes.1210

1201

See Kong, Is the Jury System Practical in South Korea?, supra note 1193, at 33; see also Lee, South
Korea’s Citizen Participation System, supra note 1199, at 22.
1202
See You, The Report on South Korea’s Citizen Participation System, supra note 1194, at 34.
1203
See Zhang, An Introduction of the Citizen Participation System of South Korea, supra note 625, at 16.
1204
Id.
1205
See You, The Report on South Korea’s Citizen Participation System, supra note 1194, at 38.
1206
See Kong, Is the Jury System Practical in South Korea?, supra note 1193, at 33.
1207
See Wang, The Observation of and Thoughts on the Lay Observer System after Watching Two Mock
Trials at the Chiayi District Court, supra note 1135, at 45.
1208
See Lee, The Current Situation and Lessons of the Citizen Participation System of South Korea, supra
note 629, at 29; see also Lee, South Korea’s Citizen Participation System, supra note 1199, at 18 to 26.
(The same author analyzed these statistics regarding the public inclinations toward the practical experiences
as they pertain to the citizen participation system.)
1209
See Lee, South Korea’s Citizen Participation System, id., at 25.
1210
Id., at 20 and 25.
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Of the 321 cases during the first three years after implementation, 289 (90%) took
one day to complete the trial proceedings and 32 (10%) took two days.1211 With regard to
the entire trial proceedings, the average duration from the pretrial proceedings to the
case’s conclusion was 84.9 days.1212 In short, compared to regular trial proceedings, the
citizen participation system would be slightly faster than trial proceedings that were only
conducted by the professional judges.1213

Moreover, statistics also indicate the support for the citizen participation system.
To those who had been selected as jurors or alternate jurors, 96.4% had a positive attitude
about the establishment of the new system because of the experiences regarding
participating in trial proceedings along with the professional judges.1214

A. Can you understand the content of the verdict?1215

Of those surveyed, 27.5% responded that they could totally understand the content
of the verdict; 60.4% could understand most of it, 11.3% could understand about half.
Only 0.9% of the subjects stated that they could not understand the verdict at all.

B. Can you concentrate well during the trial proceedings?1216

1211

Id., at 21.
Id., at 22.
1213
Id. (According to the statistics, the general trial proceedings take 87.3 days when the defendant was
under the custody and 122.9 days when the defendant was not detained.)
1214
Id., at 25. (Among the subjects, 63.3% stated that the Citizen Participation System is better than the
general trial proceedings, and 33.1% of the subjects stated that both the Citizen Participation System and
the general trial proceedings are good for the criminal justice system.)
1215
Id., at 26.
1216
Id.
1212
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Among the jurors surveyed, 87.7% could pay close attention during most of the
trial proceedings and 11.9% could concentrate on about half. Only 0.4% of jurors could
not concentrate at all on the entire trial proceedings.

C. Can you express your viewpoint during the trial proceedings (especially during
the deliberation process?)1217

Among the jurors, 73% stated that they could express the opinions adequately and
25.7% could mostly. Only 1.3% declared that they rarely had an opportunity to speak
during the trial proceedings or the deliberation process.

D. Were the instructions of the professional judges helpful?1218

Responding to this question, 70% of jurors evaluated the professional judges’
instructions as being very helpful and 28% deemed them somewhat helpful. However,
only 2% of jurors felt that the professional judges did not give helpful instructions during
the trial proceedings.

E. What difficulties exist under the citizen participation system?1219

The report also explored the difficulties that might lead the citizens to oppose to
the system. Lengthy trial proceedings were mentioned by 44.9% of the subjects, while
23.9% thought that the legal terms were too difficult to understand. Furthermore, the

1217

Id.
Id.
1219
Id.
1218
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evidentiary issues confused 11.6% of the subjects. Moreover, 11.5% of the jurors had
safety concerns and 8.1% worried about the loss of their job while performing their jury
duties.

In sum, people in South Korea overwhelmingly supported the citizen participation
system and so its implementation as part of the criminal justice system was acceptable to
the general society. Thus, after the citizen participation system had been in place for five
years (2008-2013), it was retained as part of the criminal justice system even though the
ruling party had changed since the system was established.

4.5 Which System Is Most Suitable for the Taiwanese Criminal Justice
System?

(1). The Advantages and The Disadvantages of these Current Systems
The origins of these current jury and lay participation systems were societal
mistrust of professional judges.1220 Therefore, in order to supervise the position of the
professional judges and balance the positions between the public prosecutor and
defendant (and his or her defense counsels) in the trial proceedings, 1221 the current
systems were designed for citizens to practice some jurisdiction in court so that popular
people’s sovereignty and judicial democratization would be further advanced.1222

1220

See You, The Citizens’ Participation in the Trial Proceedings, supra note 269, at 269.
Id.
1222
See Zhang, The Introduction of the Lay Participation System, supra note 423, at 62; see also Yang,
Based on the Study of Nation Participation Judiciary to Investigate the Feasibility of Military Personnel
Assigned as the Member of Military Judiciary, supra note 86, at 27.
1221
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Among these current systems, there are three basic advantages. Politically, they
promote the judicial democratization.1223 In order to protect the people’s freedom and to
realize the ideals of justice,1224 these systems were designed to protect professional judges
and the participated citizens from political or other improper interference during the
entire trial proceedings.1225 In sum, the political advantages of these systems were that
they recognized the people’s sovereignty and counter-balanced the government’s power
under the criminal justice system.1226

Secondly, with regard to the judiciary, implementation of these systems under a
criminal justice system would strengthen judicial beliefs because of the transparency of
the trial proceedings.1227 In addition, the judgments (verdicts) would be considered to be
more accurate and just 1228 because citizens’ experiences and moral value 1229 would
complement with the professional judges’ legal professionalism in the courtroom.1230 As

1223

See Xie, Citizen Involvement in Taiwanese Criminal Procedure, supra note 111, at 48; see also Huang,
Research on Citizens’ Participation in a Judicial System, supra note 100, at 35.
1224
See Xie, id., at 49 to 53; see also Lin, A Discussion of Lay Participation and the Adoption of the Lay
Participation System, supra note 426, at 5.
1225
See Zhou, Study on the Layman Acting as Lay Judge in Trial Proceedings, supra note 422, at 29; see
also He, A Discussion on the Lay Judge System in Judicial Yuan Draft Based on the Lay Judge System in
Germany, supra note 485, at 1192.
1226
See Cai Huifang (蔡蕙芳), Cong Yiban Renmin Canyu Xingshi Shenpan zhi Gongneng Lun Shiyong
Guomin Canyu Shenapn Zhidu zhi Anjian Leixing (從一般人民參與刑事審判之功能論適用國民參與審
判制度之案件類型) [A Discussion about the Eligible Cases under the Lay Participation System through
the Functions of the Lay Participation under the Criminal Trial Proceedings], 216 YUEDAN FAXUE ZAZHI
[TAIWAN LAW REVIEW] 194, 196 (2013); see also Xie, Citizen Involvement in Taiwanese Criminal
Procedure, supra note 111, at 55.
1227
See Lu Binghan (呂秉翰), Shenpan Zhidu zhi Minzhu Hua? “Guomin Canshen Shixing Tiaoli Caoan”
Pingxi (審判制度之民主化?「國民參審試行條例草案」評析) [Should the Judicial System be
Democratized? - An Evaluation of the Proposed Act of the Lay Participation Trial Act], 54:1 XINGSHI FA
ZAZHI [CRIMINAL LAW JOURNAL] 57, 69 to 70 (2010); see also Huang, Research on Citizens’ Participation
in a Judicial System, supra note 100, at 34 to 35.
1228
See Huang, id., at 32.
1229
See Cai, A Discussion about the Eligible Cases under the Lay Participation System through the
Functions of the Lay Participation under the Criminal Trial Proceedings, supra note 1226, at 197.
1230
See Su, A Study of the Lay Participation System and Its Practice Through the Constitutional Law and
the Judicial Policies, supra note 1073, at 34.
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a result, judicial legitimacy would be ensured by citizens’ participation, whether by a jury,
lay participation or another innovative trial patterns.1231

With regard to the societal aspect, after a judicial system was popularized by the
citizens’ participation,1232 the nature of an elitist, professional, secret, and bureaucratic
jurisdiction would changed as the judicial system became more accessible to the
public. 1233

In the meantime, citizens’ understanding of the legal system would

improve1234 because these systems would train citizens to be more responsible for the
public affairs through the trial proceedings.1235 In sum, these systems in effect provide
citizens with a measure of legal education.1236

However, these systems also have common challenges. For example, their
implementation is costly and time-consuming. 1237 Also, during trial proceedings, the
responsibilities of the professional judges in fact often are greater because they need to
direct the procedures more thoroughly 1238 because of the citizens’ lack of legal
training.1239 Furthermore, the quality of the judgment (verdict) would be suspicious1240

1231

See Xie, Citizen Involvement in Taiwanese Criminal Procedure, supra note 111, at 54.
See Huang, Research on Citizens’ Participation in a Judicial System, supra note 100, at 35.
1233
See Lu, Should the Judicial System be Democratized?, supra note 1227, at 68.
1234
See He, A Discussion on the Lay Judge System in Judicial Yuan Draft Based on the Lay Judge System
in Germany, supra note 485, at 1192; see also Huang, Research on Citizens’ Participation in a Judicial
System, supra note 100, at 36.
1235
See Lin and Lin, Explore the Issues of the Lay Participation, supra note 788, at 17.
1236
See Xie, Citizen Involvement in Taiwanese Criminal Procedure, supra note 111, at 61; see also Zhou,
Study on the Layman Acting as Lay Judge in Trial Proceedings, supra note 422, at 30.
1237
See Xie, id., at 46; see also Huang, Research on Citizens’ Participation in a Judicial System, supra
note 100, at 38 to 39.
1238
Id.
1239
See Lu, Should the Judicial System be Democratized?, supra note 1227, at 71.
1240
See Huang, Research on Citizens’ Participation in a Judicial System, supra note 100, at 38.
1232

195

when citizens seem to be influenced by factors other than evidence or law.1241 As a result,
the principle of legal stability might be called into question under these systems.1242

(2). The Factors That Concerned the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan
Before the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan proposed that the lay observer system
become part of the country’s criminal justice system, many factors were taken into
account1243 in order to solve the issues led Taiwanese society to have lost faith in the
judicial system:1244

A. The realization of judicial democratization and the protection of the people’s
freedom
After implementing the proposed lay observer system, the Taiwanese Judicial
Yuan expected that the significant criminal principles, such as the presumption of the
defendants’ innocence and the prosecutor’s burden of proof, would be further realized
under the criminal justice system.1245 This was because the professional judges would not
be the only people that both the public prosecutor and the defense counsels would try to
persuade during the trial.1246 In other words, the lay observers who have an open mind

1241

See Xie, Citizen Involvement in Taiwanese Criminal Procedure, supra note 111, at 47.
See Huang, Research on Citizens’ Participation in a Judicial System, supra note 100, at 40.
1243
See He, A Discussion on the Lay Judge System in Judicial Yuan Draft Based on the Lay Judge System
in Germany, supra note 485, at 1212 to 1221.
1244
Those issues which include the elitist educational system, the judicial bureaucracy under the judicial
administration, the involved and abstruse judgments, the complicated roles of professional judges under the
criminal justice system, and an inefficient criminal justice system, were discussed in the first chapter.
1245
See Zhang, Discuss the Basic Concepts of the Lay Participation System (Two), supra note 92, at 184.
1246
See Liao Daocheng (廖道成), Sifa Yuan yu 101 Nian 10 Yue 18 Ri Juban “Shen, Jian, Bian Kaocha Ri,
Han Renmin Canyu Shenpan Xinde Fabiao Hui”- Jiayi Lushi Gonghui Canyu Kaocha Ri, Han Renmin
Canyu Shenpan zhi Xinde Baogao (司法院於 101 年 10 月 18 日舉辦「審、檢、辯考察日、韓人民參與
審判心得發表會」，嘉義律師公會參與考察日、韓人民參與審判之心得報告) [A Launching
Ceremony Held by the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan with regard to Its Thoughts after Observing the Japanese
1242
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before the trial began, which would re-enforce the defendants’ right to be presumed
innocent and for the prosecutor to have the burden of proof.

B. Society’s reliance on its judicial system, which in turn would provide legal
education to society
According to previous official reports, one reason that Taiwanese society did not
trust its judicial system might have resulted from being unfamiliar with its judicial
procedures. 1247 As a result, by establishing the lay observer system, the Taiwanese
Judicial Yuan expected that Taiwanese society would recognize its criminal justice
system through participating in trial proceedings. 1248 Furthermore, after improving
citizens’ understanding of the criminal justice system, the extended effect that the social
order would be more stable is also expected in Taiwan.1249

C. The quality of the judgment
The Taiwanese Judicial Yuan anticipated that lay observers would bring the
societal values with regard to justice to the courtroom.1250Along with societal values,
more just verdicts would be arrives at, ones not only in accordance with the laws, but also
that were in accord with the social expectations regarding to a more reliable criminal
justice system.1251

and South Korea’s Lay Participation Systems- A Report of the Chiayi Lawyer Association], 16:10 QUAN
GUO LU SHI [TAIWAN BAR REVIEW] 14, 15 (2012).
1247
See JUDICIAL YUAN, THE VOLUME OF THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM – ONE, supra note 2, at 8 to 9.
1248
See Zhang, Discuss the Basic Concepts of the Lay Participation System (Two), supra note 92, at 181.
1249
Id.
1250
Id., at 183.
1251
Id.
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(3). The Analysis
Some people felt that the decision regarding whether the Taiwanese criminal
justice system should introduce a jury or lay participation system depended on what level
citizens could participate in trial proceedings.1252 In other words, if the Taiwanese judicial
system were confident that its citizens could solely decide the verdict, then a jury system
would be workable as part of Taiwanese criminal procedure. On the other hand, if
citizens’ capacity for independent judgment were in question, a lay participation system
would be more suitable.

However, this standard might be too simplistic for the Taiwanese judicial system
to resolve issue. The most crucial factor regarding the choice of systems in Taiwan should
be the “compatibility between the current trial proceedings and the proposed system.” In
fact, due to different circumstances in different countries,1253 one should not refer too
much to other systems because they have been developed and adapted according to the
particular circumstances under each criminal justice system.1254

Accordingly, before the Taiwanese criminal justice system establishes a lay
participation trial system, it should first examine carefully how the doing so would affect
all aspects of current trial proceedings.1255 In the Taiwanese context, for example, given
the professional judges’ stance toward the citizens’ verdicts;1256 the burden after the
implementation of a lay participation system that might increase on citizens, the
1252

See You, The Citizens’ Participation in the Trial Proceedings, supra note 269, at 272 to 273.
See Huang, Research on Citizens’ Participation in a Judicial System, supra note 100, at 40.
1254
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 148 and 276.
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at 48.
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See Huang, id., at 45 to 46.
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government and the entire jurisdiction. 1257 Also, the citizens’ feelings about their
positions in the criminal justice system,1258 might impel a significant change in the
proposed Taiwanese lay observer system.

If allowing citizens to participate in criminal trial proceedings were the ultimate
goal of reforms in the Taiwanese criminal justice system, the traditional jury system and
the lay participation system would not be a suitable option. In the first, the jury’s verdict
is the fatal flaw in the Taiwanese criminal justice system because the contemporary issue
regarding the involved and abstruse judgments cannot be resolved by the jury system.1259
Without the reasons being provided for a verdict, there is no way to analyze whether the
decision complied with the rules of experience and logic.1260

As for the second system, the traditional lay participation system that appointed
lay judges with fixed terms also has a fatal flaw because lay judges might gradually
become “professional” by repeating with exercising authority with the professional
judges in the courtroom. Consequently, other contemporary issues regarding the elitist
educational system, the judicial bureaucracy and the complicated roles that professional
judges operate under the Taiwanese criminal justice system cannot be solved by the
traditional lay participation system.

1257

See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 476 to 477.
1258
Id., at 380.
1259
Id., at 285 to 286; see also Lin and Lin, Explore the Issues of the Lay Participation, supra note 788, at
16.
1260
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 155 (2013): “The probative value of
evidence shall be determined at the discretion and based on the firm confidence of the court, provided that it
cannot be contrary to the rules of experience and logic.”
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However, there were also promising possibilities under both the jury and the lay
participation system. Under the jury system, the authority between the professional judges
and the jurors is distinct, so that the judge’s position is clear to both the public prosecutor
and the defendant. And under the lay participation system, the opportunities that the lay
judges have to communicate directly with the professional judges during the trial
proceedings improve citizens’ understanding regarding the functions of the criminal
justice system.

In summary, although both the jury and the lay participation system have distinct
advantages for improving the Taiwanese criminal justice system, neither could be
introduced to Taiwan directly because the fatal disadvantages cannot resolve
contemporary issues under the Taiwanese criminal justice system. Therefore, the
Japanese and South Korean “intermediate” trial systems would be a more suitable
direction for structuring the Taiwanese criminal justice system that is needed.

As a result, according to the Taiwanese proposed lay observer system, the
Taiwanese Judicial Yuan might propose its reform in the correct direction because this
proposed lay observer system is also an intermediate trial pattern. Hence, the next step
before establishing is to examine how its structures influence the Taiwanese criminal trial
proceedings.
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CHAPTER FIVE

RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE TAIWANESE PROPOSED LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM
The Taiwanese Judicial Yuan tried to make the proposed lay observer system as
detailed as possible. However, when the proposed Act of the Lay Observer System was
sent to the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan for further deliberation, the legislators passed a
resolution that required the Judicial Yuan to hold mock trials with different systems to
determine the most suitable lay participation system for the Taiwanese criminal justice
system.1261

This requirement that the legislature further review the proposed Act was indeed
necessary. According to Article Five of the proposed Act, eligible cases for the lay
observer system would be limited to two kinds of heinous circumstances:1262 First, when
the punishment of the crime was no less than seven years imprisonment or second, when
the defendant intentionally caused the victim’s death. 1263 In other words, under the
proposed Taiwanese lay observer system, only felony crimes and capital crimes would
qualify to be tried by laymen as long as no statutory exclusions were applied.1264
1261

See the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan, Lifayuan Di Ba Jie Di Er Hui Qi Di Shiqi Ci Huiyi Yishilu (立法
院第八屆第二會期第十七次會議議事錄) [The Journal of the Eighth Session, Second Term and
Seventeenth Conference], 102:7 LIFAYUAN GONGBAO (立法院公報) [THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE] 1,
619 (2013).
1262
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1263
Id., art. 5, para. 1.
1264
Id. (There are also exceptions to the application of the lay observer system. For instance, Article 5
excludes both juvenile cases and cases involving the violation of the Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act
(Taiwan) from being eligible because of their specialty status under the Taiwanese criminal justice system.
Additionally, Article 6 also denied the application of the lay system when there are circumstances present
that prevent the purposes of lay participation from being realized, such as when lay participation would not
provided a trial fairer than what a defendant would receive via general trial proceedings; when the lay
observers and their family members might be in danger; when a pending case needs highly professional
knowledge; when the defendant pleads guilty; or when other factors might cause the lay observer court to
be inappropriate for the pending case.)

201

Meanwhile, the Taiwanese Supreme Court judgment1265 concluded in 2013 that
after both the ICCPR 1266 and the ICESCR1267 were adopted by the Taiwanese legal
system, the entire criminal justice system would need to comply with the ICCPR,1268
given that the death penalty is still a possible punishment in Taiwan. In addition, the
Court also stated that defendant has right to litigate that is guaranteed by the Taiwanese
constitution.1269 Therefore, both regular and capital trials should strictly follow the due
process clauses to protect the defendant’s procedural rights.1270

Thus, because the proposed Taiwanese lay observer system would be applied to
felony and capital crimes, its trial proceedings, as well as regular trial proceedings should
be examined in order to ensure that the proposed system would be compliant with the
ICCPR and fulfill the defendant’s rights in accordance with the due process.
1265

Taiwan Zui Gao Fa Yuan, 102 Nian Tai Shang Zi No. 170 (January 10, 2013).
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) May 14, 2009. (Since Taiwan is no
longer an official member of the United Nations, there is no official record number under the U.N.
However, the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan enacted the “Act to Implement the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” in 2009;
therefore, both these two covenants were both adopted as domestic laws in Taiwan.)
1267
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) May 14, 2009.
1268
See ICCPR, supra note 1266, art. 6 stated that:
[1]. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for
the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime
and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment
rendered by a competent court.
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that nothing in this article
shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any way from any obligation
assumed under the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence.
Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age
and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by
any State Party to the present Covenant.
1269
See CONST. CT. INTERP. 396 (1996), 582 (2004), 636 (2008), and 654 (2009).
1270
See the judgment by the Taiwan Supreme Court, supra note 1265.
1266
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Because it understood the significance of implementing the lay observer system in
Taiwan, the Judicial Yuan abided by the Legislative Yuan’s resolution and appointed
both the Taipei Shihlin and the Chiayi District Courts to hold mock trials with different
systems involving laymen.1271 After exploring the experiences of these mock trials, this
chapter makes further recommendations to improve the Taiwanese criminal justice
system through the reforms of the proposed lay observer system.

5.1 Introduction of the Trial Proceedings under the Proposed Lay Observer
System
The Taiwanese Judicial Yuan framed the proposed lay observer system as a
special trial proceeding under the criminal justice system. Therefore, the procedures
under this system would be undertaken in accordance with both the Code of the Criminal
Procedure and the proposed Act of the Lay Observer System in the following
sequence:1272

1. A case begins on the trial date with an announcement of the offense with which
the defendant is charged.1273

1271

See the Secretary-General of the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan, Mi Tai Ting Xing Er Zi Di 1020002252
Hao (祕台廳刑二字第 1020002252 號) (Jan. 18, 2013); and Mi Tai Ting Xing Er Zi Di 1020003673 Hao
(祕台廳刑二字第 1020003673 號) (Feb. 7, 2013).
1272
The introduction of the trial proceedings under the proposed lay observer system is referred to the
“Introduction of the Seventh Lay Observer Mock Trial” held by the Taiwan Shihlin District Court on
November 20th, 2013; available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/GuanShen/download/%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E5%A3%AB%E6%9E%97%E5%9C%B0%E6%96%B9%
E6%B3%95%E9%99%A2%E7%AC%AC7%E6%AC%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%80%
E5%AF%A9%E6%A8%A1%E6%93%AC%E6%B3%95%E5%BA%AD%E5%AF%A9%E7%90%86%E8
%A8%88%E7%95%AB%E6%9B%B8.docx (last visited on June 2, 2014.)
1273
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 285.
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2. The presiding judge examines the accused in accordance with his or her personal
information.1274
3. The public prosecutor states the essential points of the indictment.1275
4. The judge informs1276 the defendant about the required matters.1277
5. Both parties give opening statements:1278
Before the court officially investigates evidence, both the public
prosecutor1279 and the defendant and defense counsels1280 state what they see as
the facts of the case to persuade the court and present evidence that could prove
their respective statements are true; in other words, each party offers its own
“narrative of events” to the court at this point.
6. The court begins to investigate evidence1281 in accordance with Articles 288-11282
and 288-21283 of the Taiwanese Code of Criminal Procedure.

1274

Id., art. 94. (According to this article, the professional judge has to confirm the defendant’s full name,
age, place of birth, occupation and domicile or residence.)
1275
Id., art. 286.
1276
Id., art. 287. (According to the “Introduction of the Seventh Lay Observer Mock Trial,” the court
would further confirm whether or not the defendant pleads guilty and, at this point, would confirm the
defendant’s essential points of defense.)
1277
Id., art. 95:
[I]n an examination, an accused shall be informed of the following:
(1) That he is suspected of committing an offense and all of the offenses charged. If the charge is
changed after an accused has been informed of the offense charged, he shall be informed of such change;
(2) That he may remain silent and does not have to make a statement against his own will;
(3) That he may retain defense attorney;
(4) That he may request the investigation of evidence favorable to him.
1278
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 51, para. 1 and 2.
1279
Id., art. 51, para. 1 (The public prosecutor would give his or her opening statement in accordance with
the trial plan under Article 39 of the proposed Act. According to the proposed Act, the scope of the public
prosecutor’s opening statement should include: the fact to be proven; the scope, order and methods of
investigation of evidence; and the relationship between the evidence and the pending facts.)
1280
Id., art. 51, para. 2.
1281
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 288, para. 1: “Investigation of evidence
shall begin after completion of proceeding specified in Article 287.” (The opening statement is a special
procedure under the proposed lay observer system; therefore, the investigation process would begin after
both parties give their statements to the court.)
1282
Id., art. 288-1: “Following the investigation of each evidence, the presiding judge shall ask the party’s
opinion thereof. The presiding judge shall inform the accused that he may present evidence favorable to
him.”
1283
Id., art. 288-2: “Appropriate opportunities shall be given by the court to the parties, agent, defense
attorney, or assistant to argue the probative value of the evidence.”
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7. Examination of the defendant is performed regarding the facts of the charge.1284
8. An investigation of information regarding the defendant’s sentencing is done.1285
9. Oral arguments about factual and legal issues and the scope of the sentencing are
given:1286
This process is different from the general criminal procedures that only
grant both parties opportunities to “state opinions.”1287 Under the proposed lay
observer system, a specific procedure has also been designed for both parties to
argue the defendant’s sentencing.1288 Under this procedure, the victim and his or
her family are also granted an opportunity to state their opinions regarding the
defendant’s sentencing.1289
10. The defendant gives a final statement.1290
11. The process of final deliberation is completed:1291
After oral arguments are concluded, the final deliberations take place
immediately unless specific circumstances occur.1292 In order to distinguish the
lay observers’ opinions between the “determination of factual issues and the
application to laws” and the “discretion of the defendant’s sentencing,” the
1284

Id., art. 288, para. 3: “ Except for the cases that apply the summary trial procedure, the presiding judge
shall examine the accused regarding the facts being charged with at the end of the investigation of evidence
proceeding.”
1285
Id., art. 288, para. 4: “The presiding judge’s investigation of information regarding the sentencing shall
be conducted after the examination in the preceding section.”
1286
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 53. (According to this article,
both the public prosecutor and the defense counsels should conclude the results of the investigation of
evidence that is in favor of its side and persuade the court.)
1287
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 289, para. 3: “After the conclusion of the
argument pursuant to the preceding two sections (which are the oral arguments with regard to the factual
and the legal issues), the presiding judge shall provide the parties with opportunities to state opinions
regarding sentencing.”
1288
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 53, para. 2.
1289
Id.
1290
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 290: “The presiding judge shall, before
announcing that the argument is concluded, ask the accused whether he has a final statement.”
1291
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 55 to 60.
1292
Id., art. 55. (According to this article, the special circumstances includes: it had been too late after the
argument is concluded; a natural calamity such as earthquake, typhoon or floods occurs; or the professional
judge or the lay observers suffer serious illness so that the final deliberation process cannot be completed.)
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proposed lay observer system divides the final deliberation process into six stages.
This is so the professional judges will have time to solely consider whether to
adopt the lay observers’ verdict or opinions.1293
a. There is a discussion concerning the determination of facts and application
of laws: both the professional judges and the lay observers discuss these
matters and exchange opinions with regard to the pending case.
b. The lay observers state opinions about factual and legal issues;
c. The professional judges determine factual and legal issues;1294
d. If the professional judges hold that the defendant is guilty, the lay observer
court should discuss sentencing;
e. The lay observers state their opinions with regard to the defendant’s
sentencing;
f. The professional judges deliberate the defendant’s sentencing.1295
12. Pronouncement of the judgment is made:1296
According to Article Thirty-Two 1297 of the proposed Act, when the lay
observer court pronounces the verdict, the trial proceedings end and the lay
observers’ duty is completed.

5.2 Exploring the Probable Difficulties under the Proposed Lay Observer
System on the Basis of the Experiences of the Mock Trials in Taiwan

1293

Id., art. 56, para. 1.
Under this procedural stage, the professional judges should confirm whether their decision complies
with the lay observers’ majority opinion.
1295
Under this procedural stage, the professional judges would decide whether to accept the lay observers’
opinion with regard to the defendant’s sentencing.
1296
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 62, para. 1 and 2.
(According to this article, a qualified judgment should include the syllabus of the court’s decision and the
reasons via its explanation. With regard to imposing a sentence, the lay observer court would pronounce the
crime that the defendant committed and the principal punishment.)
1297
Id., art. 32.
1294
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Through the end of 2013, the Taipei Shihlin and the Chiayi District Courts each
held seven mock trials, fourteen in total:1298 The first four in each court were held under
the lay observer system. The remaining three mock were held under the system required
by the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan; 1299 i.e., laymen had the same authority as
professional judges to determine both the defendant’s conviction and his or her
sentencing during the final deliberation process.

Meanwhile, in order to obtain opinions about lay participation trial proceedings,
the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan cooperated with the two district courts and conducted both
polls and meetings right after each mock trial ended.1300 The polls were designed to
disclose the laymen’s attitudes toward their experiences, while the meetings were
expected to get the views of professional judges, public prosecutors, defense counsels,
and the general public.1301

However, during these mock trials, all factual issues in the stimulated cases had
been simplified to examine whether the proposed lay observer (or lay participation)
system could function smoothly in Taiwan.1302 Therefore, revealed by these mock trials
were basic to the proposed system because they happened under the fundamental
conditions of the trial proceedings citizens had participated in. Looking at data from the

1298

See the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan, the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer System, supra note 140. (The
section of “Mock Trials”.)
1299
See the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan, the Journal of the Eight Session, Second Terms and Seventeenth
Conference], supra note 1261.
1300
See the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan, the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer System, supra note 1298.
1301
Id. (All results of the polls and the records of the conferences have been published on the official
website of the Taiwanese proposed lay observer system.)
1302
According to the results of the 2nd, 5th and 7th conferences of the Taipei Shihlin District Court and the
results of the 2nd and 7th conferences of the Chiayi District Court, the conference attendees noted that these
mock trials were too “simple” to reveal more practical issues.
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fourteen mock trials, one can identify three kinds of issues encountered under the
Taiwanese lay observer system:

(1). Preliminary Trial Proceedings
The question of whether the laymen and the professional judges could read case
files, along with evidence, before the trial began was the most controversial issue before
the establishment of the proposed lay observer system in Taiwan. The Taiwanese Judicial
Yuan and the Administrative Yuan had opposite views on this issue.1303 The Judicial
Yuan did not agree that professional judges should read evidence before the first trial date,
while the Administrative Yuan believed that only reading the indictment did not provide
the professional judges sufficient information for directing the entire trial proceedings.

According to the polls conducted by both the Shihlin and Chiayi District Courts,
although neither the judges nor the laymen read case files, along with evidence, before
the first trial date, the professional judges’ instructions were clear enough for the laymen
to understand the proceedings of mock trial.
Topic: Do you agree with the statement that the professional judges’ instructions
during the trial proceedings were clear?
Fully Agree
1-41304
5
6
7

Agree

Taipei

Chiayi

Taipei

N/A
57%
86%
50%

N/A
71%
67%
100%

N/A
43%
14%
50%

Chiayi

Neutral

Disagree

Fully Disagree

Taipei/
Chiayi

Taipei/
Chiayi

Taipei/
Chiayi

N/A
N/A
29%
0
33%
0
0
0
Figure 26

1303

N/A
0
0
0

THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 45.
The Taipei Shihlin and the Chiayi District Courts explored this topic regarding the participating
laymen at the first four mock trials.
1304
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N/A
0
0
0

However, in further exploring the opinions expressed during the meetings, some
judges said that without reading the case files and evidence prior to the beginning of the
trial, they found it too difficult to direct the laymen along the entire course of the trial
proceedings1305 and it felt too rushed for the judges and laymen to decide the case
immediately after the oral arguments ended.1306 Therefore, professional judges worried
their decisions might not be as reliable as the Judicial Yuan expected and the functions of
the Taiwanese criminal justice system would be lessened by the proposed lay observer
system.

Besides, although the poll results indicated that the laymen basically had
understood cases, in fact, some laymen still pointed out that since they did not read the
case files before the trial began, the professional judges’ instructions thus became
extremely important for them to comprehend the oral arguments both parties made during
the trial proceedings.1307 To summarize the opinions of the professional judges and the
laymen, allowing them to read case files, along with evidence, might be a necessary
method for guaranteeing the quality of judgments under the lay observer system.

1305

See the Shihlin District Court, the Results of the 2nd Conference, available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/Guan-Shen/download/%E9%99%84%E4%BB%B682%EF%BC%9A%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E5%A3%AB%E6%9E%97%E5%9C%B0%E6%96%B9%
E6%B3%95%E9%99%A2%E7%AC%AC2%E6%AC%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%80%
E5%AF%A9%E6%A8%A1%E6%93%AC%E6%B3%95%E5%BA%AD%E7%A0%94%E8%A8%8E%E6
%9C%83%E7%B4%80%E9%8C%84.doc (last visited on June 14, 2014.)
1306
See the Shihlin District Court, the Results of the 1st Conference, available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/Guan-Shen/download/%E9%99%84%E4%BB%B681%EF%BC%9A%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E5%A3%AB%E6%9E%97%E5%9C%B0%E6%96%B9%
E6%B3%95%E9%99%A2%E7%AC%AC1%E6%AC%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%80%
E5%AF%A9%E6%A8%A1%E6%93%AC%E6%B3%95%E5%BA%AD%E7%A0%94%E8%A8%8E%E6
%9C%83%E7%B4%80%E9%8C%84.doc (last visited on June 14, 2014.)
1307
Id.
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However, the defense counsels and scholars of criminal law thought differently.
They opposed the suggestion that reading case files and evidence before the trial began
was imperative for both the judges and laymen.1308 Because laymen are not legally
trained, after both judges and laymen read the case files and evidence, laymen’s
knowledge about cases would be significantly less than that of the professional judges.1309
This situation would carry the intolerable risk in the proposed lay observer system, that
the professional judges would “dominate” the determination of the verdict.

In addition to concerns about the unbalanced standing between the judges and the
laymen, both the defense counsels and scholars of criminal law pointed out that some
Taiwanese professional judges would investigate evidence after reading the case files and
evidence during the preliminary trial proceedings.1310 This practice would not comply
with the principle of the proposed lay observer system, namely that both the professional
judges’ and the laymen’s mind should be “blank” before the trial proceedings begin.1311

1308

See the Shihlin District Court, the Results of the 4th Conference, available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/Guan-Shen/download/%E9%99%84%E4%BB%B688%EF%BC%9A%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E5%A3%AB%E6%9E%97%E5%9C%B0%E6%96%B9%
E6%B3%95%E9%99%A2%E7%AC%AC4%E6%AC%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%80%
E5%AF%A9%E6%A8%A1%E6%93%AC%E6%B3%95%E5%BA%AD%E7%A0%94%E8%A8%8E%E6
%9C%83%E7%B4%80%E9%8C%84.TXT (last visited on June 14, 2014.)
1309
Id.
1310
See the Shihlin District Court, the Results of the 5th Conference, available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/GuanShen/download/%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E5%A3%AB%E6%9E%97%E5%9C%B0%E6%96%B9%
E6%B3%95%E9%99%A2%E7%AC%AC5%E6%AC%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%80%
E5%AF%A9%E6%A8%A1%E6%93%AC%E6%B3%95%E5%BA%AD%E7%A0%94%E8%A8%8E%E6
%9C%83%E7%B4%80%E9%8C%84.doc (last visited on June 14, 2014.)
1311
See the Chiayi District Court, the Results of the 1st and 2nd Conference, available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/Guan-Shen/download/%E9%99%84%E4%BB%B6810%EF%BC%9A%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E5%98%89%E7%BE%A9%E5%9C%B0%E6%96%B9
%E6%B3%95%E9%99%A2%E7%AC%AC1%E6%AC%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%80
%E5%AF%A9%E6%A8%A1%E6%93%AC%E6%B3%95%E5%BA%AD%E7%A0%94%E8%A8%8E%
E6%9C%83%E7%B4%80%E9%8C%84.doc (1st conference); http://www.judicial.gov.tw/GuanShen/download/%E9%99%84%E4%BB%B6811%EF%BC%9A%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E5%98%89%E7%BE%A9%E5%9C%B0%E6%96%B9
%E6%B3%95%E9%99%A2%E7%AC%AC2%E6%AC%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%80
%E5%AF%A9%E6%A8%A1%E6%93%AC%E6%B3%95%E5%BA%AD%E7%A0%94%E8%A8%8E%
E6%9C%83%E7%B4%80%E9%8C%84.doc (2nd conference) (last visited on June 14, 2014.)
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(2). The Trial Proceedings
Besides issues about the reading of evidence during the preliminary trial
proceedings, there are questions regarding whether the laymen can comprehend the trial
proceedings and determine the facts of the case accurately. This is a matter that must be
carefully considered before a lay participation system is implemented. Therefore, the
Taiwanese Judicial Yuan should pay close attention to whether laymen understood the
trial proceedings during the mock trials.
Topic: Did you understand the procedures of the trial?

11312
2
3
4
5
6
7

Almost
Understand

Mostly
Understand

Partially
Understand

Taipei

Taipei

Taipei

N/A
57%
57%
43%
57%
71%
49%

Chiayi

N/A
14%
71%
72%
43%
67%
86%

N/A
43%
43%
57%
43%
29%
38%

Chiayi

N/A
58%
29%
14%
43%
33%
14%

N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
Figure 27

Chiayi

N/A
14%
0
14%
14%
0
0

Rarely
Understand
Taipei/
Chiayi

N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0

No Answer
Taipei

N/A
0
0
0
0
0
13%

Chiayi

N/A
14%
0
0
0
0
0

Although these results show that most laymen could understand the proceedings
during the trial in which they participated, during the meetings, these results were
questioned by other attendants.1313 Under the proposed lay observer system, in order to

1312

Neither the Taipei Shihlin nor the Chiayi District Courts explored this topic regarding the participating
laymen at the first mock trial.
1313
See the Shihlin District Court, the Results of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Conference, supra notes
1305 (2nd conference), 1308 (4th conference) and 1310 (5th conference); also available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/Guan-Shen/download/%E9%99%84%E4%BB%B685%EF%BC%9A%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E5%A3%AB%E6%9E%97%E5%9C%B0%E6%96%B9%
E6%B3%95%E9%99%A2%E7%AC%AC3%E6%AC%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%80%
E5%AF%A9%E6%A8%A1%E6%93%AC%E6%B3%95%E5%BA%AD%E7%A0%94%E8%A8%8E%E6
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reduce the laymen’s burden, the trial proceedings would be processed continually within
a short time.1314 Therefore, the legally trained professionals seriously questioned whether
laymen could deal with evidence, comprehend the arguments made by both parties, and
further determine both the verdict and the sentence.

This concern is indeed crucial. Without a sufficient time for laymen to discuss
factual and legal issues with professional judges, there is a high risk that laymen could
reach their verdict based on only their “impressions” of the case rather than evidence
presented by both parties and examined by the court during the trial proceedings.1315
Moreover, the possibility of wrongful judgments might increase after the lay observer
system is implemented because in practice, Taiwanese professional judges usually
%9C%83%E7%B4%80%E9%8C%84.TXT (3rd conference); http://www.judicial.gov.tw/GuanShen/download/%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E5%A3%AB%E6%9E%97%E5%9C%B0%E6%96%B9%
E6%B3%95%E9%99%A2%E7%AC%AC6%E6%AC%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%80%
E5%AF%A9%E6%A8%A1%E6%93%AC%E6%B3%95%E5%BA%AD%E7%A0%94%E8%A8%8E%E6
%9C%83%E7%B4%80%E9%8C%84.doc (6th conference) and http://www.judicial.gov.tw/GuanShen/download/%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E5%A3%AB%E6%9E%97%E5%9C%B0%E6%96%B9%
E6%B3%95%E9%99%A2%E7%AC%AC7%E6%AC%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%80%
E5%AF%A9%E6%A8%A1%E6%93%AC%E6%B3%95%E5%BA%AD%E7%A0%94%E8%A8%8E%E6
%9C%83%E7%B4%80%E9%8C%84.doc (7th conference); see also the Chiayi District Court, the Results
of the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Conferences, available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/GuanShen/download/%E9%99%84%E4%BB%B6813%EF%BC%9A%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E5%98%89%E7%BE%A9%E5%9C%B0%E6%96%B9
%E6%B3%95%E9%99%A2%E7%AC%AC3%E6%AC%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%80
%E5%AF%A9%E6%A8%A1%E6%93%AC%E6%B3%95%E5%BA%AD%E7%A0%94%E8%A8%8E%
E6%9C%83%E7%B4%80%E9%8C%84.doc (3rd conference); http://www.judicial.gov.tw/GuanShen/download/%E9%99%84%E4%BB%B6815%EF%BC%9A%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E5%98%89%E7%BE%A9%E5%9C%B0%E6%96%B9
%E6%B3%95%E9%99%A2%E7%AC%AC4%E6%AC%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%80
%E5%AF%A9%E6%A8%A1%E6%93%AC%E6%B3%95%E5%BA%AD%E7%A0%94%E8%A8%8E%
E6%9C%83%E7%B4%80%E9%8C%84.doc (4th conference); http://www.judicial.gov.tw/GuanShen/download/%E9%99%84%E4%BB%B6817%EF%BC%9A%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E5%98%89%E7%BE%A9%E5%9C%B0%E6%96%B9
%E6%B3%95%E9%99%A2%E7%AC%AC5%E6%AC%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%80
%E5%AF%A9%E6%A8%A1%E6%93%AC%E6%B3%95%E5%BA%AD%E7%A0%94%E8%A8%8E%
E6%9C%83%E7%B4%80%E9%8C%84.doc (5th conference); and http://www.judicial.gov.tw/GuanShen/download/%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E5%98%89%E7%BE%A9%E5%9C%B0%E6%96%B9%E
6%B3%95%E9%99%A2%E7%AC%AC6%E6%AC%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%80%E5
%AF%A9%E6%A8%A1%E6%93%AC%E6%B3%95%E5%BA%AD%E7%A0%94%E8%A8%8E%E6%
9C%83%E7%B4%80%E9%8C%84.doc (6th conference) (last visited on June 14, 2014.)
1314
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 49.
1315
See the Shihlin District Court, the Results of the 2nd and 3rd Conferences, supra notes 1305 (2nd
conference) and 1313 (3rd conference); see also the Chiayi District Court, the Results of the 3rd and 5th
Conferences, supra note 1313.
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investigate evidence to determine both verdicts and sentence at the same procedural
stage.1316

Legal professionals and scholars of criminal law were concerned that laymen
would be confused by both the conviction evidence and the sentencing information
submitted by the two parties1317 because they lacked sufficient practical experience and
had only limited knowledge of evidentiary rules.1318 To explore whether this was the case
during the deliberation process in the mock trials, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan surveyed
laymen’s attitudes according to the four following topics:
Topic 1: According to your experience, are you satisfied with the trial proceedings
under this mock court?
Fully Agree
Taipei

11319
2
3
4
5
6
7

N/A
43%
43%
43%
43%
0
25%

Chiayi

N/A
43%
43%
57%
71%
33%
71%

Agree
Taipei

N/A
57%
57%
57%
57%
100%
75%

Chiayi

Neutral

Disagree

Fully Disagree

Taipei/
Chiayi

Taipei/
Chiayi

Taipei/
Chiayi

N/A
N/A
57%
0
57%
0
43%
0
29%
0
67%
0
29%
0
Figure 28

1316

N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0

N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0

See the Shihlin District Court, the Results of the 5th and 7th Conferences, supra notes 1310 (5th
conference) and 1313 (7th conference).
1317
See the Shihlin District Court, the Results of the 7th Conference, supra note 1313.
1318
See the Shihlin District Court, the Results of the 2nd, 5th and 7th Conferences, supra notes 1305 (2nd
conference), 1310 (5th conference) and 1313 (7th conference).
1319
Neither the Taipei Shihlin nor the Chiayi District Courts explored this topic regarding the participating
laymen at the first mock trial.
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Topic 2: According to your experience, are you satisfied with the process of the final
deliberation under this mock court?
Fully Agree
Taipei

11320
21321
31322
4
51323
6
71324

N/A
14%
43%
43%
43%
57%
25%

Chiayi

N/A
29%
43%
43%
42%
33%
86%

Agree
Taipei

Chiayi

N/A
86%
57%
57%
57%
43%
37%

Neutral

Disagree

Fully Disagree

Taipei/
Chiayi

Taipei/
Chiayi

Taipei/
Chiayi

N/A
N/A
57%
0
43%
0
57%
0
29%
0
67%
0
14%
0
Figure 29

N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0

N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0

Topic 3: Did you express personal opinions adequately when discussing the case
with the professional judges?
Fully Agree
Taipei

11325
21326
3
4
5
6
71327

N/A
57%
57%
29%
29%
86%
25%

Chiayi

N/A
43%
20%
72%
57%
67%
71%

Agree
Taipei

N/A
29%
43%
71%
71%
14%
62%

Disagree

Chiayi

Taipei

N/A
N/A
29%
14%
80%
0
14%
14%
43%
0
33%
0
29%
0
Figure 30

1320

Fully Disagree

Chiayi

N/A
14%
0
0
0
0
0

Taipei/
Chiayi

N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0

Id.
With regard to the Chiayi District Court, there was one layman among seven experimental subjects
who did not answer this question.
1322
Id.
1323
With regard to the Chiayi District Court, there were two laymen among seven experimental subjects
who did not answer this question.
1324
With regard to the Shihlin District Court, there were three laymen among eight experimental subjects
who did not answer this question.
1325
Neither the Taipei Shihlin nor the Chiayi District Courts explored this topic regarding the participating
laymen at the first mock trial.
1326
With regard to the Chiayi District Court, there was one layman among seven experimental subjects
who did not answer this question.
1327
With regard to the Shihlin District Court, there was one layman among eight experimental subjects
who did not answer this question.
1321
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Topic 4: Do you agree with the statement that this case has been discussed
adequately between you and the professional judges?
Fully Agree
Taipei

11328
21329
3
4
5
6
71330

N/A
43%
57%
57%
43%
57%
49%

Chiayi

N/A
29%
60%
86%
71%
67%
71%

Agree
Taipei

N/A
57%
43%
43%
57%
43%
38%

Disagree

Chiayi

Taipei

N/A
N/A
57%
0
40%
0
0%
0
29%
0
33%
0
29%
0
Figure 31

Fully Disagree

Chiayi

N/A
0
0
14%
0
0
0

Taipei/
Chiayi

N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0

Although these results indicate that most laymen would cooperate with the
professional judges during the deliberation processes, in fact, all parties, including judges,
defense counsels, and individual laymen (with the exception of public prosecutors),
pointed out that it was too difficult for laymen to deliver their verdict because too many
factors had to be considered during the final deliberation process.1331

Some defense counsels also suggested that professional judges’ explanations
about the basic principles of the criminal justice system, such as the presumption of
innocence and the evidentiary adjudication, were not clear enough to laymen.1332 Thus,
for example, under the proposed lay observer system, laymen might be hesitant to reach a

1328

Neither the Taipei Shihlin nor the Chiayi District Courts explored this topic regarding the participating
laymen at the first mock trial.
1329
With regard to the Chiayi District Court, there was one layman among seven experimental subjects
who did not answer this question.
1330
Neither the Taipei Shihlin nor the Chiayi District Courts explored this topic regarding the participating
laymen at the first mock trial.
1331
See the Shihlin District Court, the Results of the 1st and 2nd Conferences, supra notes 1306 (1st
conference) and 1305 (2nd conference); see also the Chiayi District Court, the Results of the 5th Conference,
supra note 1313.
1332
See the Shihlin District Court, the Results of the 2nd, 3rd and 6th Conferences, supra notes 1305 (2nd
conference) and 1313 (3rd and 6th conferences).
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not-guilty verdict when evidence was insufficient to fulfill the requirement of proof of
guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Yet the professional judges felt that it was a heavy burden on the judges to explain
both the factual and legal issues regarding what constitutes grounds for conviction, and
then to instruct sentencing information to laymen during the final deliberation process.1333
Thus, one can conclude that the current structure of the deliberation process will be the
next major issue to arise under the proposed lay observer system. This is because
considering both the conviction and the sentencing issues at the same time is tedious and
confusing to both judges and laymen. The proposed lay observer system might also put
the defendant in an extremely disadvantageous position and even raises, in a worst-case
scenario, the possibility of a wrongful judgment.

(3). The Deliberation
During the meetings, some laymen admitted that how to determine a case felt like
a “mystery” because they are not legally trained to judge one. 1334 Other laymen
complained that, even after they participate in the trial proceedings, they did not
understand the reasons the professional judges took an opposite (or different) decision
than theirs.1335 Accordingly, many laymen questioned whether the Taiwanese proposed
lay observer system was only designed for the citizens to “confirm” the professional
judges’ judgments, not a method for truly considering societal values.1336

1333

See the Shihlin District Court, the Result of the 2nd Conference, supra notes 1305.
See the Shihlin District Court, the Result of the 1st Conference, supra notes 1306.
1335
Id.
1336
See the Chiayi District Court, the Result of the 1st Conference, supra notes 1311.
1334
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Defense counsels and scholars of criminal law had similar reactions. Both pointed
out that without the professional judges’ authority to determine the outcome of a case, the
laymen would see their comprehension and opinions neglected by both public prosecutors
and defense counsels during the trial proceedings.1337 Moreover, judicial resources might
be wasted on a proposed system in which professional judges could still disregard the
societal values represented by the citizens who had participated in trials.1338 Therefore,
granting laymen the same authority as professional judges during the deliberation process
became a way to ensure that the lay participation system could be established
meaningfully under the Taiwanese criminal justice system.1339

However, the professional judges felt differently. Some stated that issues of
whether laymen could have authority to determine a case should lead one to carefully
consider citizens’ ability to bear their duty to judge other citizens’ wrongdoing.1340 This
viewpoint also raised the issue of whether professional judges should discuss the case
with laymen to help them gain sufficient understanding regarding some of the fine points
of the case.1341

These concerns are fundamental about any proposed lay participation system and
should be carefully examined before such a system is implemented. If it is not, the main

1337

See the Shihlin District Court, the Result of the 5th Conference, supra notes 1310.
See the Shihlin District Court, the Results of the 2nd and 3rd Conferences, supra notes 1305 (2nd
conference) and 1313 (3rd conference).
1339
See the Shihlin District Court, the Result of the 5th Conference, supra notes 1310.
1340
Id.
1341
See the Chiayi District Court, the Result of the 7th Conference, available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/GuanShen/download/%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E5%A3%AB%E6%9E%97%E5%9C%B0%E6%96%B9%
E6%B3%95%E9%99%A2%E7%AC%AC7%E6%AC%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%80%
E5%AF%A9%E6%A8%A1%E6%93%AC%E6%B3%95%E5%BA%AD%E7%A0%94%E8%A8%8E%E6
%9C%83%E7%B4%80%E9%8C%84.doc (last visited on June 15, 2014.)
1338
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purpose of establishing a lay observer system, to rebuild societal faith in the Taiwanese
criminal justice system, would not be fulfilled.

5.3 Recommendations for the Preliminary Trial Proceedings: A Modified
Indictment-Only Doctrine

(1). The Origins of Arguments regarding the Modified Indictment-Only Doctrine in
Taiwan
The indictment-only doctrine had been an extremely controversial part of the
Taiwanese criminal justice system since 1999.1342 Although the doctrine was created by
the Japanese criminal justice system, it is also a general principle that is implemented by
most adversarial trial systems.1343 When the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan decided to propose
a lay observer system, this issue inevitably again raised the debate over the indictmentonly doctrine. The mock trials had shown that the preliminary trial proceedings were the
most direct scheme that influenced the discretion of both the professional judges and the
laymen during the trial proceedings. For this reason, it is important carefully to consider
whether the indictment-only doctrine should be adopted in Taiwan.

According to Taiwanese criminal procedural law,1344 the public prosecutor is
required to submit an indictment statement, along with related evidence, to the court
when filing an accusation. In other words, the Taiwanese criminal justice system does not
currently operate under the indictment-only doctrine. Thus, professional judges receive

1342

See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 382; see also Fu, A Theoretical Study on the Principle of Unitary Information and Its
Related System, supra note 909, at 48.
1343
See Zhang, id.
1344
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 264, § 3 (2013): “When a prosecution is
initiated, the record and exhibits shall be sent therewith to the court.”
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before the first trial date evidence against the defendant from the investigating institutions,
such as police authorities and public prosecutor, regardless of whether evidence is
directly related to the indictment.1345

The indictment-only doctrine holds that the trial court should receive only basic
information from the public prosecutor that is related the indictment. 1346 Evidence,
including that offered by both the public prosecutor and the defendant would be examined
by the professional judges only after the trial begins.1347

Arguments for and against these two doctrines usually focus on concerns about
whether the professional judges should have complete blank discretion regarding the case
before the first trial date.1348 To people who support the indictment-only doctrine, the
possibility that the professional judges might be influenced by the public prosecutor’s
evidence, which acts mostly against to the defendant, should be avoided at all costs
because the defendant would be placed in a disadvantaged position prior to the beginning
of the trial.1349

The opposite arguments hold that because professional judges are legally trained,
the possibility that their discretion would be tainted by the prosecutor’s evidence is
1345

See Fu, A Theoretical Study on the Principle of Unitary Information and Its Related System, supra note
909, at 20.
1346
See Huang Hanyi (黃翰義), Lun Juanzheng Bubingsong zhi Lishi Yange ji qi Lilun Jichu (論卷証不併
送之歷史沿革暨其理論基礎) [Discuss the Historical Development and the Theoretical Basis of the
“Indictment-Only Doctrine”], 12 FAKUAN XIEHUI ZAZHI [JOURNAL OF JUDGES ASSOCIATION] 150, 153
(2010).
1347
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 382; see also Fu, A Theoretical Study on the Principle of Unitary Information and Its
Related System, supra note 909, at 48.
1348
See Huang, Discuss the Historical Development and the Theoretical Basis of the “Indictment-Only
Doctrine”, supra note 1346, at 153.
1349
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 383.
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low.1350 Indeed, no practical or academic research proves that the professional judges’
determination is influenced by evidence submitted with the indictment statement in
Taiwan. According to people who oppose the indictment-only doctrine, applying this
doctrine to the Taiwanese criminal justice system is unnecessary because it delays the
trial proceedings by preventing professional judges from reading evidence before the trial
begins.1351

As a result, the indictment-only doctrine has not, in the past fifteen years, been
accepted by the Taiwanese criminal justice system due to the belief that the professional
judges’ opinions would not be influenced by evidence during the preliminary trial
proceedings.

However, the situation changed when the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan attempted to
establish the proposed lay observer system. At that time, the necessity of adopting an
indictment-only system was supported by the Judicial Yuan itself because citizens are not
legal professionals and therefore are prone to losing their objectivity when hearing trials.

Accordingly, the Judicial Yuan made the “Modified Indictment-only Doctrine”
under Article Forty-five of the proposed Act.1352 This proposal still offers some statutory
exceptions that allow professional judges to read evidence before the first trial date.
However, the Taiwanese Administrative Yuan did not agree with the Judicial Yuan’s
proposal because this modified doctrine would, under the lay observer system, not only
1350

Id.
Id.
1352
See Cai Yuanshi (蔡元仕), Guanyu Gailiangshi Qisuzhuang Yiben Zhuyi de Jianfang Guandian (關於
改良式起訴狀一本主義的檢方觀點) [The Viewpoints of the Public Prosecutors regarding the Modified
Indictment-Only Doctrine], 72 JIAN XIE HUI XUN [THE JOURNAL OF THE PROSECUTORS ASSOCIATION] 4
(2011).
1351
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substantially change the process regarding the public prosecutor’s indictment, but also
would influence the investigation stage during the preliminary proceedings.

(2). The First Statutory Issue: Article Forty-five of the Proposed Lay Observer
System
This issue has been argued between the Taiwanese Judicial and Administrative
Yuan, with the arguments focusing on the question of whether the proposed lay observer
system should adopt the Modified Indictment-only Doctrine. Both Yuans concerned
whether both the professional judges and laymen should be allowed to read the case files,
along with evidence, before the trial begins.

A. The Standpoints of the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan
The Taiwanese Judicial Yuan’s version proposed that the lay observers would be
prohibited from reading the case files, along with evidence, before the first trial date. As
for the professional judges, unless reading the case files and evidence are needed for the
purposes of processing pre-trial proceedings, directing the trial proceedings, or ruling on
other procedural matters,1353 they would not be allowed to read information other than the
indictment prior to the trial.

There were three reasons why the Judicial Yuan drafted Article Forty-five: (1).
The Judicial Yuan simply stated that it is unnecessary for lay observers to read case files
1353

THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 45. (The Taiwanese Judicial
Yuan’s version.) (Under this article, there are four statutory circumstances that allow the professional
judges reading “necessary scope” of the case files and evidence before the first trial date: 1. For processing
the preliminary trial proceeding in order to complete the file plan required by the Article 39; 2. For
directing the trial proceedings accurately; 3. For ruling or overruling the procedural matters under the lay
observer system; and 4. Other procedural matters under the criminal justice system.)
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under the lay observer system;1354 (2). Considering that the citizens are not legally trained
and lack trial experience, the restrictions were put in place to ensure that lay observers
would not be prejudiced against the defendant;1355 (3). Lay observers only have a limited
time to participate in trials and thus, under the proposed lay observer system, their
reading the case files before the first trial date might impose on them too many
responsibilities.1356 Consequently, the Judicial Yuan stated that the restrictions regarding
lay observers reading case files would in fact reduce the burdens on citizens participating
in the Taiwanese criminal justice system.1357

As for professional judges, the Judicial Yuan considered that their legal
backgrounds would lead to their authority becoming unbalanced with that of the citizens
in the courtroom.1358 In practice, this might mean the lay observers cannot comprehend
the trial proceedings and further compromise their objectivity by relying on the judges’
determinations.1359 Besides, when judges had read evidence before the trial began, both
parties might neglect the lay observer’s understanding of the case because the judges
would be easier to communicate with the case at hand.1360

1354

Id., art. 45, para. 1. (The Taiwanese Judicial Yuan’s Explanation.)
Id.
1356
Id.
1357
Id.; see also Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial
Procedure, supra note 6, at 387.
1358
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 45, para. 1. (The Taiwanese
Judicial Yuan’s Explanation); see also Lin Junyi (林俊益), Lin Xinxu (林信旭), Renmin Guanshenzhi zhi
Jiangou (Wu) (人民觀審制之建構（五）) [The Establishment of the Lay Observer System- Five], 59:1
JUNFA ZHUANKAN [THE MILITARY LAW JOURNAL] 1, 4 (2013).
1359
Id.
1360
Id.
1355
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Therefore, to ensure that the lay observers would significantly participate in the
proposed system,1361 the Judicial Yuan expected that both the professional judges and the
citizens would be as much objective “blank slates” as possible before the trial
proceedings begin.1362 Accordingly, under Article Forty-five of the proposed Act, the
judges should only read the case files based on procedural necessities and the lay
observers should be completely prohibited from reading the case files.

B. The Standpoints of the Taiwanese Administrative Yuan
The Administrative Yuan looked to the examples of lay participation systems in
other countries, such as those of Germany and France, and noted that professional judges
and laymen in these countries are both allowed to read evidence before the trial
begins.1363 In addition, the Administrative Yuan offered two reasons why the Taiwanese
lay observer system should allow both professional judges and laymen to read the case
files, along with evidence, before the first trial date.

(a). If the professional judges alone were to read the case files prior to the trial,
they could have the duty of explaining issues regarding the case to the laymen during the
trial proceedings.1364 (b). Granting lay observers the right to read the case files and

1361

Id.
Id.
1363
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 45 (The Taiwanese
Administrative Yuan’s Explanation); see also Huang Shiyuan (黃士元), Renmin Guanshen Shixing Tiaoli
Caoan Pingxi- yi Juanzheng Jiechu ji Zhengju Caiding wei Zhongxin (shang) (人民觀審試行條例草案評
析-以卷證接觸及證據裁定為中心（上）) [Analyze the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer SystemCentered on the Issues of Reading the Evidence and the Scheme of the Evidential Ruling-One], 2604 FA
WU TONG XUN [THE JUSTICE DISPATCH] 5 (2012). (The author briefly introduced Article 249, Paragraph 2
of the German criminal procedural law that schemed a procedure for the laymen to read the case file and the
evidence before the first trial date.)
1364
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, id. (The Administrative Yuan’s explanation); see
also Su Peiyu (蘇佩鈺), Chutan Renmin Guanshen Zhidu- Cong Taiwan Shihlin Difang Fayuan Guanshen
1362
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evidence to ensure that they directly obtain important information about the pending
case.1365 As a result, the Administrative Yuan stated that the trial proceedings would
proceed more efficiently after both the professional judges and the lay observers read the
case files and evidence.1366

Regarding probable prejudice against the defendant after both the professional
judges and the lay observers read the case files, the Administrative Yuan explained that
this would not happen under the proposed lay observer system. According to Article Two
of the Taiwanese Criminal Procedural Code,1367 the public prosecutor and investigative
institutions had investigated evidence that is both favorable and unfavorable to the
defendant. Therefore, a case file that the public prosecutor submitted to the court would
in fact be more objective and complete than the indictment only.1368 The Administrative
Yuan believed that it would be more likely to undermine the objectivity of either the
professional judges or the lay observers to only read the indictment statement prior to the
first trial date.

In summary, the Administrative Yuan opposed the Modified Indictment-only
Doctrine because it would be incompatible with the proposed lay observer system, as it
deprives the professional judge of the authority to read the case files and evidence but still

Moni Fating Guancha Chufa (初探人民觀審制度- 從臺灣士林地方法院觀審模擬法庭觀察出發) [A
Brief Exploration of the Proposed Lay Observer System: Starting with the Observation of the Mock Trials
Held by the Taiwan Shihlin District Court], 13 JIAN CHA XIN LUN [TAIWAN PROSECUTOR REVIEW] 184,
188 (2013).
1365
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, id. (The Administrative Yuan’s explanation.)
1366
Id.
1367
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 2 (2013): “A public official who conducts
proceedings in a criminal case shall give equal attention to circumstances both favorable and unfavorable to
an accused.”
1368
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 45. (The Administrative
Yuan’s explanation); see also Su, A Briefly Exploration of the Proposed Lay Observer System, supra note
1364, at 187.
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expects the laymen to understand the case after receiving the professional judges’
instructions.1369 Accordingly, the Administrative Yuan suggested that the lay observers,
as well as the professional judges, would read the case files under the proposed lay
observer system.1370

C. Functions of the Indictment-only Doctrine under a Criminal Justice System
Before determining whether the Taiwanese proposed lay observer system should
adopt the Modified Indictment-only Doctrine, one needs to explore the functions of this
doctrine and to compare these functions to the purposes of the proposed lay observer
system.

In general, in addition to preventing the professional judges from being prejudiced
against the defendant before the trial, applying the indictment-only doctrine further
advances the adversarial system in the criminal justice system.1371 This is so first, because
with the professional judges, not being allowed to read evidence submitted by the public
prosecutor before the trial began, the task of investigating evidence would become both
parties’ responsibility to perform in the courtroom.1372 Under these circumstances, the

1369

See Yu Lizhen (余麗貞), Qianlun “Renmin Guanshen Shixing Tiaoli Caoan”- Shi Tisheng Sifa Weixin
de Liangfang Miaoyao Ma (Xia) (淺論「人民觀審試行條例草案」- 是提升司法威信的良方妙藥嗎
（下）) [Briefly Discuss the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer System: Whether it Would be an Efficient
Method to Improve the Reliance of the Taiwanese Judicial System-Three], 77 JIAN XIE HUI XUN [THE
JOURNAL OF THE PROSECUTORS ASSOCIATION] 22, 23 (2012).
1370
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 45. (According to the
Administrative Yuan’s version, only the lay observers were mentioned in this article because the
professional judges could read the case file along with the evidence in accordance with the articles under
the Taiwanese criminal procedural code.)
1371
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 382.
1372
Id., at 384.
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professional judges would no longer take the leading role in investigating evidence in
order to discover the truth of the facts.

Second, since the investigation of evidence would be mainly based on both parties’
statements during the trial proceedings, not only would the public prosecutors become
more active in order to fulfill the burden of proof,1373 but also the defendant and his or her
counsels would be more inclined to prepare oral arguments in order to persuade the
professional judges. 1374 Moreover, issues regarding evidence’s competency and its
relationship to the pending case would be examined more objectively by the court1375 if
professional judges could not read the case files before the trial began.1376 This would
lead to the situation cutting the practical connection to the trial court continuing in the
direction of investigation that the public prosecutor intends.1377

Accordingly, the adoption of the Modified Indictment-only Doctrine would
improve the Taiwanese criminal justice system because the professional judges’ duty of
investigating evidence would only have a supplementary effect to discover the truth when
both parties would not disclose sufficient evidence to the pending case.1378 Therefore, the

1373

See Huang Chaoyi (黃朝義), Qisu Juanzheng Bingsong yu Fating Quanze Buming xia Shishi Jiaohu
Jiewen zhi Xinsi (起訴卷證併送與法庭權責不明下實施交互詰問之省思) [Thoughts Pertaining to the
Practice Cross-Examination while Authorities of the Court Are Not Clear when Receiving the Case File
and Indictment], 66 YUEDAN FAXUE ZAZHI [TAIWAN LAW REVIEW] 48, 53 (2000); see also Fu, A
Theoretical Study on the Principle of Unitary Information and Its Related System, supra note 909, at 41.
1374
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 385.
1375
See Chen, Discussion About the Discretion of Control of Court Proceedings, supra note 60, at 33 and
38 to 39; see also Huang, Thoughts Pertaining to the Practice Cross-Examination while Authorities of the
Court Are Not Clear when Receiving the Case File and Indictment, supra note 1373, at 53.
1376
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 385.
1377
See Lin and Lin, The Establishment of the Lay Observer System- Five, supra note 1358, at 4, 10 and 12.
1378
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 163, para. 2 (2013): “The court may, for
the purpose of discovering the truth, ex officio investigating evidence.”
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Taiwanese criminal justice system could shift to the modified adversarial pattern more
firmly.

D. Conclusion
Looking at the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan’s and the Administrative Yuan’s versions
of Article Forty-five with regard to whether allowing both professional judges and lay
observers to read case files, along with evidence, before the first trial date, the modified
indictment-only proposal made by the Judicial Yuan seems be more suitable for the
proposed lay observer system, as the proposed system would be the first time that the
Taiwanese criminal justice system has cooperated with its citizens in this way during trial
proceedings.

Among the reasons that the Taiwanese Administrative Yuan’s arguments against
the application of the modified doctrine were not persuasive were:

(a). The Administrative Yuan stated that both professional judges and lay
observers would be closer to the truth of the case after reading the case files before trial
but that this is not a significant characteristic that the proposed lay observer system
needs.1379 Also, the lay observers are not expected to read the case files as carefully as
professional judges before the trial1380 because their duty is to express their opinions to
the court, in accordance with their experiences, as part of the trial proceedings.1381

1379

See Su, A Brief Exploration of the Proposed Lay Observer System, supra note 1364, at 187.
See Zhang, A Discussion about Introducing A Lay Participation System under A Criminal Justice
System, supra note 75, at 36.
1381
See Cai, The Viewpoints of the Public Prosecutors regarding the Modified Indictment-Only Doctrine,
supra note 1352, at 8; see also Su, A Brief Exploration of the Proposed Lay Observer System, supra note
1364, at 187.
1380
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(b). Although the Administrative Yuan referred to both the German and French lay
participation systems to point out that allowing laymen to read evidence before the trial
begins is workable, one thing that the Administrative Yuan did not mention was that the
laymen under the German lay participation system were appointed to specific terms.1382
Therefore, these appointed citizens could fully practice the lay participation duties,
including reading the case files before trial, before deciding to accept the position.1383
Besides, the German laymen would be more familiar with the evidentiary issues due to
their practical experiences during their terms of duty.1384 These characteristics of German
lay participation system are different from the Taiwanese proposed lay observer system.

(c). When discussing foreign experiences, both the Japanese 1385 and South
Korean1386 criminal justice systems adopted the indictment-only doctrine for their lay
participation systems. In these countries, the professional judges could still direct the trial
proceedings and give sufficient instructions to the laymen without reading the case files
prior to the trial.1387 Therefore, the adoption of the Modified Indictment-only Doctrine as
part of the proposed lay observer system would not be an obstacle for the judges to

1382

See Huang, Analyze the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer System, supra note 1363; see also Zhang, A
Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure, supra note 6, at
332.
1383
See Zhang, id.
1384
Id.
1385
See Liao, A Launching Ceremony Held by the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan with regard to its Thoughts
after Observing the Japanese and South Korea’s Lay Participation Systems, supra note 1246, at 15; see
also Hong Weide (洪維德), Riben Caipanyuan Zhidu Kaocha Baogao- Qianye Difang Fayuan Pangting ji
Caipanyuan Xuanren Sheshi Canfang deng (日本裁判員制度考察報告-千葉地方法院旁聽暨裁判員選任
設施參訪等) [A Report of the Japanese Saiban-in System- Discover the Selection Process and the
Facilities of the Chiba District Court], 16:10 QUAN GUO LU SHI [TAIWAN BAR REVIEW] 44, 47 (2012).
1386
See You, The Report on South Korea’s Citizen Participation System, supra note 1194, at 22 and 23.
1387
See Jiang Nianzu (蔣念祖), Yi Suren Jiaodu Kan Riben Caipanyuan Zhidu yu Hanguo Peishen Zhi Dui
Taiwan de Qishi (以素人角度看日本裁判員制度與韓國陪審制對臺灣的啟示) [A Lesson to Taiwan
Based on the Citizen’s Viewpoints with regard to the Japanese Saiban-in System and South Korea’s Citizen
Participation System], 218 TAIWAN FAXUE ZAZHI [TAIWAN LAW REVIEW] 7, 14 (2013).
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practice their authority because Article Forty-five still allows them to read evidence for
the purposes of preparing for the pre-trial proceedings and directing the trial proceedings.

(d). The Taiwanese Administrative Yuan’s version of Article Forty-five which
allows the lay observers to read case files, does not solve the concern that the citizens’
objectivity would be tainted by evidence without competency or relationship to the case
before the trial begins.1388 If lay observers are allowed to read evidence prior to the trial,
it might be difficult for them to distinguish between the evidence’s competency and the
probative value when evidence is later excluded by the court during the trial
proceedings.1389 Moreover, since the lay observers are appointed for particular case, it
might be too much to ask citizens to read the case files, which in turn would probably
raise constitutional issues regarding imposing unnecessary obligations on citizens.1390

Accordingly, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan’s version of Article Forty-five seems
more suitable for the proposed lay observer system. This is because the Modified
Indictment-only Doctrine would not only prevent the lay observers from being influenced
by the evidence submitted by the public prosecutor, but would also ensure the
professional judges could still read the case files in order to take charge of the needed
procedural matters.

(3). The Second Statutory Issue: Article Forty-three of the Proposed Lay Observer
System

1388

See Lin and Lin, The Establishment of the Lay Observer System- Five, supra note 1358, at 13.
See Fu, A Theoretical Study on the Principle of Unitary Information and Its Related System, supra note
909, at 41.
1390
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 332 and 416.
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The Taiwanese Judicial Yuan and the Administrative Yuan also had different
positions regarding the extent to which the court would deal with evidence under the
preliminary proceedings. To simplify this issue, the arguments are surrounding the
procedural stage of the “evidentiary ruling.”

A. The Position of the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan
According to the Judicial Yuan, it would not be good for lay observers to read
evidence that might be without competency or that related to the pending case during the
trial proceedings. Thus, it required that during the preliminary trial proceedings, the court
investigate and further exclude, by court ruling, both unqualified and unnecessary
evidence from the regular trial proceedings.1391

This statutory obligation resulted from concerns whether lay observers would
make their determinations accurately.1392 The Judicial Yuan worried that the Taiwanese
citizens would be confused when the court dealt with procedural issues around evidence,
which carried the risk of tainting their objectivity because citizens lack professional
training and adequate experience in the law.1393

1391

THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 43, para. 1. (The definition
of “unnecessary” is referred to via the Code of the Taiwanese Criminal Procedure, Article 163-2); see also
the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 163-2 (2013): “The following circumstances shall
be deemed unnecessary: (1) Inability to investigate; (2) It bears no critical relationship with the fact to be
proven; (3) It is unnecessary to investigate because the facts to be proven is clear; (4) Filing the motion
again for the same evidence.”
1392
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, id., art. 43. (The Taiwanese Judicial Yuan’s
explanation.)
1393
Id.
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The Judicial Yuan also worried that the efficiency of the trial proceedings would
be lessened under the proposed lay observer system.1394 It explained that when both
necessity and competency issues of evidence remain for the trial court to determine, the
bench has to suspend the trial proceedings before reaching decisions on those evidentiary
issues. This situation would delay the trial, and thus the proposed lay observer system
would lose its crucial characteristic of constituting a concentrated and continuing trial.1395

As a result, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan proposed that “evidentiary rulings” be
part of the preliminary proceedings because the court just needs to practice a firm
confidence standard, not a strict proof standard, before deciding the rulings. 1396
According to the Judicial Yuan’s version, before closing the preliminary proceedings, if a
determination of the evidence’s competency is needed, the commissioned judge should
investigate evidence and discuss it with the bench before offering a ruling.1397

Besides, when one party files a motion to investigate evidence, the court has to
determine by its ruling whether that evidence is relevant or not.1398 After the preliminary
proceedings are closed, evidence that has not been judged competent or relevant for the
pending case by the court could not be used by either the public prosecutor or the defense
counsel to try to prove certain facts or to request a further investigation during the trial
proceedings.1399

1394

Id.
Id.
1396
Id.; see also Lin Peiju (林佩儒), Xingshi Susong Zhunbei Chengxu zhi Yanjiu (刑事訴訟準備程序之
研究) [The Research on Preliminary Proceeding of Criminal Procedure], NATIONAL CHUNG CHENG
UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF LAW (2010) at 100.
1397
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 43, para. 1.
1398
Id., para. 2 and 3.
1399
Id., para. 6.
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However, the Judicial Yuan also emphasized that the court’s determination on
either the competency or the relevance of the evidence should not include discussions
regarding the facts of the pending case because these factual issues should remain for the
professional judges and lay observers to determine in the trial court.1400 The Judicial
Yuan further explained that, under the proposed lay observer system, the reason for
selecting and investigating evidence during this procedural stage is to ensure that both the
professional judges and lay observers would participate significantly after the beginning
of the trial.1401

In sum, the Judicial Yuan stated that because the issues of the evidence’s
competency and relevance to the pending case are crucial to the matters, range, sequence,
and methods of the evidence investigation stage after the trial begins, it is necessary to
separate the preliminary and general trial proceedings into distinct stages so that the lay
observers will not be confused by these procedural matters.1402

B. The Position of the Taiwanese Administrative Yuan
The Administrative Yuan responded to the Judicial Yuan that it is difficult to
distinguish procedural and substantial issues in practice. Therefore, under the proposed
lay observer system, when the court was required to deal with evidentiary issues during
the preliminary proceedings, the investigation process very likely would be repeated after
the beginning of the trial, and thus further delaying regular trial proceedings.1403

1400

Id., art. 43. (The Taiwanese Judicial Yuan’s explanation.)
Id.
1402
Id.
1403
Id. (The Administrative Yuan’s explanation.)
1401
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In addition, the Administrative Yuan stated that the evidentiary rules should be
practiced flexibly in accordance with different situations in each case.1404 Therefore, the
Administrative Yuan asserted that under the proposed lay observer system, the
evidentiary rules would be distorted by the Judicial Yuan’s version of Article Forty-three.

For example, according to Article 158-4 of the Taiwanese Code of Criminal
Procedure,1405 the trial court is required to consider both the protection of human rights
and the maintenance of the public interests (the so-called balancing test) in issues of
admissibility when evidence is obtained illegally.1406 In other words, the balancing test
should be practiced during the trial proceedings because the court should take all
circumstances under which officials obtained a particular piece of evidence, along with
other admitted evidence, into account.1407 If, under the proposed lay observer system, the
competency issue were required only during the preliminary processes, the balancing test
would be impractical because all illegally obtained evidence would, without exception be
excluded before the trial.1408

Also, the Administrative Yuan pointed out that although the Judicial Yuan drafted
an exceptional condition under Article Forty-three of the proposed Act for allowing the
1404

See Su, A Brief Exploration of the Proposed Lay Observer System, supra note 1364, at 186; see also
Yu Lizhen (余麗貞), Qianlun “Renmin Guanshen Shixing Tiaoli Caoan”- Shi Tisheng Sifa Weixin de
Liangfang Miaoyao Ma (Chung) (淺論「人民觀審試行條例草案」- 是提升司法威信的良方妙藥嗎
（中）) [Briefly Discuss the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer System: Whether it Would be an Efficient
Method to Improve the Reliance of the Taiwanese Judicial System-Two], 76 JIAN XIE HUI XUN [THE
JOURNAL OF THE PROSECUTORS ASSOCIATION] 13, 14 (2012).
1405
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 158-4 (2013): “The admissibility of the
evidence, obtained in violation of the procedure prescribed by the law by an official in execution of
criminal procedure, shall be determined by balancing the protection of human rights and the preservation of
public interests, unless otherwise provided by law.”
1406
See Su, A Brief Exploration of the Proposed Lay Observer System, supra note 1364, at 186; see also
Yu, Briefly Discuss the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer System- Two, supra note 1404, at 14.
1407
Id.; see also THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 43. (The
Taiwanese Administrative Yuan’s explanation.)
1408
Id.
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trial court to reconsider excluded evidence when the statutory basis of exclusion changed
after the trial began.1409 In practice, however, whether the reconsideration of the bench on
this matter would also interfere with the lay observers’ determination regarding that
questioned evidence would also be at issue.1410

Moreover, the Administrative Yuan noted that the proposed system might be only
implemented in certain regions of Taiwan,1411 possibly resulting in different regions
applying different standards to the evidentiary rules after the proposed act was
enacted.1412 The Taiwanese Administrative Yuan thus worried that the different standards
to the evidentiary rules would further raise constitutional issues infringing the people’s
right to litigate and might violate the equal protection principle.1413

With these considerations, the Administrative Yuan suggested abolishing Article
Forty-three from the proposed Act because, to comply with the current evidentiary rules
of Taiwanese criminal procedural laws, a “streamlined” pre-trial proceeding would be the
best stage for the proposed lay observer system.1414 In addition, the Administrative Yuan
also stated that the general principles of criminal procedural laws should not be modified
after the proposed lay observer system was established under the Taiwanese criminal
justice system.1415
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Id., art. 43, para. 4.
Id., art. 43. (The Taiwanese Administrative Yuan’s explanation.)
1411
Id., art. 78.
1412
See Su, A Brief Exploration of the Proposed Lay Observer System, supra note 1364, at 186; see also
Yu, Briefly Discuss the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer System- Two, supra note 1404, at 15.
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THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 43. (The Taiwanese
Administrative Yuan’s explanation.)
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See Cai, The Viewpoints of the Public Prosecutors regarding the Modified Indictment-Only Doctrine,
supra note 1352, at 7.
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C. The Preliminary Proceedings and the Evidentiary Rulings Stage under the
Taiwanese Criminal Justice System
Arguments between the Judicial and Administrative Yuan about Article Fortythree were focused on whether the Judicial Yuan’s version would eventually change
current principles regarding evidentiary rules. Therefore, before analyzing which version
would be more suitable for the proposed lay observer system, it is necessary to look at the
main purposes of the preliminary proceedings and the evidentiary ruling stage under the
Taiwanese criminal justice system.

According to Article 273 of the Taiwanese criminal procedural laws, there are
eight statutory matters that a court should determine before the first trial date:1416

[T]he court may summon the accused or his agent and notify the public prosecutor,
defense attorney, assistant to be present in preliminary proceeding before the first trial
date to arrange the following matters:
(1) The effect of the prosecution and its scope and any circumstance that might change
the article of law charged with as cited by the public prosecutor;
(2) Asking the accused, agent, or defense attorney whether to plead guilty to the crime
charged by the public prosecutor, and determining whether to apply summary trial
procedure or summary procedure;
(3) Main issues of the case and evidence;
(4) The opinion regarding the admissibility of the evidence;
(5) Informing the parties to motion for investigation of evidence;
(6) The scope, order and methods of investigation of evidence;
(7) Ordering the presentation of exhibits or evidential documents;
(8) Other trial related matters.
In order to decide the parameters of the trial, the Taiwanese professional judges
could arrange the “scope, order and methods of investigation” by selecting evidence
before the trial begins.1417 In addition, Article 163-2 of the Taiwanese criminal procedural
laws also grants the professional judges discretion on whether the evidence has “critical
1416
1417

See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 273 (2013).
See Lin and Lin, The Establishment of the Lay Observer System- Five, supra note 1358, at 9 and 14.
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relationship with the fact to be proven” so that it is necessary for further investigation by
the court.1418

These two types of determinations regarding whether to admit specific evidence to
be further investigated were called “evidentiary rulings.” 1419 In other words, the
evidence’s competency and necessity to the case would be ensured after being admitted
by the court before the trial.1420 Conversely, once specific evidence was determined to be
inadmissible, it would be excluded from the trial proceedings.1421

However, this type of evidentiary ruling is not mandatory to the court under
general trial proceedings in Taiwan. Therefore, it is made at the discretion of professional
judges, who, during the preliminary proceedings, have to make a determination whether
to exclude evidence or to overrule the parties’ motions to investigate it.1422

D. Reasons for Supporting the Judicial Yuan’s Version of Article Forty-Three
To respond to the Administrative Yuan’s concerns about the practice of the
evidentiary rules under the Taiwanese criminal justice system, the worries that the

1418

See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 163-2 para. 1 (2013): “The court may
overrule, by a ruling, the motion for investigation of evidence filed by a party, agent, defense attorney, or
assistant, if it deems to be unnecessary. The following circumstances shall be deemed unnecessary: … (2) it
bears no critical relationship with the fact to be proven.”
1419
See Zhang Yonghong (張永宏), Lun Zhengju Caiding Zhidu- Jian Cong Guomin Canyu Shenpan
Zhidu de Jiaodu Sikao (Shang) (論證據裁定制度- 兼從國民參與審判制度的角度思考（上）)
[Discussion regarding the Scheme of the Evidentiary Rulings: Considered through the Role of the Lay
Participation System-One] 1589 SIFA ZHOUKAN 1, 2 (April 13, 2012); see also Zhang, A Study of the
Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure, supra note 6, at 392.
1420
Id.
1421
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 273, para. 2 (2013): “If the court
determines, in accordance with the provisions of this code, that the evidence referred to in Item IV of the
preceding section shall not be admitted, then, the said evidence shall not be presented at the trial date.”
1422
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 392.
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balancing test would become impractical under the proposed lay observer system are
misplaced. This is because the balancing test was not exclusive to the trial proceedings. In
other words, the professional judge would also weigh the public benefit and human rights
during the preliminary procedures.

Questions also were raised as to whether the standards for evidentiary rules would
be different under the proposed lay observer system. Some argued that only the trial court
could examine the exception rules of the hearsay doctrines, such as Articles 159-21423 and
159-31424 of the Taiwanese criminal procedural laws, because these statutory conditions
could be confirmed only after a trial begins.1425 Besides, since the Taiwanese criminal
justice system adopted the modified adversarial pattern, both parties should, during the
trial proceedings, have an opportunity to state their opinions about the evidentiary
issues.1426

1423

See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 159-2 (2013):
[W]hen the statements made, in the investigation stage, by a person other than the accused to the public
prosecuting affairs official, judicial police officer, or judicial policeman are inconsistent with that made
in trial, the prior statement may be admitted as evidence, provided that special circumstances exist
indicating that the prior statements are more reliable, and that they are necessary in proving the facts of
the criminal offense.
1424
Id., art. 159-3 (2013):
[S]tatements made in the investigation stage by a person other than the accused to the public prosecuting
affairs official, judicial police officer, or judicial policeman may be admitted as evidence, if one of the
following circumstances exists in trial and after proving the existence of special circumstances
indicating its reliability and its necessity in proving the facts of criminal offense:
(1) The person died;
(2) The person has lost his memory or has been unable to make a statement due to physical or emotional
impairment;
(3) The person cannot be summoned or has failed to respond to the summons due to the fact that he is
staying in a foreign country or his whereabouts are unknown;
(4) The person has refused to testify in court without justified reason.
1425
See Su, A Brief Exploration of the Proposed Lay Observer System, supra note 1364, at 186; see also
Yu, Briefly Discuss the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer System-Two, supra note 1404, at 14.
1426
See Lin, The Research on Preliminary Proceeding of Criminal Procedure, supra note 1396, at 100.
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These doubts were misplaced. Articles 159-2 and 159-3 of the criminal procedural
law are statutory exceptions to the exclusionary rules. 1427 Therefore, when the
circumstances mentioned in these two articles are not fulfilled, the court should apply the
general rules and exclude hearsay as admitted evidence.1428 Regarding the opportunity for
both parties to state opinions with regard to the evidence, under Article Thirty-nine, it had
been resolved because the court should grant both parties opportunities to do so.1429

As for the Administrative Yuan’s view that it is difficult to distinguish between
procedural and substantial issues in practice, this problem did not result from the
requirement that the court determine whether to investigate specific evidence before
closing the preliminary proceedings. In fact, what caused this confusing situation was the
fact that the Taiwanese professional judges usually process the preliminary proceedings
as a stage of the general trial.1430 In practice, then, both the procedural and substantive
evidentiary issues are determined together by the court at the same procedural stage
because the professional judges do not separate the stage of preliminary proceedings from
the general trial proceedings.

In short, the Judicial Yuan’s version of Article Forty-three is more suitable for the
proposed lay observer system because a distinct procedural stage ensures the lay
observers’ significant participation even though they lack professional training and trial

1427

See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 399.
1428
Id.; see also the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 159 (2013): “Unless otherwise
provided by law, oral or written statements made out of trial by a person other than the accused, shall not be
admitted as evidence.”
1429
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 39, para. 1, sec. 6.
1430
See Lin and Lin, The Establishment of the Lay Observer System- Five, supra note 1358, at 13.
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experiences.1431 Therefore, the preliminary proceedings should play the role of drawing
the evidentiary parameters of the trial.1432 The clearer the trial proceedings are, the fewer
burdens are placed on the lay observers and the more functions the proposed lay observer
system could have in the interest of improving the Taiwanese criminal justice system.

To establish the trial parameters, a distinct stage focusing on evidentiary rulings
would be the most efficient method under the proposed lay observer system because only
evidence that both contains competency and relates directly to the pending case would be
admitted to the courtroom. 1433 Therefore, even with citizens’ participation in the
Taiwanese criminal justice system, judges’ discretion regarding evidentiary rulings
should be practiced firmly. If issues of concerning the competency and necessity wait
until the trial begins, arguments made by both parties will delay the proceedings,
probably confuse the lay observers about evidence’s probative value,1434 and further
distort the trial core purpose of determining the defendant’s innocence or guilt.1435

Therefore, the Judicial Yuan’s version of Article Forty-three in the proposed Act
of the lay observer system indicated that the court should determine the admissibility of
evidence before closing the preliminary proceedings and could prevent either
incompetent or unnecessary evidence from being admitted to the courtroom. This
evidence “gatekeeper” function was meant to ensure that both the public prosecutor and

1431

Id., at 2.
Id.
1433
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 391.
1434
See Fu, A Theoretical Study on the Principle of Unitary Information and Its Related System, supra note
909, at 41; see also Zhang, Discussion regarding the Scheme of the Evidentiary Rulings, supra note 1419, at
2.
1435
See Lin and Lin, The Establishment of the Lay Observer System- Five, supra note 1358, at 24.
1432
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the defense counsels would prepare for the preliminary proceedings more focused on the
scope, sequence, and methods of evidentiary investigation.1436

In summary, the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan’s version of Article Forty-three of the
proposed Act does not modify the current standard of evidentiary rules;1437 instead, it
improves the practice of evidentiary rulings under the proposed lay observer system. By
selecting the crucial evidence after excluding unnecessary evidence, the court determines
the scope of the evidentiary investigation so that the trial focuses on the most important
issues and the trial become clearer for the lay observers. 1438 As for the potential
constitutional issues of the defendant’s right to litigation and equal protection principle,
these two concerns are relate to the whole structure of the proposed lay observer system
in Taiwan, not just to the practice of the evidentiary rules.

5.4 Recommendations for the Trial Proceedings: An Independent Sentencing
Phase
One question that those wanting to implement a lay participation system should
first consider whether the laymen will completely comprehend the trial proceedings so
that they can accurately arrive at verdicts. This factor is crucial because, the Taiwanese
proposed lay observer system operates only in felony and capital cases.1439 Therefore,
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Hsu Tsunglin (許宗麟), Jiangou Xingshi Shenpan Chengxu Zhuti Quan- yi Zhunbei Chengxu ji qi
Xiuzheng wei Hexin (建構刑事審判程序主體權-以準備程序及其修正為核心) [The Structuration of the
Rights of Procedural Subjects of Criminal Trial - Centering on the Preliminary Proceeding and Relevancy
Modifications], SOOCHOW UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF LAW (2010) at 86; see also id., at 30.
1437
See Lin and Lin, The Establishment of the Lay Observer System- Five, supra note 1358, at 21; see also
Luo Bingcheng (羅秉成), Guanshen shi Duyao Haishi Buyao? Bianhuren Guandian de Pipanxing Lijie (觀
審是毒藥還是補藥？- 辯護人觀點的批判性理解) [Whether the Lay Observer System is a Poison or a
Medicine- the Critical Points of the Defense Counsel], 16:4 QUAN GUO LU SHI [TAIWAN BAR REVIEW] 31,
36 (2012).
1438
See Lin and Lin, id., at 23.
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even though the lay observers’ decisions are only reference points for the professional
judges, if laymen cannot competently reach their verdicts, there is a greater risk of a
wrongful judgment than under the general trial in Taiwanese criminal proceedings. This
is because in 2011, the Taiwanese Supreme Court pointed out some procedural issues
with regard to the continued conviction and sentencing phases. Accordingly, the lay
observer system should be closely scrutinized these procedural issues.

(1). Three Taiwanese Supreme Court Judgments
The Taiwanese Supreme Court first responded to issues regarding the separation
of the conviction and sentencing phases in 2011.1440 Since then, the same case kept
directing the Court’s attention to the issue of whether the Taiwanese criminal trial
proceedings were structured sufficiently before a court pronounced its judgment on a
capital case. In Taiwan, although the conviction phase is distinct from the sentencing
phase, between them comes a procedural stage, where the presiding judge examines the
defendant regarding the facts of the accusation made against him or her.1441 The purpose
of these procedural measures is to prevent the professional judges’ determination of the
facts from being influenced by sentencing information.1442

The Court further emphasized that although it is sufficient for professional judges
to examine the sentencing information according to the standard of “firm confidence”
within their free discretion, the process of investigation evidence and the opportunity for
1440

Taiwan Zui Gao Fa Yuan, 100 Nian Tai Shang Zi No. 2261 (May 5, 2011).
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 288, para. 3 and 4 (2013):
[E]xcept for the cases that apply the summary trial procedure, the presiding judge shall examine the
accused regarding the facts being charged with at the end of the investigation of evidence proceeding.
The presiding judge's investigation of information regarding the sentencing shall be conducted after the
examination in the preceding section.
1442
See the Supreme Court Judgment, supra note 1440.
1441
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both parties to state opinions are still needed to fulfill the requirements of a legitimate
verdict.1443 Without these procedures before the announcement of the court’s decision on
the defendant’s punishment, that guilty judgment would constitute a contravention of the
laws and regulations1444 and thus could be appealed to the Taiwanese Supreme Court.1445

However, the Court also pointed out that the Taiwanese criminal procedural laws
are only granted the two parties, meaning that the defense counsels are not afforded the
opportunity to state their opinions about the probable sentence.1446 Therefore, it would not
constitute an absolutely illegal judgment even though the current procedural process
might not be sufficient for the public prosecutor and defendant to “argue” the issues
around the latter sentencing in a capital case.1447

Six months after this Supreme Court judgment, when the Taiwanese High
Court1448 retained the death penalty as its sentence in the same case.1449 The Supreme
Court again reminded that a legitimate judgment under the Taiwanese criminal justice
system required the court to scrutinize all factors under Article 571450 and 581451 of the
Taiwanese criminal code before announcing the defendant’s punishment.

1443

Id., see also the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 310, § 3 (2013): “The reasons of a
written judgment of "Guilty" shall, depending upon the circumstances, include the following:…(3) The
circumstances specified in Article 57 or 58 of the Criminal Code which justify the exercise of discretion in
imposing a sentence…”
1444
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, id., art. 379, § 14 (2013): “A judgment shall be on its face
under the following circumstances:… 14. Where no reasons are specified in the judgment or where ground
of reasons specified are contradicting.”
1445
Id., art. 377 (2013): “Appeals to the court of third instance may only be filed where the judgment is in
contravention of the laws and regulations.”
1446
Id., art. 289, para. 3 (2013): “After the conclusion of the argument pursuant to the preceding two
sections, the presiding judge shall provide the parties with opportunities to state opinions regarding
sentencing.”
1447
See the Supreme Court Judgment, supra note 1440.
1448
Taiwan Gao Deng Fa Yuan, 100 Nian Shang Zhong Geng (Yi) Zi No. 21 (September 7, 2011).
1449
Taiwan Zui Gao Fa Yuan, 100 Nian Tai Shang Zi No. 7302 (December 29, 2011).
1450
See CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 17, art. 57 (2013) (Taiwan):
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In this judgment, the Court explained that the function of a criminal justice system
is to realize the nation’s power of justice with appropriate punishment.1452 Therefore, only
when the court examines each factor regulated under Articles 57 and 58 of the criminal
code is the punishment appropriate for the defendant’s conviction.1453 In short, in these
two previous judgments, the Supreme Court valorized the sentencing phase by again
noting that a court’s decision on the accused’s punishment should carefully consider the
entire situation in each case, along with every factors required by law.

This position was reinforced by a third Supreme Court decision in 2013. In this,
the Court for the first time, mentioned the two covenants,1454 the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); after these two covenants were adopted as domestic
laws by the Taiwanese judicial system. The Court confirmed that capital trial proceedings,

[S]entencing shall base on the liability of the offender and take into account all the circumstances, and
special attention shall be given to the following items:
1. The motive and purpose of the offense.
2. The stimulation perceived at the moment of committing the offense.
3. The means used for the commission of the offense.
4. The offender’s living condition.
5. The disposition of the offender.
6. The education and intelligence of the offender.
7. Relationship between the offender and the victim.
8. The seriousness of the offender’s obligation violation.
9. The danger or damage caused by the offense.
10. The offender’s attitude after committing the offense.
1451
Id., art. 58 (2013) (Taiwan): “When imposing a fine, the financial ability of the offender and the
proceeds of the crime shall be considered in addition to the provisions of the preceding article. Where the
proceeds exceed the maximum fine, the fine may be increased at discretion within the limit of the proceeds.”
1452
See the Supreme Court Judgment, supra note 1449.
1453
Id.
1454
Taiwan joined the ICCPR and ICESCR when it was still a member of the United Nations. In 2009, the
Administrative Yuan sent these two covenants to the Legislative Yuan for deliberation, and both of them
were adopted as domestic laws by the Taiwanese legal system after the Enforcement Act, the Act to
Implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, were validated in the same year.
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including both the conviction and sentencing phases should strictly comply with the
Taiwanese Constitution’s due process clauses to ensure the defendant a fair trial.1455

The Court also stated that the investigation of evidence and the oral argument are
the two core procedures of the Taiwanese criminal justice system because not only are
they key to discovering the facts of the case, but also because the court’s verdict and
penalty determinations result from these two proceedings.1456

Regarding the sequence of investigating evidence, the Court emphasized again
Article 288 in the Taiwanese criminal procedural code, i.e., the investigation stages for
conviction and sentencing information should be distinguished from the examination of
the defendant1457 to ensure professional judges’ determinations on the conviction and
sentencing issues separately. In addition, the definition of “investigation of information
regarding the sentencing” was clarified in terms of its scope and processes.1458

With regard to the scope, the Court stated that the defendant’s sentencing
information, same as evidence for conviction, should be also in accordance with Article
288-1 of the procedural law.1459 In other words, although the methods for investigating
the sentencing information are not codified by laws because this information may be
reviewed according to a lower standard (the firm confidence in the judges’ free discretion)
than evidence for conviction, the court should investigate all factors that are relevant to
the determination of the defendant’s punishment.
1455

See the Supreme Court Judgment, supra note 1265.
Id.
1457
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 288, para. 3 and 4 (2013).
1458
Id., art. 288, para. 4 (2013).
1459
Id., art. 288-1, para. 2 (2013): “The presiding judge shall inform the accused that he may present
evidence favorable to him.”
1456
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As for the process of the investigation, the Court stated that both parties, including
the defense counsels, should have the opportunity to state opinions and to provide any
evidence relevant to the sentencing.1460 Furthermore, the legal terms of “arguments on the
law”1461 under the Taiwanese criminal procedural code, were defined by the Court as
including issues about not only the elements of a crime but also the legal results of the
conviction.1462 Accordingly, the stage of the arguments on the law would be no longer
limited to the issues around the accused’s conviction. The public prosecutor’s opinion
regarding why the court should pronounce a specific sentence for the defendant and the
statements of the defendant and his or her counsels rebutting the public prosecutor’s
claim about the sentencing would be also processed under this stage.1463

The Taiwanese Supreme Court took these three judgments explaining the
significance of the sentencing phase into account to ensure that the trial court’s discretion
on the defendant’s punishment would be clear and prudent.1464 Therefore, in order to
prevent the court’s arbitrary decisions, the Court declared its position clearly and
positively on the requirements of the procedural stages:

First, the scope of the evidence investigation includes not only the statutory
factors under Articles 57 and 58 of the Taiwanese criminal code, but also relevant
information, whether favorable the defendant or not, under Article 288-1 of the

1460

See the Supreme Court Judgment, supra note 1265.
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 289, para. 1 (2013): “After the
investigation of evidence has been completed, arguments on the law and facts shall be made in the
following sequence…”
1462
See the Supreme Court Judgment, supra note 1265.
1463
Id.
1464
Id.
1461
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Taiwanese criminal procedural code. Second, regarding methods used to consider these
factors, Article 289 of the Taiwanese criminal procedural code was defined so that both
parties, including the defense counsels, should have the opportunity to state opinions and
enunciate a position on the probable sentence. The Court also provided a reminder that
the conviction phase should be distinguished from the sentencing phase so that the
decision-maker’s determination in the conviction phase would not be influenced by the
sentencing information.

In summary, although these requirements mandated by the Taiwanese Supreme
Court still do not constitute an independent stage of “sentencing arguments” under the
general criminal justice system, the Court’s position makes it clear that the sentencing
phase has become more and more crucial under the Taiwanese criminal justice system.

(2). The Proposed Lay Observer System and the Supreme Court’s Judgments
Because the sentencing phase had been emphasized by the Supreme Court in its
previous three judgments, and because the proposed lay observer system would be
implemented in the Taiwanese criminal justice system, that system’s proceedings also
needed to closely abide by the Supreme Court’s judgments. However, according to the
proposed Act, and given the results of the mock trials, the proposed lay observer system
might not completely eliminate the Supreme Court’s concerns that people who make the
final decision about a case, especially laymen, might be confused by evidence for
conviction and the sentencing information because of the continued trial proceedings.
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According to Article Fifty-three of the proposed Act,1465 the procedural stages of
the lay observer system basically refer to the general trial proceedings of the Taiwanese
criminal procedural code. The sequence of the oral arguments, including both factual and
legal issues, is by the public prosecutor, the defendant, and the defense counsel.1466 In
addition, a separated deliberation process in which the sentencing stage only occurs after
the professional judges have announced the defendant’s guilt.1467 Then, issues about the
extent of the probable penalty are “argued” in the same sequence, while the general
procedural laws still stipulate that stating opinion is sufficient. 1468 Furthermore, the
proposed Act also grants the victim and his or her family, after the stage of the oral
argument is completed, the opportunity to state their opinions with regard to
sentencing.1469

The proposed Act mostly followed the Supreme Court’s judgments. However, the
proposed system does not take into account the laymen’s ability to comprehend the trial
proceedings. Therefore, under the proposed lay observer system, there is still a risk that
laymen will be influenced by the sentencing information before delivering a verdict.

In general, to reduce the burden to the lay observers, the proposed lay observer
system would continually process the trial proceedings unless special circumstances
obstruct this procedure.1470 However, the proposed Act also grants the presiding judge
authority that, when needed, and even though the oral argument stage had been closed, a
1465

THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 53.
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 289, para. 1 (2013).
1467
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 56.
1468
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 289, para. 3 (2013).
1469
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 53, para. 2.
1470
Id., art. 49. (According to this article, the special circumstances include national holidays; natural
calamities; the lack of lay observers; the professional judge’s sickness; or the absence of the public
prosecutor, defense counsel, defendant, witness, etc.)
1466
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new oral argument stage can be instituted until all issues regarding the case are
clarified.1471 Under these circumstances, it is possible that the lay observers would be
confused by this back-and-forth process.

This assumption was, in fact, proven by the results of the mock trials held by both
the Shihlin and Chiayi District Courts. Although the majority of lay observers agreed in
poll results that they comprehended the trial proceedings,1472 professional judges, public
prosecutors, defense counsels, and some lay observers questioned these poll results
because the general trial situation was not easy for ordinary citizens to understand.1473

The Taiwanese Supreme Court also decided that before determining the
defendant’s punishment, the court should evaluate all relevant aspects of the criminal
code to prevent the judgment from being arbitrary. However, the professional judges
usually look at evidence for both the conviction and the sentencing at the same procedural
stage. 1474 Accordingly, whether the lay observers, who lack legal training and trial
experience, would understand the differences between the conviction and the sentencing
investigation became a crucial issue.1475

In sum, the current trial proceedings under the proposed lay observer system grant
both parties an opportunity for oral arguments to influence the extent of probable
sentence. However, considering the lay observers’ limited ability to comprehend the
1471

Id., art. 53, para. 3.
See the polls result, figure 27.
1473
See the Shihlin District Court, the Results of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Conference, supra notes
1305 (2nd conference), 1313 (3rd, 6th and 7th conferences), 1308 (4th conference) and 1310 (5th
conference); see also the Chiayi District Court, the Results of the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Conferences, supra
note 1313.
1474
See the Shihlin District Court, the Results of the 5th and 7th Conferences, supra notes 1310 (5th
conference) and 1313 (7th conference).
1475
See the Shihlin District Court, the Results of the 7th Conference, supra notes 1313.
1472
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procedural stages, even this separate deliberation process might not be sufficient to ensure
that all statutory factors would be carefully considered by the laymen during the
sentencing phase. Also, the laymen might be influenced by that sentencing information
when determining whether or not the defendant is guilty.

(3). Recommendation: An Independent Sentencing Phase
After considering the laymen’s ability to comprehend the trial proceedings that
they participate in, an independent sentencing phase seems the best arrangement for the
Taiwanese lay observer system because it operates separately from the conviction phase.
This allows different procedures for distinct stages of the trial, that the risk that
sentencing information might influence the decision-makers’ determination of accused’s
conviction is reduced.

A. The Necessity of the Independent Sentencing Phase: South Korea’s Citizen
Participation System
The verdict delivered by the jurors under the South Korean citizen participation
system is not binding on the court1476 because the system does not believe the jurors
should have the same level of authority as the professional judges to determine this.1477
Therefore, South Korea’s criminal justice system pays more attention to other issues,
such as the jurors’ factual influence on the professional judges.1478

1476

ACT ON CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 646, art. 46, para. 5 (S. Kor.): “No
verdict and opinions under paragraphs (2) through (4) shall be binding on the court.”
1477
See Lee, The Current Situation and Lessons of the Citizen Participation System of South Korea, supra
note 629, at 26; see also Wu, The Citizens’ Participation in the Trial Proceedings, supra note 266, at 143.
1478
See Wu, id., at 136 and 145 to 146; see also SIFA YUAN 101 NIANDU HANGUO GUOMIN CANYU
SHENPAN ZHIDU KAOCHA BAOGAO (司法院 101 年度韓國國民參與審判制度考察報告) [THE
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However, although the jurors lack the same authority as the professional judges to
determine a case, the statistics show that the citizens’ opinions strongly influence the
professional judges’ final decision because the judge must provide an explanation when
the trial court does not accept the jury’s verdict.1479 Accordingly, under South Korea’s
citizen participation system, the jurors’ factual influence still directs attention to certain
issues regarding whether or not the juror could accurately reach a verdict that is accepted
by the judges.

To prevent the possibility that the jury’s determination of the defendant’s guilt
would be confused by the sentencing information, South Korea’s citizen participation
system stipulated that its deliberation process would be separate,1480 i.e., the sentencing
deliberation process would only start when the professional judges had determined the
defendant’s guilt. Yet the trial court, under the same procedural stage, would still
investigate evidence, both for the conviction and the sentencing phases of the trial.1481

To ensure that the jurors could understand the trial proceedings, South Korean
citizen participation system called for a “procedural gate” that granted the professional

TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S OBSERVATION REPORT OF SOUTH KOREA’S CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
SYSTEM], at 15 (2012).
1479
See You, The Report on South Korea’s Citizen Participation System, supra note 1194, at 21; see also
THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S OBSERVATION REPORT OF THE SOUTH KOREA’S CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION SYSTEM (2012), id., at 15 and 76.
1480
ACT ON CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 646, art. 46, para. 2 and 4 (S. Kor.):
“Jurors taking part in a trial shall deliberate on whether guilty or not guilty after hearing the explanation
under paragraph (1)….”; “If a verdict delivered pursuant to paragraph (2) or (3) is guilty, jurors shall
discuss sentencing with judges who take part in the trial and shall express their opinions. The presiding
judge shall explain the extent of punishment and conditions of sentencing before discussing sentencing.”
1481
HYONGSA SOSONG BEOB [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT], Act. No. 341, Sept. 23, 1954, 292, 292-2 and
292-3 (S. Kor.).
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judges the authority to exclude a case from the citizen participation system. 1482
Accordingly, although both felony crimes and other serious cases would be eligible to
apply for a citizen participation process,1483 in practice, cases deemed too complicated or
difficult for prospective jurors to understand would not be tried by South Korea’s citizen
participation system because the professional judge would exclude these cases in
advance.1484

According to statistics gathered during the first three years of the citizen
participation system, the professional judges excluded a high number and percentage of
cases from being tried by jurors; this was largely because almost one out of five citizen
participation cases were rejected by the judges. Although in 2010 this figure was less than
20%, it was because of an increase over the previous figure, but not because the
professional judges reduced their level of authority to exclude the cases.1485

1482

ACT ON CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 646, art. 9, para. 1:
[A] court may decide not to proceed to a participatory trial for a period beginning after indictment is
filed and ending on the day after the closing of preparatory proceedings for a trial in any of the
following cases:
1. If a juror, an alternate juror, or a prospective juror has difficulties in attending a trial or is unlikely to
be able to duly perform his/her duties under this Act because of a violation or likely violation of the life,
body, or property of the juror, alternate juror, prospective juror, or any of his/her family members.
2. If some of the accomplices do not want a participatory trial and it is considered difficult to proceed to
a participatory trial;
3. If it is considered inappropriate to proceed to a participatory trial due to any other cause or event.
1483
Id., art. 5.
1484
See SIFA YUAN 100 NIANDU HANGUO GUOMIN CANYU SHENPAN ZHIDU KAOCHA BAOGAO (司法院
100 年度韓國國民參與審判制度考察報告) [THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S OBSERVATION REPORT
OF SOUTH KOREA’S CITIZEN PARTICIPATION SYSTEM], at 41 (2011).
1485
See Shin, The Citizen Participation System of South Korea, supra note 626, at 16.
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Year

Amounts of all cases

2008

233

2009

336

2010

437

Totality

Cases tried with the citizen’s

Cases excluding citizen’s

participation

participation

64
(27.5%)
95
(28.3%)
162
(37.1%)
321
(31.9%)

1006

61
(26.2%)
75
(22.3%)
75
(17.2%)
211
(21.0%)

Figure 32:
The amount and the percentage that professional judges accepted and excluded cases
from being tried by the jurors in the South Korean citizen participation system.1486
The judges to decision on whether to exclude a citizen participation case were
unpredictable. Under South Korean citizen participation system, there are three statutory
factors under which the court can decide not to proceed to a participatory trial.1487
However, among all of the 211 cases in 2008-2011, none were excluded because of the
statutory factors regarding the jurors’ safety concerns. As for the factor that some of the
accomplices did not want to be tried by the jurors, only 38 cases, 18% of total, fell under
this factor. The remaining 173 cases (82% of the 211 total), were based on the
professional judges’ decision that jurors’ participation was inappropriate or unnecessary
without predictable reasons.1488

Accordingly, more than 75% South Korean citizen participation system dealt with
cases where the defendant had already confessed before the trial began.1489 Critics noted
that cases referred for the citizen participation system were comparatively simpler than

1486

See THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S OBSERVATION REPORT OF SOUTH KOREA’S CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION SYSTEM (2011), supra note 1484, at 62; see also id., at 15 to 16.
1487
ACT ON CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 646, art. 9.
1488
See Lee, South Korea’s Citizen Participation System, supra note 1199, at 19.
1489
See THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S OBSERVATION REPORT OF SOUTH KOREA’S CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION SYSTEM (2012), supra note 1478, at 48.
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most of the general cases because the judges had exercised their discretion in selecting
these cases.1490

Many elements of the proposed Taiwanese lay observer system were modeled
after the South Korean citizen participation system. For example, both the separated
deliberation processes1491 and the professional judge’s discretion to exclude cases from
being tried by the lay observers1492 closely resemble the South Korean system. Moreover,
in Taiwan, the laymen’s opinion was not binding on the court.1493 Accordingly, the results
of the South Korean citizen participation system would provide a significant forecast of
the proposed lay observer system in Taiwan.

It seemed that South Korean citizen participation system has had a positive effect
on that country’s criminal justice system. These are because it not only ensures jurors’
understanding of the trial proceedings when the professional judges serve as their
“gatekeeper,” but also because the deliberation process is divided into conviction and
sentencing phases. However, this procedural scheme does not reduce the possibility that
the jurors will be confused by the sentencing information when determining whether or
not the defendant is guilty. And the reasons are as followed.

First, the professional judge’s authorities to sift the easy cases from all the eligible
ones does not help jurors to comprehend the procedural matters under a criminal justice
system. Relatively straightforward cases, especially those that already included the

1490

See THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S OBSERVATION REPORT OF SOUTH KOREA’S CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION SYSTEM (2011), supra note 1484, at 41.
1491
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 56.
1492
Id., art.6.
1493
Id., art. 59.
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defendant’s confession, only help jurors to quickly determine that the defendant is guilty
because the factual issues were clear. Accordingly, this “gatekeeper” stage in fact raised
the criticism that South Korea’s citizen participation system might well gradually become
a trial pattern that will only deal with the defendant’s punishment, 1494 thus sharply
reducing the function of a lay participation system to sentencing issues.

Besides, regarding the separation of the deliberation process from the conviction
to sentencing stages, there is no reduction in the possibility that citizens might be
influenced by the sentencing information when determining whether or not the defendant
is guilty. The key moment at which a layman’s discretion on conviction might be
influenced is when evidence for both the conviction and sentencing are investigated and
argued under the same procedural stage. Therefore, the division of the deliberation
process into two stages might be too late to prevent the laymen’s discretion from being
“tainted.”

One element that the Taiwanese criminal justice system would introduce into the
lay observer system is that judgments of controversial cases could be closer to the societal
value. For this reason, the proposed lay observer system needs effective solution, such as
implementing the independent sentencing phase, to reduce the risk that the prospective
lay observers would be confused by the complicated trial proceedings.

B. The Possibility of Implementing the Independent Sentencing Phase

1494

See THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S OBSERVATION REPORT OF SOUTH KOREA’S CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION SYSTEM (2012), supra note 1478, at 48.
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(a). The Long-standing Practical Experiences: the U.S. Criminal Justice System
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees all defendants
the right to be tried by an impartial jury. 1495 In the historical development of this
amendment, the jury only took charge of the fact-finding process and the determination of
the verdict. 1496 With regard to the punishment, this discretion remained with the
professional judges until the Furman case of 1972.1497 Although most of the Supreme
Court’s ruling pertained to the independent penalty phase for capital crimes, it was still
important to explore its backdrop because these procedural requirements would improve
the entire Taiwanese criminal justice system.

I. Furman v. Georgia: 408 U.S. 238. (1972)
Before this case, most capital trials in the U.S. were unitary proceedings. However,
the Supreme Court found that the challenged statutes in this case might cause
unconstitutional arbitrariness concerning the defendant’s sentence because jurors might
not have access to the most relevant evidence regarding sentencing under the unitary
proceedings. 1498 Accordingly, the Furman decision terminated the pattern of unitary
proceedings in trials of capital cases, so that the decision on capital sentencing would be
“unfettered” in the later cases.1499

1495

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Sarah Breslow, Note: Pleading Guilty to Death: Protecting the Capital Defendant’s Sixth Amendment
Right to a Jury Sentencing after Entering a Guilty Phase, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1245, 1248 (2013). (The
author also pointed out that even though most capital sentencing schemes left the discretion to the jury, the
Supreme Court did not agree with the statement that a defendant had a constitutional right to jury
sentencing.)
1497
Id., see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238. (1972).
1498
Elizabeth S. Vartkessian, Emerging Issues in Legal Procedure: Article: What One Hand Giveth, the
Other Taketh Away: How Future Dangerousness Corrupts Guilty Verdicts and Procedures Premature
Punishment Decision in Capital Cases, 32 PACE L. REV. 447 (2012).
1499
Id., at 448.
1496

255

II. Gregg v. Georgia: 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
After Furman, capital trial proceedings in the U.S. experienced a transition
period.1500 Some states retained a unitary pattern but tried to eliminate the possibility of
allowing arbitrary capital trial proceedings, while others adopted a two-phase capital
trial.1501 Therefore, in Gregg, the Supreme Court firmly reiterated that the jury determines
the sentence should impose the death penalty under a procedure separated from the
verdict stage.1502 Thus, it can be said that Gregg “cemented the role of bifurcation in
modern capital sentencing.”1503

III. Woodson v. North Carolina: 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
In the same year as Gregg, the Court decided in Witherspoon v. Illinois1504 that in
deciding the defendant’s punishment, one of the jury’s most important duties is to
“maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system.”
Therefore, the Woodson Court further explained that since the imposition of the death
penalty would follow the “evolving standards of decency,” the capital defendant should

1500

Id. (The author pointed out that 35 states enacted new death penalty statutes in order to respond to
Furman.); see also John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive Criminal
Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 143,145 (1986).
1501
Id.
1502
See Elizabeth S. Vartkessian, What One Hand Giveth, the Other Taketh Away, supra note 1498, at 448
to 449.
1503
Id., at 448. (In Gregg, the Court quoted the American Law Institute’s comments under the Modern
Penal Code that “The obvious solution (to the issues that whether the jury could disregard prejudicial
evidence under a unitary proceeding) is to bifurcate the proceeding, avoiding strictly by the rules of
evidence until and unless there is a conviction….”)
1504
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
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be granted a discrete sentencing phase so that each aggravating and mitigating factors
would be prudently evaluated.1505

In addition to these significant cases, which affirmed the importance of an
individual sentencing phase for the jury to determine the accused’s punishment, the
Supreme Court also mandated in Proffitt v. Florida an individual evidence hearing, after
the defendant was found guilty of a capital trial, even when the jury’s verdict of sentence
was only advisory to the trial judge.1506 To the Court, such a hearing would further refine
the sentencing process by allowing both the prosecutor and the defense counsels to
present arguments for or against the probable punishment.1507

In a 2005 case, the Court pointed out that “the use of mitigation evidence is a
product of the requirement of individualized sentencing.”1508 This ruling reinforced the
Court’s view that the main purpose of an individual sentencing procedural stage
(especially under a capital trial) was to ensure that the sentencing decision-makers would
have the opportunity to determine all relevant factors, especially mitigating ones that
pertain to the death penalty.1509

These Supreme Court’s judgments concluded that under the U.S. criminal justice
system, the sentencing phase should be distinct from the conviction phase. Conviction
requires proving guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt” while the determination of sentencing
1505

Stephen P. Garvey, Article: “As the Gentle rain From Heaven”: Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 989, 999 (1996); see also Jalem Peguero, Note: On Mitigation: The Role of “Execution
Impact” Evidence, 16 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 65, 67 (2014).
1506
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 249 (1976).
1507
See Jalem Peguero, The Role of “Execution Impact” Evidence, supra note 1505, at 67.
1508
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163,174 (2005).
1509
Id., at 171; see also See Jalem Peguero, The Role of “Execution Impact” Evidence, supra note 1505, at
67.
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requires moral value.1510 Accordingly, evidence or information that is needed under these
two stages should receive investigation in separate process.1511

(b). Explore the Practical Exercises of the U.S. Criminal Justice System
The sentencing phase should be separated from the conviction phase mainly
because the decision-makers’ discretion could be influenced by evidence if these
procedural stages were joined. Two particular concerns are: (1). Whether the conviction
evidence will dilute the mitigating factors, resulting in an excessive punishment on the
guilty party and (2). Whether the sentencing information will taint the decision-makers’
objectivity before determining the accusation against the defendant.

With regard to the relationship between the exposure of evidence and the jury’s
decision-making process, recent research has shown that jurors’ tendency to “premature
punishment decisions”1512 because they usually have an “immediate emotional response
to much of the guilt phase evidence” before the sentencing phase begins.1513 As for the
probable reasons that impel the jury to make an early determination of the defendant’s
punishment, research has further concluded that this often resulted because the jury read

1510

See Sarah Breslow, Note: Pleading Guilty to Death, supra note 1496, at 1251.
See Jin Menghua (金孟華) and Chen Youning (陳又寧), Meiguo Peishen zhi Guandian xia de
Guanshen zhi- yi Guanshen Yuan de Juece Guochen wei Zhongxin (美國陪審制觀點下的觀審制-以觀審
員的決策過程為中心) [The Viewpoint of the Lay Observer System under the U.S. Jury System- Focus on
the Lay Observer’s Deliberation Process], 16:4 QUAN GUO LU SHI [TAIWAN BAR REVIEW] 83, 93 (2012).
1512
See Elizabeth S. Vartkessian, What One Hand Giveth, the Other Taketh Away, supra note 1498, at 478.
(According to this research, 39% of the jurors had determined the defendant’s punishment before the
sentencing began.)
1513
Id., at 468.
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sentencing information too early during the conviction phase and, thus they were
overloaded with too many factors during the trial proceedings.1514

This research also pointed out that prejudicial assessment of the defendant’s
sentence would further reflect the jury’s verdict that the defendant was guilty.1515 In other
words, the jury might return a guilty verdict simply because of the impact of their
“premature punishment decisions,” rather than because they examined evidence
according to the standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

As a result, these studies suggested that jurors’ ability to distinguish the nature of
two-stage trial proceedings should be carefully considered; 1516 otherwise, the most
significant function of the bifurcate scheme, which is to individualize the sentencing
process, would be eroded because the conviction and sentencing phases are practically
joined. 1517 Further, under these joined proceedings, sentencing might become more
arbitrary under the U.S. criminal justice system because aggravating and mitigating
factors cannot be evaluated equally.1518

(c). Conclusion
In Taiwan, lay observers would encounter the most severe facts during the trial
proceedings because only felony and death-eligible crimes would fall under the proposed
1514

Id., at 480; see also H. Mitchell Caldwell and Thomas W. Brewer, Article: Death Without Due
Consideration?: Overcoming Barriers to Mitigation Evidence by “Warning” Capital Jurors to the Accused,
51 HOW. L.J. 193, 212 to 213 (2008). (Even though both authors proved that the jury selection process
played a crucial role in creating bias regarding the defendant, discussions were also included with regard to
how the conviction and sentencing phases also influence the jury’s verdict.)
1515
See Elizabeth S. Vartkessian, id.
1516
Id., at 460.
1517
Id., at 486.
1518
Id.
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lay observer system. By referring to the American experience, research had affirmed that
the laymen’s decisions could be influenced by conviction evidence and sentencing
information due to “their lack of expertise and limited experience in understanding the
legal requirements for determining the defendant’s guilt and punishment.”1519 Therefore,
the defendant would be put in a disadvantageous position within the trial proceedings,
when laymen are exposed to the sentencing factors prior to the penalty phase.

According to the current U.S. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial
proceedings are distinguished by positioning the sentencing phase as a post-conviction
procedure.1520 In Taiwan, to ensure that the lay observers determine evidence by rules
during the conviction phase, rather than the impact of the sentencing information, an
independent and individualized sentencing stage would become necessary. After adopting
this two-stage scheme, the lay observers would also prudently consider both aggravating
and mitigating factors before reaching a decision on sentencing.

C. The Foreseeable Implementation of the Independent Sentencing Phase in Asia:
The Japanese Saiban-in System
To refer to another innovative lay participation system in Asia, according to the
Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure,1521 Japanese criminal trial proceedings are similar
to those in Taiwan in that the conviction phase and the sentencing phase are processed
continuously before the trial court determines and announces its final judgment.1522

1519

Id., at 452.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.
1521
KEISOHO [C. CRIM. PRO.] [Code of Criminal Procedure] (1948) (Japan).
1522
See Sugita Munehisa (杉田宗久), translated by Zhang Yonghong (張永宏), Riben Caipanyuan Zhidu
zhi Chengxu yu Yunyong (日本裁判員制度之程序與運用) [The Procedural Schemes and the Practice of
the Japanese Saiban-in System] 1650 SIFA ZHOUKAN 1, 3 (June 20, 2013).
1520
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Accordingly, after the Saiban-in system was implemented, Japan’s criminal justice
system was also concerned with the issue of whether or not the saiban-ins could
understand its criminal trial proceedings. One study revealed:
Year

Totally Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Totally Disagree

H 25 (2013)

7.6 %

24.8 %

49.1 %

13.5 %

5.1 %

H 24 (2012)

8.0 %

27.8 %

47.1 %

13.1 %

4.0 %

H 23 (2011)

9.3 %

27.4 %

39.9 %

18.3 %

5.1 %

H 22 (2010)

14.5 %

30.3 %

39.9 %

11.1 %

4.3 %

H 21 (2009)

12.4 %

33.9 %

41.0 %

9.6 %

3.0 %

Figure 33:
Do you agree that the trial proceedings are easy to comprehend?1523
According to the above data, the percentage of the saiban-ins’ comprehension of
criminal trial proceedings dropped from 46.3% to 32.4% since the first year when the
Saiban-in system was implemented.1524 Although the survey does not further disclose
what might cause the Japanese citizens to report its criminal trial proceedings are easy or
difficult to comprehend, it further asked the saiban-ins how they felt about the length of
the trials in which they were participating:

Totally Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Totally Disagree

H 25 (2013)

8.1 %

23.6 %

45.3 %

16.2 %

6.9 %

H 24 (2012)

9.0 %

29.8 %

41.9 %

14.6 %

4.7 %

H 23 (2011)

10.9 %

23.7 %

41.2 %

17.0 %

7.1 %

H 22 (2010)

15.6 %

32.1 %

37.0 %

10.6 %

4.7 %

H 21 (2009)

15.8 %

31.2 %

40.4 %

9.4 %

3.2 %

Figure 34:
Do you agree that the trial proceedings are time-efficient?1525
1523

See the Investigation Report of the Practice of the Saibain-In system, supra note 1167, at 42.
Id. (According to the report, the percentage of people who agreed with the statement that the trial
proceedings of the Japanese Saiban-in system are easy to comprehend was 46.3% in H21; 44.8% in H22;
36.7% in H23; 35.8% in H24; and 32.4% in H25.)
1525
Id., at 43.
1524
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The above chart shows that the Japanese saiban-ins gradually lost their positive
thoughts about the length of the trial proceedings under the Saiban-in system because the
percentage who agreed that the trial was time-efficient declined.1526
The trial proceeding is speedy
Agree

Disagree

The trial is easy to understand
Agree

Disagree

H 25 (2013)

31.7 %

23.1%

32.4 %

18.6%

H 24 (2012)

38.8 %

19.3%

35.8 %

17.1%

H 23 (2011)

34.6 %

24.1%

36.7 %

23.4%

H 22 (2010)

47.7 %

15.3%

44.8 %

15.4%

H 21 (2009)

47.0 %

12.6%

46.3 %

12.6%

Figure 35:
A Comparative Look at the Two Previous Topics

According to the comparative results between the saiban-ins’ comprehension of
the trial proceedings and their feelings about the trial length, one could conclude that the
saiban-ins’ comprehension will decline when they feel that the trial proceedings are
tedious.

Recently, more and more Japanese trial courts have adopted the process that
allows for totally distinct conviction and sentencing phases. 1527 The trial under the
Saiban-in system begins with a stage of investigating evidence and the presentation of
oral arguments for conviction. When the defendant is found guilty, the investigation of
evidence and the oral arguments for sentencing occur. The Saiban-in system in time

1526

Id. (According to the report, the percentage of people who agreed with the statement that the trial
proceedings of the Japanese Saiban-in system are speedy was 47% in H21; 47.7% in H22; 34.6% in H23;
38.8% in H24; and 31.6% in H25.)
1527
See Sugita Munehisa, The Procedural Schemes and the Practice of the Japanese Saiban-in System,
supra note 1522, at 15. (The author pointed out that even though there were not many cases practiced by
this separate scheme, this trend had gradually spread to the entire Japanese criminal justice system.)
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adopted this procedural scheme out of concern that such sentencing information,
including the victim’s and his or her family’s opinions, as well as the defendant’s
previous criminal record, would influence the laymen’s decision about conviction.1528

Therefore, in order to ensure that evidence remained “uncontaminated” under the
conviction phase, the Saiban-in system divided its trial proceedings into separate
conviction and sentencing stages, when the judge worries the case at hand might be too
difficult for lay participants to understand. These separated trial proceedings would be
more effective to prevent the laymen from considering factors that are not related to the
accusation against the defendant. Therefore, only when the court concludes the
defendant’s guilty does the saiban-in read the sentencing information. As a result, the
two-stage procedural scheme is also workable under a lay participation system.

(4). Conclusion
In Taiwan, before the three Supreme Court judgments were delivered in 2011 and
2013, the judicial system’s attitude toward individualized sentencing was extremely
conservative. In 2010, the Taiwanese Constitution Court reaffirmed its position with
regard to the procedural issues that was not to modify any procedural stage under the
Taiwanese criminal justice system.1529 In addition, the Court further declined to consider
a petition1530 brought by a non-governmental organization (The Taiwan Alliance to End

1528

Id.
Judicial Yuan No. 1295 Dismissal Case Council (2006). (The Justice stated in this dismissal that the
definition of “argument of law” had already included both the guilt and sentencing issues. Additionally, the
Justice also addressed that the defendant had been granted an opportunity to give his or her final statement
before the court announced its judgment. Therefore, no constitutional issue was established.)
1530
See the dispatch released by the Taiwan Alliance to End the Death Penalty on Mar. 29, 2010; available
at http://www.taedp.org.tw/story/1712 (last visited on July. 18, 2014).
1529
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the Death Penalty) that argued that the Taiwanese criminal procedure could not ensure the
defendant an effective defense scheme.1531

The underlying reason that the Justices did not tend to revise the criminal
procedure was that the Constitutional Court did not wish to become involved in the death
penalty issue at that moment. However, the truth was that, although the Court did not tend
to separate the trial proceedings, in practice, some professional judges had already
scheduled the court separately for processing the conviction and sentencing stages if such
separation is needed.1532

By referring to the foreign lay participation systems, the South Korean experience
showed that the proposed system in Taiwan might not suffice to prevent laymen from
being influenced by the conviction evidence and sentencing information. Also, the
American experience and research confirmed the essential function of an individualized
sentencing stage, while the Japanese Saiban-in system verified the possibility for a nonjury system to establish the two-stage procedure to the criminal justice system.
Accordingly, the independent penalty phase under the Taiwanese proposed lay observer
system is necessary and conceivable.

The Taiwanese criminal justice system also undertakes the stage of “questioning
the defendant about the facts of the accusation” in order to prevent the professional
judges’ verdicts from being influenced by the sentencing information. After considering
the lay observers’ ability to comprehend the trial proceedings, it is clear that the two-stage
scheme does not conflict with the general principle of the Taiwanese criminal justice
1531
1532

Judicial Yuan No. 1358 Dismissal Case Council (2010).
See the Shihlin District Court, the Results of the 7th Conference, supra note 1313.
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system. In addition, the bifurcated procedures would also improve the Taiwanese criminal
justice system in many ways.

First, the defendant’s right to defense could be further realized under the
sentencing phase because the penalty argument would be processed more
substantially.1533 Besides, this two-stage scheme could avoid procedural contradictions
and raise the efficiency of the trial proceedings. For example, if the defendant acquitted
when the conviction phase ended, then it would not be necessary to commence an
investigation and undertake the oral arguments of the penalty phase. Moreover,
individualizing the sentencing phase will not increase lay observers’ burden to participate
in trials because its implementation to the lay observer system is only an adjustment of
the current proposed sequence of the procedures.

In short, for the purpose of ensuring the lay observers’ accurate determination on
both the accused’s guilt and the appropriate punishment, the Taiwanese proposed lay
observer system should make distinct its sentencing to secure for the defendant the fairest
possible trial.

5.5 Recommendation for the Deliberation Process: a Distinctive Right to
Deliberate
According to current proposed Act of the lay observer system in Taiwan, the
court’s finial decision regarding the defendant’s conviction and sentencing will not be
bound by the lay observers’ deliberation results. 1534 In other words, the Taiwanese

1533
1534

See Luo, Whether the Lay Observer System is a Poison or a Medicine, supra note 1437, at 38.
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 59, para. 1.
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proposed lay observer system would be implemented as a consultative practice. Therefore,
how the professional judges determine the facts, apply laws to facts, and how they
exercise their discretion with regard to sentencing will be still based on their decision
even after the citizens participate in the trial.

This scheme raised a controversial debate in Taiwan: whether laymen would be
granted the same authority as professional judges in determining cases. This issue would
directly influence the outcome of the implementation of the proposed lay observer system.
The contemporary five pending issues under the Taiwanese judicial system revealed that
the society’s distant feeling to the judicial system resulted from the elitist educational
system, the extinct situation of judicial bureaucracy, and the unavoidably involved and
abstruse judgments. These issues are expected to be resolved by the cooperation and
communication between the society and the court. As a result, the deliberation process
became the last but not the least crucial scheme of the trial proceedings under the
Taiwanese proposed lay observer system.

Before further exploring issues regarding the deliberation process, since the lay
participation systems in both Japan and South Korea require the laymen as well as the
professional judges to secure information; 1535 there is less resources to analyze the
practical outcomes of the trial proceedings under the Saiban-in system and the citizen
participation system.1536 Accordingly, the discussion regarding the deliberation scheme
might be mostly based on poll results or legal theories.

1535

ACT ON CRIMINAL TRIALS WITH PARTICIPATION OF SAIBAN-IN, supra note 591, art. 70 (Japan); see
also ACT ON CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 646, art. 12 para. 3 (S. Kor.)
1536
See Sugita Munehisa, The Procedural Schemes and the Practice of the Japanese Saiban-in System,
supra note 1522, at 25.
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(1). The Scope of the Lay Observers’ Deliberation
Before considering the most suitable scheme for both lay observers and
professional judges to deliberate their decisions under the lay observer system, a
prerequisite issue pertaining to the scope of deliberation should be concluded first
because to what degree a criminal justice system allows its citizens to become involved is
directly related to the deliberation scheme.

Since the lay observers’ ability to comprehend the trial proceedings is the prior
consideration in all aspects before framing the structure of the Taiwanese lay observer
system, the first issue would assess whether the lay observer system could adopt the
Anglo-American jury system that would allow citizens only to make decisions regarding
factual issues in trials.

In general, issues under a criminal justice system would be divided into two
categories: the factual issues and the legal issues. The factual issues usually consist of the
discovery of the facts, and the legal issues typically consist of the concepts of law
declaration and the legal application, the rulings of procedural matters, and the discretion
of the sentencing.1537 It is a “theoretically logical thought” that a lay participation system
should be structured to let the citizens discover the facts and let the professional judges
practice their discretion on the legal matters because legal issues need legal professions in
order to be decided accurately.

1537

See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 333.
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However, this is difficult to realize, especially under a codified criminal justice
system. Take the Taiwanese criminal justice system as an example; the court needs not
only to determine a case in accordance with codified criminal codes, but it also must
follow the method of syllogism before making judgment. That is, professional judges
should explain criminal codes in order to categorize the elements of a crime, discover the
facts by examining relevant evidence, and further apply laws to facts before announcing
the final decision as it pertains to the accusation and sentencing. Accordingly, when
exercising the syllogism method, the discovery of fact (the factual issues) cannot be
isolated from the process of legal application (the legal issues) because different cases
have different circumstances that the court should evaluate via evidence.

Therefore, the notion of “[letting] the citizens discover the facts and [letting] the
professional judges practice their discretion on the legal matters” becomes a theoretically
possible but practically difficult scheme for the lay observer system.1538 In addition, even
though the discretion of the sentencing belongs to the legal issues, in practice, the results
of a guilty party’s punishment usually attracts an intense reaction to a criminal justice
system.1539 Accordingly, the laymen’s opinions about penalty are deemed to be one of the
important references that a lay participation system should take into account in
Taiwan.1540

In sum, the most suitable and practical scope of the lay observers’ determination
under the proposed Taiwanese lay observer system would be allowing those citizens to
practice their discretion on both the factual and legal issues and only leave the procedural

1538

Id., at 334.
Id.
1540
Id.
1539
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matters to the court to decide.1541 With regard to other details under the deliberation
process, it could be further discussed separately in accordance with the different purposes
of the conviction and sentencing phases.1542

(2). The Conviction Phase
The current Taiwanese proposed lay observer system introduced to the South
Korean citizen participation system 1543 that the laymen’s verdict would only be a
consultative opinion to the court.1544 The deliberation process would be further divided
into two stages: the conviction and sentencing stages. During each stage, professional
judges and lay observers will discuss issues together but determine decisions
separately.1545

A. Issues under the Taiwanese Proposed Lay Observer System
The strongest argument to support the laymen’s authority to decide the case by
cooperating with professional judges is, without this authority, the implementation of the
system would become meaningless when a final decision is still decided by the court’s

1541

Id.
See Sarah Breslow, Note: Pleading Guilty to Death, supra note 1496, at 1251.
1543
ACT ON CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 646, art. 46, para. 5 (S. Kor.)
1544
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 59, para. 1; see also Jiang
Nianzu (蔣念祖), Meiyou Qisu Zhuang Yiben, Yiqie Long shi Jia- Cong Suren Jiaodu Kan Riben
Caipanyuan Zhidu yu Hanguo Peishen Zhidu Dui Taiwan de Qishi (沒有起訴狀一本，一切攏是假-從素
人角度看日本裁判員制度與韓國陪審制度對台灣的啟示) [Without Adopting the Indictment-Only
Doctrine, The Rest of the Reforms Will Fail- a Lesson to Taiwan from both the Japanese Saiban-in System
and South Korea’s Citizen Participation System] 91 SIFA GAIGE ZAZHI [JUDICIAL REFORM MAGAZINE] 51,
55 (2012).
1545
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, id., art. 56; see also ACT ON CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 646, art. 46. (S. Kor.)
1542
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sole discretion. The same discussion was also encountered by the South Korean citizen
participation system because of its consultative pattern.

To the people who suggested reconsidering the consultative pattern, without the
same authority as professional judges, the position of the laymen in the courtroom would
be inevitably neglected by both public prosecutor and defense counsels because
professional judges are the only persons who can decide the case in the long run.1546
Under these circumstances, the cooperative design of the lay participation would be
diminished1547 because the citizens’ enthusiasm about participating in trials would be
reduced.1548 As a result, the proposed lay observer system might turn out to be a waste of
judicial resources, and it would likely bring about the fifth failure under the Taiwanese
judicial system.1549

The argument that the consultative pattern would be meaningless most likely
results from an assumption that laymen’s opinions are highly possible different from
those of the professional judges. However, this assumption is baseless and could be
further overturned by the South Korean practical experience. Five years after the

1546

See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 344 to 355; see also THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S OBSERVATION REPORT OF THE
SOUTH KOREA’S CITIZEN PARTICIPATION SYSTEM (2012), supra note 1478, at 91 and 92.
1547
See Lin and Lin, Explore the Issues of the Lay Participation, supra note 788, at 28 to 29; see also Shen
Yumei (沈育美), She Biaojue Quan, Duzhong Biaoyi? Zai Lishi Guanjian Shike Canyu “Sifa Yuan Renmin
Guanshen Zhidu Yanyi Weiyuan Hui” (捨表決權 獨鐘表意？- 在歷史關鍵時刻參與“司法院人民觀審
制度研議委員會”) [Disregard the Right to Deliberate but Choose the Consulting Pattern- Participate in
the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan’s Committee of the Lay Observer System], 86 SIFA GAIGE ZAZHI [JUDICIAL
REFORM MAGAZINE] 33, 34 (2011).
1548
See You, An Analysis of the Unique Design under the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer System, supra
note 268, at 66; see also Wang Zhaopeng (王兆鵬), Zhengzhi Buceng Ruci Lengmo, Sifa Buceng Ruci
Zhuanzhi (政治不曾如此冷漠。司法不曾如此專制) [Politics is Never so Aloof and the Judiciary is Never
so Autocratic], 86 SIFA GAIGE ZAZHI [JUDICIAL REFORM MAGAZINE] 31, 32 (2011).
1549
Lin Yushun (林裕順), Renmin Canshen, Shenyi shi Minzhu (人民參審，審議式民主) [The Lay
Participation and the Judicial Democracy], 86 SIFA GAIGE ZAZHI [JUDICIAL REFORM MAGAZINE] 40, 42
(2011).
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implementation of the citizen participation system, over 90% of the judgments in South
Korea were consistent with the jury’s verdict.1550 Accordingly, even though the laymen
did not have the same authority as the professional judges in determining cases, the
juror’s verdict cannot be ignored or neglected because of their “factual influence.”1551

In sum, by exploring the South Korean practical experience regarding the
system’s consultative pattern, it is clear that there is no definite result suggesting that only
when the lay participants are able to determine a case with the professional judges would
the implementation of the system under a criminal justice system be meaningful or
substantial. In other words, even though the laymen do not have the authority to decide
whether the accused is guilty or not, their opinions are still influential, which is the
definition of “meaningful” and “substantial,” according to those who are opposed to the
consultative pattern, regarding the court’s discretion.1552

In addition, it might be a paradox that by granting laymen the authority to
determine a case, the most crucial matter during the trial proceedings, which is the
discovery of the truth, would be consequently improved during the conviction phase.
According to the Japanese Saiban-in system, although saiban-ins have the right to
deliberate with the professional judges,1553 the official statistical results revealed that, at

1550

See Zhang, An Introduction of the Citizen Participation System of South Korea, supra note 625, at 16;
see also Lee, The Current Situation and Lessons of the Citizen Participation System of South Korea, supra
note 629, at 23. (The author pointed out that in the first three years, there were 321 cases tried via the
citizen participation system; among these cases, 292 – or 91% of the court’s final decisions were consistent
with the jury’s verdict.)
1551
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 344; see also THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S OBSERVATION REPORT OF SOUTH
KOREA’S CITIZEN PARTICIPATION SYSTEM (2012), supra note 1478, at 15.
1552
Id.
1553
ACT ON CRIMINAL TRIALS WITH PARTICIPATION OF SAIBAN-IN n, supra note 591, art. 67 (Japan).
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least to Japanese society, there was no significant improvement under the Saiban-in’s trial
proceedings to discover the truth.1554

Moreover, there is one situation worthy of further analysis. That is, the percentage
of Japanese citizens’ willingness to participate in criminal trial proceedings has been
extremely low during the past five years:
Absolutely Fairly

2013
2012
2011
2010
2009

Not exactly

Even though it’s an obligation but N/A
still do not want to participate in
4.9%
9.1% 40.6%
44.6%
0.8%
4.7%
10.2% 41.9%
41.9%
1.1%
3.8%
10.7% 42.3%
41.1%
2.3%
4.6%
10.4% 42.6%
41.4%
1.0%
7.2%
11.3% 43.9%
36.3%
1.3%
Figure 36:
Are you willing to participate the criminal trial proceedings as a saiban-in?1555
Per these results, over 80% of Japanese do not want to be a saiban-in under its

criminal justice system even though they have the same authority as the professional
judges. Therefore, the argument that the citizens would lose their enthusiasm for
participating in trial proceedings if they do not have the same authority as the
professional judges is, in fact, not persuasive.

Upon further exploring the factors that caused Japanese society’s refusal to
participate in trials, it was determined that the main reasons were almost always focused
on the citizens’ worries about their ability to exercise their determination under the
criminal justice system.

1554

See The Investigation Report of the Practice of the Saibain-In system, supra note 1167, at 13 and 41.
(According to this official report, before the Saiban-in system was implemented, 35.5% of Japanese society
agreed that the trial court would discover the truth of the fact. However, when the saiban-ins participated in
the trial proceedings, the percentage of people who felt this way decreased; there were 34.3% in 2009;
39.6% in 2010; 32.2% in 2011; 34.1% in 2012 and 31.3% in 2013.)
1555
Id., at 51.
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The obstacle reasons
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009
It is a heavy responsibility to decide other 75.5% 76.2% 73.9% 78.7% 76.1%
people’s fate.
It is an uneasy job to make a verdict 62.3% 61.6% 62.1% 63.4% 61%
accurately and justly.
It is doubtful to state an opposite opinion in 50.1% 50.8% 45.6% 52.6% 50.7%
front of professional judges.
The defendant’s retaliation would cause a 48.4% 47%
46%
49.3% 48.2%
threat.
It is uncertain to determine prudently.
47.9% 47.5% 46.9% 53.6% 49.7%
Figure 37:
Are you willing to participate in the criminal trial proceedings as a saiban-in?
As a result, it would be concluded that the Japanese citizens’ low inclinations to
participate in the criminal trial proceedings are because of their hesitation to determine a
case. This conclusion is in direct opposition to the claim made by those who support the
laymen’s authority to determine in Taiwan.

As for the Taiwanese society’s inclinations to participate in criminal trial
proceedings, the mental pressure is also an obstacle to the citizens when they have to
determine the case during a limited time with an abundance of information submitted by
both parties in the trial proceedings.1556 According to Taiwanese research, 20% of people
would decline to participate in trial proceedings. Among these people, only around 25%
claimed that they would decline because they do not have the same authority as the
professional judges.1557 However, nearly 40% of people stated that their refusals resulted

1556

See Su, A Brief Exploration of the Proposed Lay Observer System, supra note 1364, at 194.
Lin Junyi (林俊益), Wenjian Tachu Renmin Canyu Shenpan de Diyi Bu- Bentu Hua de Remin
Guanshen Zhi (穩健踏出人民參與審判的第一步 - 本土化的人民觀審制) [To Strengthen the First Step of
the Lay Participation- a Localized Lay Observer System], 55:5 XINGSHI FA ZAZHI [CRIMINAL LAW
JOURNAL] 41, 60 to 61 (2011).
1557
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from the fact that they are not legal professions, and many people also stated that their
discretion might not be objective enough to determine a case.1558

Therefore, to reduce the lay participants’ burden to determine a case during the
conviction phase when the citizens do not yet possess enough confidence to do so, the
design that dictates that the lay observers’ verdict is not binding to the court would
increase the Taiwanese society’s willingness to participate in trials and would, therefore,
increase the possibility of establishing the proposed lay observer system in Taiwan.

Since the function of the discovery of truth was not significantly improved by
Japanese saiban-in’s participation, emphasis should be placed lay participants’ ability to
better comprehend the trial proceedings.1559 With regard to whether Taiwanese society’s
“enthusiasm” about the lay participation system would be diminished because of the
consultative pattern, this concern should not take precedence over the requirement that a
procedural scheme should ensure a defendant a sufficient conviction decision.

As such, it would be more suitable for the Taiwanese proposed lay observer
system to design its conviction phase as a consultative pattern before the citizens have
adequate ability to determine a case by exercising the standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt in the guilt-innocence phase.1560

1558

Id. (The author stated that, “might not be objective to determine the case” was the second highest
reason given among the 20% of people who would decline to participate in the trial proceedings without
concrete data.)
1559
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 335.
1560
Id., at 343.
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B. The Risks of the “Two-Way Rubber Stamps” under the Conviction Phase
Issues regarding how the deliberation process might eliminate the risks of both the
professional judges and the lay observers inevitably “being a rubber stamp to each other”
during the conviction phase were also troublesome when the Taiwanese proposed lay
observer system was newly formed. In fact, regardless of whether lay participants have
the authority to determine the case with the professional judges or not, these issues also
gained the attention of both the Japanese Saiban-in system and the South Korean citizen
participation system.

(a). The Position of the Lay Observer under the Conviction Phase
Before discussing the proper schemes of the conviction phase in the Taiwanese
proposed lay observer system, it is necessary to decide the position of the lay observers in
the conviction phase. Since the consultative pattern would be more suitable in Taiwan,
the lay participation should be defined as a “supplement” to the court.

According to the practical experiences in Japan, saiban-ins have often been able to
discover the details of evidence that the professional judges might neglect.1561 As a result,
lay participants would apply their social experiences to the court and improve the court’s
judgment such that it was closer to the truths. In short, lay participation under the
conviction phase should be defined as a method for the court to replenish its innate lack
of societal values and experiences.

1561

See Sugita Munehisa, The Procedural Schemes and the Practice of the Japanese Saiban-in System,
supra note 1522, at 27.
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(b). Methods to Prevent the Lay Observers From Being A “Rubber Stamp” to the
Professional Judges
Since the lay observers’ decisions during the conviction phase are intended to
serve as consultation to the court, their positions should be as independent as possible so
that their opinions will represent the true values of society and will be free of interference.

According to Article Fifty-six of the proposed Act of the Taiwanese lay observer
system, the professional judges and the lay observers will discuss issues together just as it
done via the Japanese system, but they will determine decisions separately as is done via
South Korean system during the deliberation process.1562 The Japanese saiban-in system’s
conviction phase is designed to be a cooperative pattern because the saiban-ins have the
same authority to deliberate as the professional judges.1563 On the contrary, South Korea’s
system separates jurors from judges and the jury will determine the verdict through their
own discretion after hearing the professional judge’s instructions.1564

The consideration of these transitional procedures in Taiwan is the result of two
expected functions of the deliberation process. First, professional judges were supposed
to help lay observers by offering clarification that would allay any confusions; this would
be done by discussing both the factual and legal issues together.1565 In addition, it was
expected that the design of the separated determination stage would function as a
1562

THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 56; see also ACT ON
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 646, art. 46. (S. Kor.)
1563
ACT ON CRIMINAL TRIALS WITH PARTICIPATION OF SAIBAN-IN, supra note 591, art. 66, para. 1 (Japan)
states: “Deliberations for the decision with participation of the saiban-in
at the panel under Article 2, paragraph (1) shall be conducted by the Member Judges and the saiban-in.”
1564
ACT ON CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 646, art. 46 para. 2 (S. Kor.) states:
[J]urors taking part in a trial shall deliberate on whether guilty or not guilty after hearing the explanation
under paragraph (1), and may deliver a verdict if the jury reaches an unanimous verdict: Provided, That
the jury may hear opinions of judges who take part in the trial when a majority of jurors requests to do
so.
1565
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 57. (The explanation.)
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procedural gate to ensure that the lay observers would express their personal opinions
without hesitation or interference when professional judges are not present.1566

Although these unique design for the deliberation process in Taiwan obtained
positive support from the lay observers during the mock trials, 1567 the Japanese
experiences of its Saiban-in system indicated that the saiban-ins felt differently. Not only
were the Japanese saiban-ins not confident in expressing their opposite opinions when
engaging with the professional judges,1568 but the professional judges also put forth
significant effort in hopes of persuading the saiban-ins’ decisions.1569 Therefore, there
were still concerns that the Taiwanese lay observers would not be completely
“independent” during the deliberation process; there was still the possibility that
professional judges might try to influence the lay observers when discussing the factual
and legal issues before leaving lay observers to deliver their verdict.1570

Accordingly, the deliberation process in the conviction phase under the Taiwanese
proposed lay observer system should be modified to be more consistent with South
Korea’s pattern, which prevents the lay observers and the professional judges from
joining together in either the discussion or the determination process in order to ensure
the lay observers’ independent discretion regarding the accused’s conviction. This pattern
would prevent the professional judges from over-dominating the entire trial proceedings

1566

Id., art. 56. (The explanation.)
See Figures 29, 30 and 31.
1568
See The Investigation Report of the Practice of the Saibain-In system, supra note 1167, at 47.
1569
See Jiang, Without Adopting the Indictment-Only Doctrine, The Rest of the Reforms Will Fail, supra
note 1544, at 53.
1570
See You, An Analysis of the Unique Design under the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer System, supra
note 268, at 70 to 71.
1567
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in order to induce the lay observers’ verdict to comply with the court’s inclinations
toward the final determination.1571

However, this proposed procedural scheme might bring with it challenges. The
first one has to do with the lay observers’ inability to discuss the legal and factual issues
without the professional judges. Without any clarification, will these laymen be
sufficiently capable of delivering an “accurate” verdict in accordance with the standard of
beyond a reasonable doubt during the conviction phase?

The response to this concern suggests that, it is unnecessary that the lay observers’
verdict be “legally accurate” in the conviction phase. Since the lay observers are not legal
professionals, and their verdict regarding the accused’s conviction is defined as a
consultative opinion to the court, the verdict’s function is to serve as an expression of the
societal values. Therefore, lay observers’ societal experiences should be more crucial than
the verdict’s accuracy under this consultative pattern. In other words, societal values that
the lay observers bring to the court under the proposed lay observer system should not be
judged as they are not related to the nature of right or wrong in their verdict.

In any case, without discussing the legal and factual issues during the deliberation
process, the professional judges in Taiwan would have no opportunity as the Japanese
judges do to interfere with the lay observers’ discretion in order to persuade them into
following the court’s decision regarding the result of the accusation.1572 Under these

1571

Id., at 69.
See Jiang, Without Adopting the Indictment-Only Doctrine, The Rest of the Reforms Will Fail, supra
note 1544, at 53.
1572
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circumstances, the lay observers would practice their discretion regarding the accused’s
conviction more freely.

Furthermore, as for the lay participants’ ability to comprehend the trial
proceedings before delivering their verdict to the court, the Taiwanese proposed lay
observer system would introduce a procedural stage as “intermediary discussion” that
allows the professional judges to decide whether and when they need to instruct the lay
observers before the trial proceedings are closed.1573 Additionally, during the deliberation
process, the lay observers have the right to request that the professional judges explain
any factual and legal issues that are unclear.1574 Therefore, the lay observers would not be
completely “ignorant” before forming their determination about the defendant’s
conviction under the proposed system.

In short, even though the accuracy under the guilt-innocence phase is of
significant importance, it is not necessary that the Taiwanese proposed lay observer
system be established such that the lay observers would make their determination during
the conviction phase exactly as professional judges would do. After confirming the
procedures in the deliberation process regarding the decision of the conviction, the next
issue would be regarding whether the lay observers should strictly follow the judge’s
instructions. In other words, should the professional judges’ instructions or explanations
be binding to the lay observers?

According to Article Fifty-seven of the proposed Act of the Taiwanese lay
observer system, in order to ensure that the lay observers would not compromise their
1573
1574

THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 2, 47 and art. 50, para. 2.
Id., art. 57.
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opinions because of their lack of legal professions or trial experiences, when the
professional judges give their instructions regarding factual and legal issues to the lay
observers, either the judges’ personal or the bench’s opinion would be permissible.1575

However, it is difficult for the professional judges to explain issues regarding
discovery of the facts or legal application regarding the pending case without expressing
their personal opinions because of the different situations in each case.1576 Therefore, the
proposed lay observer system should not require lay observers to strictly follow the
professional judge’s instructions regarding the conviction in the deliberation process, in
order to prevent their thoughts from being influenced by the professional judges.

In addition, this consultative design would not bring about any issues related to
“jury nullification” under the Anglo-American’s jury system because lay observers in
Taiwan are not the final decision-makers regarding the accused’s conviction.

In sum, the deliberation process in the conviction phase under the Taiwanese
proposed lay observer system should maintain its consultative pattern because of the
consideration of the lay observers’ insufficient abilities. Furthermore, the lay observers’
discussion stage should be modified to be an entirely separate procedural stage from the
professional judges in order to prevent the judges’ influence on the lay observers’
determination. Moreover, to ensure the lay observers’ free discretion, the judges’
explanations regarding both factual and legal issues would also serve as a consultative

1575

Id. (The explanation).
See You, An Analysis of the Unique Design under the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer System, supra
note 268, at 70.
1576
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purpose such that the lay observers’ verdict would bring societal values to the court
without any compromise.

(c). Methods to Prevent the Professional Judges From Being A “ Rubber Stamp” to
the Lay Observers
According to the South Korean practical experiences regarding its citizen
participation system, it was discovered that although the jurors do not have the right to
determine the case, the professional judges might still compromise their opinions when
they have to explain why the court does not accept the jury’s verdict. 1577 This
compromise was referred to as “factual influence” under the South Korean citizen
participation system.1578

The proposed Act of the Taiwanese lay observer system also adopted this
statutory requirement.1579 In other words, the court is required to provide explanation as
to why it does not accept the lay observer’s verdict as part of the reasoning. Therefore,
when the trial court does not fulfill this statutory requirement when its judgment differs
from the lay observers’ verdict, a lack of reason would constitute a “judgment
automatically in contravention of the laws and regulations,” and this judgment could be
appealed to the higher court.1580

1577

ACT ON CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 646, art. 49 para. 2 (S. Kor.) states:
“If a judgment pronounced differs from the jury's verdict, the written judgment shall include reasons
therefor.”
1578
See THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S OBSERVATION REPORT OF SOUTH KOREA’S CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION SYSTEM (2012), supra note 1478, at 15 and 76.
1579
THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 64.
1580
See the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 56, art. 379, § 14 (2013) states: “A judgment shall
be on its face under the following circumstances:… 14. Where no reasons are specified in the judgment or
where ground of reasons specified are contradicting.”
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In sum, the same risk may exist in Taiwan that the professional judges might also
“surrender” their determination regarding the defendant’s conviction as the South Korean
judges do, so that they could eliminate their statutory obligation to explain their reasons
in the written judgment.1581

Accordingly, this statutory obligation with regard to the judge’s explanation in a
written judgment should be abolished in order to avoid this kind of “factual influence”
that would sacrifice the interests of the defendant during the conviction phase under the
Taiwanese proposed lay observer system. This abolishment does not result solely from
the particular requirement under the proposed system in Taiwan; in fact, there were other
legal concerns that also concluded that this statutory obligation should not be
implemented into Taiwanese proposed lay observer system.

First, under the general trial proceedings in the Taiwanese judicial system, it was
considered that the court should only pronounce one decision in a case.1582 It would be
prohibited even the professional judge voluntarily states his or her personal opinions as a
separated part of reasoning in a judgment. 1583 Second, although the lay observers
participate in the trial proceedings, it is still the litigants (or the victims and their families)
who should be the objects of the court’s judgment and to whom the court should respond.

1581

See Zhang, An Introduction of the Citizen Participation System of South Korea, supra note 625, at 16;
see also Jiang, A Lesson to Taiwan Based on the Citizen’s Viewpoints with regard to the Japanese Saibanin System and South Korea’s Citizen Participation System, supra note 1387, at 19.
1582
See COURT ORGANIC ACT, supra note 866, art. 106 (2011) (Taiwan) (This Article states that,
professional judges’ personal determinations would not be made available to the public until the judgment
is final.)
1583
Taiwan Yunlin Difang Fayuan Xingshi Panjue, 97 Niandu Zhu Su Zi No.1 (Apr. 29, 2011); see also
Xiang Chengzeng (項程鎮) and Lin Guoxian (林國賢), Panjue Fu Butong Yijian Shu, Faguan Jiang Bei
Cheng (判決附不同意見書，法官將被懲) [The Judges would be Punished if They Were Found to Write
Dissenting Opinions in the Written Judgment] ZI YOU SHI BAO [LIBERTY TIMES NET] (Taiwan) on June 7,
2011; available at http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/498578 (last visited on July 28, 2014).
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As a result, it would be “odd” to require the professional judges to communicate with the
lay observers regarding their different determination in the judgment.

This recommendation regarding “exempting” the professional judges from the
responsibility of “communicating with the society through its judgment” would bring
with it challenges. In South Korea, the jurors’ “factual influence” results from the
statutory obligation of the judges.1584 In other words, this statutory requirement on judges
to explain reasons forced them and both public prosecutor and defense counsels cannot
neglect the jury’s verdict. Therefore, the jurors’ participation would still be a substantial
part of the South Korean citizen participation system.

However, by “exempting” the professional judges from the responsibility of
“communicating with the society through its judgment,” the considerations then turned to
whether this factual influence result from lay participation would be vanished in Taiwan
and further cause the implementation of the proposed lay observer system meaningless. In
addition, without the court providing reasons as to why it does not accept the lay
observers’ verdict, the lay observers would not understand why the court denies their
determination.1585 Under these circumstances, how could the Taiwanese criminal justice
system regain the people’s trusts?

It is undeniable that these challenges might occur after the proposed lay observer
system is officially established into the Taiwanese criminal justice system. However, it
would only cause slight impact even though the lay observers do not have the right to

1584

See You, An Analysis of the Unique Design under the Proposed Act of the Lay Observer System, supra
note 268, at 63; see also Shin, The Citizen Participation System of South Korea, supra note 626, at 14.
1585
See the Shihlin District Court, the Results of the 2nd Conference, supra notes 1305.
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determine while the professional judges do not have to disclose their reasons for rejecting
the lay observers’ verdict.

In practice, no one can estimate how the court would evaluate the lay observers’
verdict until the judgment is announced. Accordingly, public prosecutors still have to
fulfill the burden of proof in order to establish the accusation, and the defendant and the
defense counsels also have to provide strong arguments in order to controvert the public
prosecutor’s statement. Therefore, the “factual influence” that ensures that both parties
cannot neglect the lay participation will exist until the court makes its final decision.

As for the professional judges, although they do not have to explain their reasons
in the written judgment, in order to show the court’s respect to both lay observers and
entire system, the proposed Act of the lay observer system still requires the professional
judges to explain the reasons to the lay observers in person after the deliberation process
closed.1586 In other words, the judges’ obligation to disclose their reasons for rejecting the
lay observers’ verdict has not been completely removed from the proposed system. The
Taiwanese judges would still need to acknowledge the lay observers’ verdict, and the
proposed Act grants them the opportunity to communicate with the lay observers via this
procedural design.

In short, the purposes of the waiver regarding the statutory obligation of the
professional judges should express their reasons in the written judgment are to reduce the
judges’ burdens under the proposed lay observer system, and to lessen the possibility that

1586

THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 59, para. 2.
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the judges might compromise their determination simply because they do not want to
spend more time on writing more opinions regarding their judgments.

C. Conclusion
When discussing a suitable scheme for the deliberation process in the Taiwanese
proposed lay observer system, many focused on the arguments that who, the professional
judges, the lay observers, or the cooperation of the judges and the lay observers, could
make a better decision in the conviction phase. However, even after referring to the
practical experiences associated with different patterns, these kinds of early evaluations
should not substantially apply to the proposed system in Taiwan. The results regarding
the lay participation’s impact on the judges’ explanation and their application of laws
could only be analyzed after the proposed system is implemented into the Taiwanese
criminal justice system.1587

Accordingly, before ensuring that the lay observers’ participation would not
infringe upon the defendants’ rights to litigate guaranteed by the Taiwanese Constitution,
a more suitable scheme for the deliberation process in the conviction phase is that: the lay
observer’s verdict should be considered consultative to the court in order to maintain
justice and stability within the Taiwanese criminal justice system.1588

(3). The Sentencing Phase

1587

See Zhang Yonghong (張永宏), Lun Renmin Guanshen Shixing Tiaoli Caoan Zhidu Sheji shang de
Jige Keti (論人民觀審試行條例草案制度設計上的幾個課題) [The Discussion regarding the Scheme of
the Proposed Lay Observer System], 59:2 JUNFA ZHUANKAN [THE MILITARY LAW JOURNAL] 17, 22 (2013).
1588
See THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S OBSERVATION REPORT OF THE SOUTH KOREA’S CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION SYSTEM (2012), supra note 1478, at 90 to 91.
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The current proposed Act of the Taiwanese lay observer system adopted the
procedures of South Korean citizen participation system.1589 During the sentencing stage,
before the professional judges make their decision solely, the judges would hold
discussion with the lay observers and lay observers will give their personal opinions to
the court. In short, under the penalty stage of the Taiwanese proposed lay observer system,
lay observers do not have to conclude their opinions regarding the sentencing to a verdict,
and their personal opinions would serve as consultations to the professional judges as
well as the verdict regarding the conviction.

However, although the sentencing discretion along with the process of law
declaration and legal application are all defined as legal issues under the Taiwanese
criminal justice system,1590 the law declaration and legal application in practical need
people who are legal professionals to determine, while sentencing discretion necessitates
the application of ethics.1591 Accordingly, due to the different natures of the conviction
and sentencing stages under the criminal justice system, the procedural scheme of the
sentencing stage should be more flexible to allow for both the opinions and knowledge of
legal professionals and the moral concerns of the people to be expressed.

A. The Procedure Scheme of the Sentencing Stage: whether granting lay observers
the right to deliberate

(a). The Principles Applied to the Sentencing Stage

1589

THE PROPOSED ACT OF THE LAY OBSERVER SYSTEM, supra note 999, art. 56.
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 333 to 335.
1591
See Sarah Breslow, Note: Pleading Guilty to Death, supra note 1496, at 1251.
1590
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Before framing a suitable sentencing phase under the proposed Taiwanese lay
observer system, what principles the court should adopt and how the court puts those
principles into practice as a standard before determining the accused’s sentencing should
be clarified.

In Japan, the accused’s liability dominated the court’s determination of sentencing
in the general criminal justice system before the Saiban-in system was established. The
Japanese judges considered the guilty party’s offense along with his or her liability so that
the court could decide the extent of probable penalty and deliberate the final sentencing
by determining all circumstances and the statutory sentencing factors.1592

After the Saiban-in system was established, the same principle was adopted as the
sentencing standard for both professional judges and saiban-ins to decide the guilty
party’s punishment.1593 In contrast, the South Korean criminal justice system tried to
develop a sentencing system in order to structure a more stable and just database for the
court to refer to during the penalty phase.1594

In Taiwan, there was less discussion focused on issues regarding what principle
the lay observer court should follow. After referring to both the Japanese and South
Korean experiences, and considering the Taiwanese Supreme Court’s judgments in 2011
and 2013, it is clear that the proposed lay observer system should adopt both the statutory
factors under Articles Fifty-seven and Fifty-eight of the Taiwanese criminal code and

1592

See Sugita Munehisa, The Procedural Schemes and the Practice of the Japanese Saiban-in System,
supra note 1522, at 25.
1593
Id.
1594
See THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S OBSERVATION REPORT OF SOUTH KOREA’S CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION SYSTEM (2011), supra note 1484, at 26.
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Article 288-1 of the Taiwanese criminal procedural code as sentencing principles and also
establish a sentencing system for the criminal justice system at the same time.1595

(b). A Comparative Study among Japan, South Korea and Taiwan
Japan and South Korea’s different sentencing standards also reflect the differences
regarding the structures of their sentencing stages and the differences between their
unique lay participation systems. The Japanese criminal justice system focuses on an
overall balancing test between the accused’s liability and the circumstances of the
conviction before determining the sentencing. Therefore, the Saiban-in system granted
lay participants the right to deliberate under the sentencing stage and maintained the
“special majority vote” at the same time in order to ensure that the court’s final decision
on sentencing would not one-sidedly emphasize either professional judges’ or saiban-ins’
opinions.1596

In practice, it was discovered that saiban-ins’ opinions usually focused on the
individual circumstances in a case, while professional judges paid more attention on the
legal factors, such as whether the accused accomplished the offense or whether the
accused’s intention was heinous, etc.1597 This separate but cooperative determination
pattern complies with the nature of the Saiban-in system, which is designed such that
professional judges and lay participants are expected to improve each other’s discretion.

1595

See the Supreme Court Judgment, supra note 1265.
ACT ON CRIMINAL TRIALS WITH PARTICIPATION OF SAIBAN-IN, supra note 591, art. 67 (Japan)
1597
See Sugita Munehisa, The Procedural Schemes and the Practice of the Japanese Saiban-in System,
supra note 1522, at 27.
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In the South Korean criminal justice system, the court’s discretion of sentencing is
expected to be predictable and stable so that the sentencing database is established for the
court to consider. Accordingly, its citizen participation system does not grant jurors the
right to deliberate under the sentencing stage as well as the conviction stage because of
the concerns that jurors might overly weigh the heinousness of the conviction and neglect
other legal factors, such as the accused’s intention, negligence or liability.1598

However, for the court’s reference regarding the societal values, each juror has the
opportunity to state his or her personal opinion when they discuss related issues with the
professional judges during the sentencing phase,1599 but the South Korean judges are still
the final decision-makers regarding the guilty party’s punishment under the citizen
participation system.1600

In practice, although the jurors’ opinions are not binding on the professional
judges’ discretion, the societal values they bring would still improve the reasonableness
of sentencing in the long run because jurors pay more attention to the individual
circumstances in a case.1601 In addition, the professional judges also have great respect
for the jurors’ opinions, and this is demonstrated in that more than 90% of the court’s
final decisions regarding the guilty party’s punishment comply with the jurors’

1598

See THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S OBSERVATION REPORT OF SOUTH KOREA’S CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION SYSTEM (2012), supra note 1478, at 95 to 96.
1599
ACT ON CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 646, art. 46 para. 4 (S. Kor.) states:
“ If a verdict delivered pursuant to paragraph (2) or (3) is guilty, jurors shall discuss sentencing with judges
who take part in the trial and shall express their opinions. The presiding judge shall explain the extent of
punishment and conditions of sentencing before discussing sentencing.”
1600
See Zhang, An Introduction of the Citizen Participation System of South Korea, supra note 625, at 14
to 15.
1601
See THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S OBSERVATION REPORT OF SOUTH KOREA’S CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION SYSTEM (2012), supra note 1478, at 20 and 29.
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suggestions. 1602 In 92.6% of inconsistencies, the differences between sentencing
suggestions and judges’ sentencing is less than a year of imprisonment, and usually the
gap between professional judges’ and jurors’ decisions would be no more than two
years.1603

Case amount
Percentage

Jurors’ opinion >
Court’s decision
5
1.8%

Jurors’ opinion
≒ Court’s decisions

Jurors’ opinion <
Court’s decision
12
4.4%

256
93.8%
Figure 38:
The jurors’ opinions and the court’s final decision about sentencing (2008 to 2010)1604
The sentencing standards under the Taiwanese criminal justice system contains

both legal and factual factors that the court should consider during the deliberation
process because the criminal code regulated that “sentencing shall be based on the
liability of the offender (the legal factors) and take into account all of the circumstances
(the factual factors).”1605 The code further listed specific factors that the court must pay
attention to before imposing any penalty on the accused.

Therefore, the scheme of the South Korea’s sentencing stage might not be a
sufficient design for the Taiwanese proposed lay observer system to adopt because the
statutory factors requires both the knowledge of legal professionals and social
experiences in order to ensure a proper sentencing. Although South Korea’s practical
experiences revealed that the jurors’ opinions and the court’s decisions were almost the
same, it is unknown whether the Taiwanese proposed lay observer system would have
similar outcomes, especially when most of Taiwanese people were more concerned with

1602

See id., at 46; see also Lee, South Korea’s Citizen Participation System, supra note 1199, at 23.
See THE TAIWANESE JUDICIAL YUAN’S OBSERVATION REPORT OF SOUTH KOREA’S CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION SYSTEM (2012), supra note 1478, at 46.
1604
See Lee, South Korea’s Citizen Participation System, supra note 1199, at 23.
1605
See CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 17, art. 57 (2013) (Taiwan).
1603
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sentencing issues because their judicial system obviously disregarded societal
expectations during the deliberation process.1606

In addition, although lay participants might pay close attention to the heinousness
of an accused’s conviction during the sentencing stage, professional judges might also
depart from social experiences because they care whether the results of their legal
applications are accurate. As a result, only when both professional judges and lay
observers discuss and determine the accused’s sentencing together during the sentencing
stage would the court’s determination be prevented from being one-side.

Accordingly, societal experiences should be valued, especially during the
sentencing stage in Taiwan, so that the court’s discretion as it is applied to the accused’s
punishment could further comply with both the accused’s liability and the societal
feelings regarding the justness of the judicial process. In sum, the Taiwanese proposed lay
observer system should grant the lay observers the right to deliberate and establish its
sentencing system for the lay observer court to refer to during the sentencing phase.

(c). Challenges?
There are two issues that would need to be resolved before granting the Taiwanese
lay observers the right to deliberate during the sentencing phase. The first issue has to do
with the historical factors that caused the judicial system to decline lay participation
during the sentencing phase.

1606

See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 334.
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Under the early Anglo-American jury system in the 13th century, a jury could not
participate in the sentencing phase because discretion in this procedural stage was defined
as an exclusive authority to the court (judge).1607 The main reasons were:1608 (1). A jury’s
discretion on sentencing might be prejudice or unjust because it only considered of one
case without considering the impacts to the entire criminal justice system. (2). Allowing a
jury to determine sentencing would inevitably present the risk that the jury might
determine the accused’s conviction by considering the sentencing information. (3). A
jury’s discretion usually focused on the purposes of retribution rather than other factors,
such as prevention or rectification. (4). Sentencing is highly flexible with regard to
discretion; therefore, it would be time-consuming to obtain a unanimous vote.

These historical concerns might not occur under the Taiwanese proposed lay
observer system in this era. First, a sentencing database could improve sentencing results
and make them more stable and just, even if lay observers only participate in one case.
Second, the Taiwanese lay observers’ verdict regarding conviction is not binding on the
court; therefore, the risk that the court’s determination of conviction would be tainted by
sentencing information is low because of judges’ legal professionalism and trial
experiences. Third, the Japanese practical experiences have overturned the prejudiced
impressions that lay participants do not take factors other than retribution into account
when they make decisions during the sentencing stage.1609 And, finally, the Taiwanese
proposed lay observer system could adopt the Japanese special majority vote under the
sentencing stage in order to obtain a decision that complies with both legal and societal
values.
1607

Id., at 296.
Id., at 296 to 297.
1609
See Sugita Munehisa, The Procedural Schemes and the Practice of the Japanese Saiban-in System,
supra note 1522, at 27.
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After resolving the historical issues regarding whether lay participants should
have the right to deliberate during the sentencing stage, a contemporary issue regarding
whether “residual doubt” can be introduced to the penalty phase becomes the next
challenge to the Taiwanese proposed lay observer system.

This issue occurs when the lay observers delivered a not-guilty verdict to the court
but the professional judges still convicted the accused based on the charged of the public
prosecutor. Under this circumstance, it is probable that the lay observers will weigh the
mitigating factors over the aggravating factors during the sentencing stage because it is
the most direct and efficient method to reduce the arbitrariness on the accused’s penalty
by the judges.

However, this assumption raised a controversial issue among capital trials in the
U.S. jury system because neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor most of the states defined
residual doubt as a statutory mitigating factor.

The meaning of “residual doubt” was defined by Justice O’Connor in her
concurring opinion in Franklin;1610 that is, “a lingering uncertainty about facts, a state of
mind that exists somewhere between beyond a reasonable doubt and absolute certainty.”
When discussing whether the sentencing jury could consider this lingering doubt as a
mitigation factor in a capital trial, the Court concluded that neither the Eighth
Amendment nor the Due Process Clause guaranteed the defendant in a capital trial the
right to state residual doubt as an argument in the penalty phase. To the U.S. Supreme

1610

Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 188 (1988).
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Court, this uncertainty regarding the conviction did not fall within the scope of the
statutory mitigating factors1611 because the mandated mitigating factors should be related
to the defendant’s character, records, or any other circumstance of the event (offense).1612

In addition, in McCluskey, the court stated that allowing the jury’s discretion on
residual doubt during the sentencing phase would create a “two-stage guilt determination”
in a capital trial and thus the standard of the prosecutors’ burden of proof in the guilty
phase would be increased from beyond a reasonable doubt to absolute certainty.1613
However, the sentencing phase should be a procedural stage for the jury to consider
“how,” rather than “whether,” the defendant committed the crime with which he or she
was charged.1614 Accordingly, although the Supreme Court did not directly strike residual
doubt out of the penalty phase, this lingering concern was denied by most of the states in
the U.S jury system.

In contrast, to those states that had supported residual doubt as a permissible
mitigation factor in the penalty phase, the jury’s discretion regarding whether the
defendant’s guilt was an absolute certainty could “correct an err in the determination of
guilt.”1615 In addition, there was an alternative method used to introduce residual doubt to

1611

United States v. McCluskey, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187880, 18 and 22-23 (D.N.M. June 26, 2013);
see also Jennifer R. Treadway, NOTE: “Residual Doubt” in Capital Sentencing: No Doubt It is an
Appropriate Mitigating Factor, 43 CASE W. RES. 215, 221 and 225 (1992). (The author pointed out that
even some states adopted residual doubt as a mitigating factor, this lingering doubt still would not “fall
within the scope of mitigating factors which must be considered under the Eighth Amendment.”)
1612
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 174 (1988); see also Edding v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110
(1982) and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
1613
United States v. McCluskey, supra note 1611, at 24.
1614
Oregen v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 526 (2006).
1615
United States v. Davis, 132 F. Supp. 2d 455, 467 (2001); see also McCluskey, supra note 1611, at 24
to 25.
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the capital trial, and this was to define it as a non-statutory mitigating factor so that a
defendant would state it as a mitigating argument in the penalty phase.1616

However, in practice, the professional judges usually refused to instruct the jury
with regard to residual doubt in the sentencing phase. Therefore, the consideration of
residual doubt in the penalty stage was practiced conservatively in the U.S. capital trials.

(d). Analysis
According to the debate under the U.S. criminal justice system regarding whether
residual doubt could be a mitigating factor in the penalty phase, the main considerations
could be categorized into three categories: logic, relevancy and operative influence.1617

I. Logic: Regarding logic, one issue having to do with whether residual doubt
would change the standard in the conviction phase from “beyond a reasonable doubt” to
“absolute certainty” should be discussed because it might cause inconsistencies regarding
a defendant’s conviction between the conviction and the sentencing phases.

However, this situation would not occur under the proposed Taiwanese lay
observer system because lay observers are not the decision-makers in the conviction
phase. Therefore, even though the lay observers may have doubts regarding a defendant’s
conviction, which might influence them regarding the accused’s punishment in the
penalty phase, it is not the situation that the U.S. Supreme Court worried and tried to

1616
1617

See Jennifer R. Treadway, “Residual Doubt” in Capital Sentencing, supra note 1611, at 223 and 224.
Id., at 228.
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avoid because the defendant’s conviction is confirmed by the professional judges under
the proposed lay observer system.

II. Relevancy: Should residual doubt be a part of the statutory mitigation factors,
which include the defendant’s character, record, or circumstances of the crime? In the
United States of America, people who support residual doubt as a statutory mitigating
factor have stated that this kind of lingering doubt in a capital trial has improved capital
sentencing1618 and has provided a higher degree of reliability as required by Lockett.1619
In order to fulfill this high-reliability requirement, the Court in Lockett further indicated
that “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense” should be constitutionally relevant as a mitigating factor.1620

As a result, although residual doubt is not a traditional mitigating factor mandated
by U.S. constitutional law, it is hard to insist that the issue regarding whether the guilty
defendant is the true perpetrator is completely irrelevant to the circumstances of the
offense.1621 In addition, the statutory factors that the Taiwanese court should consider
regarding the circumstances of the offense were regulated by laws that includes the
defendant’s motive and purpose of the offense, the stimulation that the defendant
encountered at the moment of committing the crime, and the means that the defendant
took. Accordingly, when the lay observers participate in the Taiwanese criminal justice
system, they should also consider these factors because of the relevancy of the offense.

1618

Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, ARTICLE: A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and the
Progression Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 631, 671 (2004); see also id., at
231.
1619
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
1620
See Jennifer R. Treadway, “Residual Doubt” in Capital Sentencing, supra note 1611, at 230.
1621
Id., at 231.
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III. Operative influence: U.S. research has proved that, residual doubt, although
not admitted by the U.S. Supreme Court as a statutory mitigation factor, is considered by
the jury during the penalty phase even though the court does not instruct them in this
regard prior to deliberation.1622 Accordingly, residual doubt should no longer be defined
as the jury’s “whimsical” thoughts because it could be “genuine, based on the evidence,
and not the imagination of jurors.”1623

In sum, although the U.S. criminal justice system was unwilling to completely
adopt residual doubt into capital trials, issues that concerned by the U.S. system might not
negatively influence the Taiwanese proposed lay observer system or criminal justice
system because of the different schemes during the deliberation process and the different
requirements with regard to the statutory sentencing factors.

B. The Procedure Scheme of the Sentencing Stage: the Standard of the Deliberation
Vote
After confirming that the Taiwanese proposed lay observer system should grant
lay observers the right to deliberate during the sentencing phase, the next step is to
structure a suitable standard regarding how both professional judges and lay observers
make their final decisions by vote.

(a). The Japanese Saiban-in System

1622

Id., at 232.
Michael Mello, ARTICLE: Outlaw Executive: “Crazy Joe,” The Hypnotized Witness, and the Mirage
of Clemency in Florida, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 1, 43 (1997).
1623
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The Japanese Saiban-in system created a “special majority vote” pattern during
the deliberation process for professional judges and saiban-ins to deliver their verdict.
According to Article Sixty-seven of the Japanese Act on Criminal Trials with
Participation of Saiban-in,1624 the verdict would be returned by a majority vote of the
saiban-in court. The reason that the Japanese Saiban-in system retained the standard of
majority vote was that the collegial panel in general criminal trial proceedings adopted
this standard to form the final decision and there is no other consideration to change the
standard after the saiban-in participate in trials.1625

However, there was one particular requirement to the saiban-in system; that is, at
least one professional judge should join the majority, otherwise the verdict is not legal.1626
When the Japanese criminal justice system established its lay participation system, there
was one concern regarding how to maintain the professional judge’s significant position
in the courtroom after saiban-ins participate in trials.

Although the Japanese Supreme Court had confirmed that1627 the Constitution did
not exclude the possibility that people other than professional judges could practice
judicial power, this concern might be still suspiciously close to a constitutional level
issue.1628 Therefore, the Japanese criminal justice system ultimately assigned the “special

1624

ACT ON CRIMINAL TRIALS WITH PARTICIPATION OF SAIBAN-IN, supra note 591, art. 67, para. 1 (Japan):
[T]he decision with participation of the saiban-in at the deliberations under paragraph (1) of the
preceding Article shall be rendered by the majority of opinions of the number of persons
constituting the panel including the opinions of both the Member Judges and the saiban-in
notwithstanding the provisions of Article 77 of the Court Act.
1625
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 346.
1626
ACT ON CRIMINAL TRIALS WITH PARTICIPATION OF SAIBAN-IN, supra note 591, art. 67, para. 1 (Japan).
1627
See the Japanese Supreme Court’s Judgment, supra note 796.
1628
See Sugita Munehisa, The Procedural Schemes and the Practice of the Japanese Saiban-in System,
supra note 1522, at 32.
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majority vote” to its Saiban-in system in order to ensure that the professional judges
would still play a crucial role in the Japanese criminal justice system.1629

(b). The Taiwanese Proposed Lay Observer System
The current general criminal justice system in Taiwan also adopted the majority
standard during the deliberation process.1630 After referring to the Japanese Saiban-in
system, the proposed lay observer system should also adopt the “special majority vote”
into the deliberation process under the sentencing phase. By establishing this cooperative
pattern under the sentencing phase, it could further realize two functions to the proposed
lay observer system. First, the special majority vote would avoid the similar constitutional
issue to be also encountered by the proposed system when it grants the lay observers right
to deliberate but still requires at least one professional judge’s approval. Second, it would
further reduce the lay observers’ mental pressure to determine other’s sentencing when
only capital and felony crimes are eligible to be tried by the proposed system in Taiwan.

(c). Challenges?
In practice, the design of the special majority vote encountered some challenges in
Japan. Some questioned that opinions in the penalty stage are more likely to be split than
the decision in the conviction phase; therefore, after the saiban-ins participate in the
penalty phase, the court’s final decision regarding the defendant’s sentencing will be
closer to a substantial majority vote,1631 which is two-thirds of professional judges and

1629

Id.; see also Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial
Procedure, supra note 6, at 342 and 347.
1630
See COURT ORGANIC ACT, supra note 866, art. 105 (2011) (Taiwan).
1631
ACT ON CRIMINAL TRIALS WITH PARTICIPATION OF SAIBAN-IN, supra note 591, art. 67, para. 2 (Japan):
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saiban-ins when the Saiban-in system requires that at least one professional judge join the
majority.1632

Under this probable condition, whether the Japanese professional judges’
significant position in the courtroom would be influenced by the modification of an
increased deliberation standard is doubtful because the similar issues regarding raising the
beyond a reasonable doubt (the standard that the conviction phase applies) to absolute
certainty (the probable standard in the penalty phase) was also suspicious in the U.S.
capital trials.

This worry is unnecessary to the Taiwanese proposed lay observer system. Unlike
the Japanese Saiban-in system, the professional judges are the only decision-makers
during the conviction stage so that they even play a more significant role than the
Japanese judges do after the lay observers participate in the criminal justice system.
Moreover, even though the lay observers have different determinations from the
professional judges regarding the sentencing issues, the introducing of the special
majority vote to the proposed lay observer system, in fact, further guarantees the
professional judges’ position in the sentencing phase because at least one professional
judge should join the lay observers.

In addition, this probable situation that the lay participation raises the standard of
deliberation in the penalty phase could ensure the guilty party a more just and impartial
[I]n cases where opinions are split on the sentencing and none of them obtains the majority of opinions
of the number of persons constituting the panel including opinions of both the Member
Judges and the saiban-in respectively, the decision of the panel shall be rendered by the most
favorable opinion to the accused, which number is obtained by adding the number of the most
unfavorable opinions to the accused to the number of favorable opinions one by one.
1632
See Zhang, A Study of the Proposed Civil Participation System in Taiwan’s Criminal Trial Procedure,
supra note 6, at 348.
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sentencing from the judges’ arbitrariness especially when the lay observers do not agree
with the court’s guilty-verdict. It is extremely significant when the proposed lay observer
system only applies to felony and capital trials in Taiwan. When the lay observer court’s
determination regarding sentencing is formed by more professional judges’ and lay
observers’ approval, there will be a greater guarantee of reasonable punishment, which
will likely improve and rebuild society’s trust in the Taiwanese criminal justice system.

The other concern regarding the design of a special majority vote was that, by
referring to the Japanese Saiban-in system’s practical experiences, it brings a worry that
the sentencing in Taiwan might become more severe after the lay observers participate in
trials. This assumption is correct but imperfect because the sentencing results under the
Japanese Saiban-in system did not become severe only in one way. To be more precise,
the sentencing results under the Japanese Saiban-in system were split such that some
sentence became more severe while some in fact became clement.1633

For example, when the defendant committed crimes related to sexual assault or
negligently caused the victim’s death, saiban-ins intended to sentence the accused in
accordance with the prosecutor’s charge or in accordance with even more severe charges
that had not been made.1634 However, saiban-ins also pronounced more probation than
professional judges did because of the concerns they had regarding the accused’s
potential for rehabilitation.1635 As such, it is hard to conclude that sentencing in Taiwan
would definitely result in more severe sentences.

1633

See Sugita Munehisa, The Procedural Schemes and the Practice of the Japanese Saiban-in System,
supra note 1522, at 32.
1634
Id.
1635
Id., at 32 and 27. (The author pointed out that the percentage of probation under the general trial
proceedings in Japan was 13%. After the saiban-ins participated in the criminal trial proceedings, the
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Although some defendants were imposed severe punishment under specific crimes
in Japan, the Saiban-in court’s results regarding the sentencing should be described as an
appearance of the societal values, rather over-interpreted as arbitrariness. In addition, by
creating a Taiwanese sentencing database, the lay observer court could further refer to
and stabilize the court’s decision regarding the sentencing. In short, neither the concern of
raising the conviction standard during the sentencing phase nor the worries about severe
sentencing results would cause the Taiwanese lay observer system to not grant its lay
observer the right to deliberate during the sentencing phase.

(4). Conclusion
After referring to both the Japanese Saiban-in system and South Korean citizen
participation system, it has been determined that the most suitable scheme for the
deliberation process under the Taiwanese proposed lay observer system is a distinct
procedural stage for conviction and sentencing. Before ensuring that prospective lay
observers in Taiwan have sufficient ability to determine the validity of the public
prosecutor’s accusation, the lay observer’s verdict should be retained as a consultative
opinion to the court.

In contrast, the nature of the sentencing phase requires ethics as much as legal
professionalism before the court makes its decision regarding the accused’s penalty.
Therefore, the lay observers should have the right to deliberate with professional judges
to ensure that the sentencing results under the proposed system will be more reasonable

percentage slightly increased to 15.6%. This is more obvious when probation is pronounced with a
protective measure for the accused. This increased from 35% in general to 55.7% in the Saiban-in system.)
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and just. By structuring the distinct procedural stage of the deliberation process under the
proposed lay observer system in Taiwan, not only would the conviction phase retain its
accuracy, but the sentencing phase would also improve by way of the cooperative
relationship between professional judges and lay observers.

As a result, the criticisms1636 regarding the waste of judicial resources when lay
observers under the proposed system do not have the right to deliberate would be
diminished.

1636

See You, The Citizens’ Participation in the Trial Proceedings, supra note 269, at 273; see also Lin
Yushun (林裕順), Renmin zhi Guanshen? Ying Congtou Canyu Daowei (人民只觀審？應從頭參與到尾)
[Only Allowed to Observe the Trials? The Laymen Should Participate Throughout the Trial Proceedings],
85 SIFA GAIGE ZAZHI [JUDICIAL REFORM MAGAZINE] 28 (2011).

303

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
The Taiwanese Judicial Yuan’s proposal in 2011 regarding the implementation of
the lay observer system surprised not only Taiwanese society, but it also came as a
challenge to legal professionals. This was in large measure thanks to the fact that there
had already been four failed attempts made by the Taiwanese judicial system to establish
a similar lay participation system. However, this proposal is different from those that
came before it in that it is to serve as an answer to the judicial scandals and controversial
cases of 2010, which gained the attention of the Taiwanese people who urged the
government to find an efficient measure to improve its criminal justice system.

Although there has been strong societal support for the lay observer system as a
means of judicial reform, the Judicial Yuan disappointed the people with its conservative
design for the proposed system. After assessing the Japanese Saiban-in system and South
Korean citizen participation system, the Judicial Yuan has proposed that the Taiwanese
lay observer system be practiced as a consultative scheme, which is seen as cautious since
it grants the people with less power than they might have under a different design. The
Judicial Yuan’s concerns, and the reasons as to why it has set up the system in this way,
are the result of previous constitutional suspicions. The consultative design is the Judicial
Yuan’s attempt to counter or mitigate any suspicions regarding the constitutional issues.

However, before completely eliminating those constitutional issues, not only the
structure of the proposed system has to be constrained, but also the Administrative and
Legislative institutions hesitate about determining and further approving the
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implementation to the Taiwanese criminal justice system. Accordingly, the best and most
efficient way to avoid a fifth failure in Taiwan is to explore the origins of lay
participation under both jury and lay participation systems and to analyze the beginnings
of innovative patterns in this age.

By knowing and understanding the historical origins and contemporary
developments of the existing lay participation trial patterns that are employed in the
United Kingdom, the United States of America, Germany, France, Japan and South Korea,
the Taiwanese judicial system will be in a better position to resolve doubts regarding the
constitutionality of its proposed lay observer system in all aspects. Only after these
prerequisite issues regarding the establishment of the proposed lay observer system are
resolved would the Judicial Yuan have more flexibility in framing the needed lay
participation trial pattern in accordance with the Taiwanese criminal justice system.

Among the options of the jury system, the traditional lay participation system and
the innovative mixed trial patterns, the Judicial Yuan’s final decisions regarding the
issues of “judicial democratization and judicial professionalization” and “the quality of
the judgment (verdict) and the protections of the defendants’ litigation rights” would
directly influence the outcomes as they pertain to the ability of the proposed system.
These outcomes will also decide whether the Taiwanese judicial system can restore the
credibility of professional judges and to regain the people’s trust with regard to fairness
of the court.

Although it seems that the innovative mixed trial pattern, which is employed via
the Japanese Saiban-in system and the South Korean citizen participation system, would
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be a better starting point for both professional judges and lay observers to practice their
authority under the Taiwanese criminal justice system, it is still necessary to determine
how the current intermediate design will influence trial proceedings in Taiwan when, per
the proposed Act of the lay observer system, only felony and capital cases are eligible to
apply for lay participation trials.

When the Taiwanese Administrative Yuan decided to approve the Judicial Yuan’s
proposal regarding the implementation of the lay observer system, the Legislative Yuan
took a different position. The Legislators required the Judicial Yuan to hold mock trials
and to try different trial patterns before they further determine the proposed Act.

When framing the structure of the proposed lay observer system, the procedural
stages, including the preliminary trial proceedings, the trial proceedings and the
deliberation process underwent controversial debates because these three stages directly
or indirectly influence the authority between the professional judges and the lay observers.
After referring to both the Japanese Saiban-in system and the South Korean citizen
participation system’s practical results, it is concluded that the citizens’ ability to
comprehend the trial proceedings and to objectively determine the case at hands plays a
crucial role in society’s reactions regarding the effects of lay participation.

Accordingly, to look at the proposed Act of the lay observer system as a basis for
improving the proposed system, the preliminary trial proceeding should be processed
more efficiently by professional judges through the adoption of the modified indictmentonly doctrine and the fulfillment of an evidentiary ruling stage. In addition, the trial
proceedings should be divided into conviction and sentencing stages so that the
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sentencing phase can be individualized. Moreover, with regard to the deliberation process,
the lay observers’ right to deliberate should be granted in accordance with the different
purposes of these two stages. That is, the lay observers’ verdict regarding the conviction
would be a consultative opinion to the court, and their determinations regarding the
sentencing would become the court’s final decision only when at least one professional
judge joins the majority vote.

Two years have passed since the proposed Act was sent to the Taiwanese
Legislative Yuan for deliberation, and the Legislators are still undecided as to whether or
not to enact the act under the Taiwanese criminal justice system. Meanwhile, in 2014, to
provide more practical resources for the Legislators’ considerations, the Taiwanese
Judicial Yuan not only extended the mock trials to Keelung and Kaohsiung Districts
Courts,1637 but it also modified the trial pattern via different schemes such as introducing
the “shadow jury” and separating the trial into two stages.1638

It is good to see that the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan has an open view regarding the
reform measure it has proposed to the criminal justice system. However, there are still
many fundamental matters that should be examined and considered carefully before the
Legislative Yuan can approve and fully implement the measure.

1637

See the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan, Kuoda Shiban Renmin Canyu Shenpan- Sifa Yuan Jueyi Xinzeng
Jilong, Gaoxiong Diyuan Shiban Guanshen Moni Fating (擴大試辦人民參與審判-司法院決議新增基隆、
高雄地院試辦觀審模擬法庭) [Extend the Lay Participation- Judicial Yuan Decided to Add Keelung and
Kaohsiung District Courts to Hold Mock Trials] 1698 SIFA ZHOUKAN 1, 1 (Mar. 6, 2014).
1638
Id., see also the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan, Tuidong Renmin Canyu Shenpan Zhidu- Jiayi Diyuan Moni
Guanshen Changshi Chengxu Eryuan Shenli (推動人民參與審判制度-嘉義地院模擬觀審嘗試程序二元
審理) [Promoting the Lay Participation System- Chiayi District Court Tried to Implement Two-Stage Trial
Proceedings] 1695 SIFA ZHOUKAN 1, 1 (May 9, 2014).
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For example, although severe crimes are more likely to gain the attention of the
people, it is unclear as to whether the proposed system should begin with these cases
(especially the capital crimes) when the citizens’ ability to fully practice their
determination objectively is uncertain. In addition, considerable research has concluded
that the selection process (voir dire) also plays a crucial role regarding the court’s final
decision. Moreover, there have been only a few discussions regarding how the appeal
system would respond to the lay observer court’s decisions. Furthermore, there is also the
matter regarding whether defendants would be granted the right to choose (or the right to
decline) to be tried by lay observers when it is the first time that the Taiwanese citizens
participating in the general criminal trial proceedings.

In summary, there still needs to be more discussion regarding the Taiwanese
proposed lay observer system, before it ultimately becomes the judicial reform measure to
improve the Taiwanese criminal justice system.
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